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If behavior is influenced by the perceived character of situations, many disciplines that study behavior
may eventually need to take into account individual differences in the perceived character of the world. In
the first effort to empirically map these perceptions, subjects varied on 26 dimensions, called primal
world beliefs or primals, such as the belief that the world is abundant. This dissertation leverages the first
comprehensive measure of primals to further discussions in political, developmental, clinical, and positive
psychology. Chapter I challenges the consensus that political conservativism is distinguished by the
belief that the world is dangerous. Results suggest previous research relied on a measure highlighting
dangers conservatives fear and neglecting dangers liberals fear, when both perceive the world as almost
equally dangerous (8 samples; total N=3,734). A novel account of political ideology is proposed based on
more predictive primals. Chapter II discusses how primals might develop. The author distinguishes
retrospective theories—where primals reflect the content of past experiences—from interpretive
theories—where primals act as lenses for interpreting experiences while remaining uninfluenced by
them—and suggests twelve ways each theory’s relative merit can be empirically tested. A novel
comprehensive framework for considering experiences in relation to any new construct is also proposed.
Chapter III explores primals’ wellbeing-related correlates. By showing that many parents aim to teach
negative primals to their children, some prevalence for meta-beliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs)
associating negative primals with positive outcomes is established. Study 2 tests these meta-beliefs in
six samples (total N=4,535) in regards to eight outcomes: job success, job satisfaction, emotion,
depression, suicide, physical health, life satisfaction, and flourishing. Results indicate that negative
primals are almost always associated with modestly to dramatically worse outcomes, across and within
professions. In addition to filling a literature gap, and establishing bases for future comparison studies,
findings could be used to strengthen interventions by undermining counterproductive meta-beliefs.
Findings also underscore the urgent need for further research on the impact of primal world
beliefs—teaching children or anyone that the world is a bad place in order to protect or prepare them may
be ill-advised.
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ABSTRACT

LEVERAGING THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF PRIMAL WORLD BELIEFS TO
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN POLITICAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Jeremy D. W. Clifton
Martin E. P. Seligman
If behavior is influenced by the perceived character of situations, many disciplines that study
behavior may eventually need to take into account individual differences in the perceived
character of the world. In the first effort to empirically map these perceptions, subjects varied on
26 dimensions, called primal world beliefs or primals, such as the belief that the world is
abundant. This dissertation leverages the first comprehensive measure of primals to further
discussions in political, developmental, clinical, and positive psychology. Chapter I challenges the
consensus that political conservativism is distinguished by the belief that the world is dangerous.
Results suggest previous research relied on a measure highlighting dangers conservatives fear
and neglecting dangers liberals fear, when both perceive the world as almost equally dangerous
(8 samples; total N=3,734). A novel account of political ideology is proposed based on more
predictive primals. Chapter II discusses how primals might develop. The author distinguishes
retrospective theories—where primals reflect the content of past experiences—from interpretive
theories—where primals act as lenses for interpreting experiences while remaining uninfluenced
by them—and suggests twelve ways each theory’s relative merit can be empirically tested. A
novel comprehensive framework for considering experiences in relation to any new construct is
also proposed. Chapter III explores primals’ wellbeing-related correlates. By showing that many
parents aim to teach negative primals to their children, some prevalence for meta-beliefs (i.e.,
beliefs about beliefs) associating negative primals with positive outcomes is established. Study 2
tests these meta-beliefs in six samples (total N=4,535) in regards to eight outcomes: job success,
job satisfaction, emotion, depression, suicide, physical health, life satisfaction, and flourishing.
Results indicate that negative primals are almost always associated with modestly to dramatically
vi

worse outcomes, across and within professions. In addition to filling a literature gap, and
establishing bases for future comparison studies, findings could be used to strengthen
interventions by undermining counterproductive meta-beliefs. Findings also underscore the
urgent need for further research on the impact of primal world beliefs—teaching children or
anyone that the world is a bad place in order to protect or prepare them may be ill-advised.
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PREFACE
Growing up, I hated science. It seemed like nothing but dull worksheets with predetermined answers. Only in grad school did I first experience its thrill, which is discovery. I may
never get to sail un-sailed seas, but I can dig through data with statistical tools to unearth
answers to fascinating questions nobody has answered before, and not just answers that other
people care about, but ones that I care about, deeply. Six years ago, for example, I had no idea
that the most basic beliefs individuals hold about reality fall along three dimensions of Safe,
Enticing, and Alive; I had no idea these beliefs were so stable; and I had no idea political
conservatives don’t actually see the world as especially dangerous (low Safe scores). Also, who
would have thought that finding one’s own intuitions to be demonstrably false was so much fun? I
think it says something positive about the state of humanity that so many of us have dedicated
ourselves to indulging in discovery—luckily a pro-social addiction—and society has chosen to
support our lifestyle.
While I hope this dissertation qualifies my acceptance into the community of discovery
addicts, this community may by its nature find this dissertation a tad unsatisfying. I spent most of
my graduate career learning the skills of psychometric validation and developing the Primals
Inventory. The plan of a measurement-focused dissertation changed when I realized that, simply
by being the most comprehensive measure of its kind, the Primals Inventory could be leveraged
to quickly address some obviously important ongoing empirical discussions about relevant
beliefs. Yet low-hanging empirical fruit is not necessarily the most delicious. Given primal world
beliefs’ broad theoretical implications, the most delicious question is, can causation be
established experimentally? While much in this dissertation seeks to inform how experimentation
might be pursued, readers may feel like I’m sidestepping the big question to ask smaller ones—
because I am. Nevertheless, I invite readers to enjoy these discoveries anyway, if only as mere
prologue to more important discoveries in the future. I suppose the same might be said of all
empirical science.
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Each of these three chapters represent more or less stand-alone research articles. Preregistered hypotheses in this dissertation can be found on the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/gw79e/?view_only=de0b61485c4748979414e51df0af5b5d). For readers unfamiliar
with primals, useful nonessential background reading is Clifton and colleagues (2019) paper
introducing primal world beliefs. A less time consuming option is glancing at Figure 1 in the
appendix, which introduces the reader to all 26 primals, the main characters of this three-chapter
story. Chapter 1 examines how primals might influence politics, pushing back against the
accepted idea that conservatives see the world as dangerous. Chapter 2 discusses where
primals might come from, focusing on the relevance (irrelevance rather) of experiences. Chapter
3 explores which primals might contribute to wellbeing and success; it turns out that many
parents aim to teach their children that the world is in various ways a bad place, which may not
be the best idea. Overall, this dissertation aims to contribute to important ongoing discussions in
political, developmental, clinical, and positive psychology while demonstrating the value of the
primals framework along the way.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE PRIMAL WORLD BELIEFS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Abstract
Cooperation requires agreement and compromise, which can be frustrated by deeper,
unrecognized disagreements. Humans disagree on at least 26 primal world beliefs (“primals”)
which are extremely basic beliefs about the world’s typical character. One primal, the belief that
the world is dangerous, correlates with and is widely thought to contribute to political
conservativism. However, this literature has relied on a measure which overemphasizes dangers
conservatives fear and underemphasizes dangers liberals fear (replicated here, N=611). After
administering a nuanced measure to eight samples (total N=3,734), the belief the world is
dangerous shared surprisingly little variance with political ideology (<1%), placing it among those
primals least correlated with political ideology. Six primals explained considerably more variance:
Hierarchical (15%), Intentional (11.5%), Acceptable (9.2%), Worth Exploring (6.9%), Just (5%),
and Progressing (2.6%). Together, their prominence suggests an alternative account in which
conservatives see an inherently hierarchical, fair, cosmically sanctioned order to the universe that
is being eroded, suggesting wisdom in constraining change and tolerating inequality; while
liberals see an inherently nonhierarchical, unfair world that is improving, suggesting wisdom in
accelerating change and resisting inequality. This account has implications for contemporary
political messaging, historical analysis, and the future of human cooperation.

1

Introduction
The Proposition in Question
Humans possess a remarkable capacity to cooperate in large groups. Many cooperative
efforts fail, however, due to a common fault-line separating those who typically favor change
("liberals”) and those who typically oppose it (“conservatives”). Psychologists have sought to
explain how this fault-line arises and perpetuates itself, proposing various contributing factors,
such as values, demographics, Big Five traits, prejudices, cognitive ability, and genetics (Carney
et al., 2008; Crawford et al., 2017; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Pratto et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011;
Stankov, 2009). Laham and Corless (2016) observe that a family of proposed factors indicate
conservatism is associated with fear. This family includes terror management theory, death
anxiety, threat sensitivity, disgust emotions, fear of uncertainty, identity threat, and—the current
interest—belief in a dangerous world (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Inbar et al., 2009; Jost et al.,
2003; Weise et al., 2008; Weissflog et al., 2013).
A great deal of research supports or evokes the following proposition: that a general
belief that the world is a dangerous place (a) distinguishes political conservatism in crosssectional research and probably (b) drives conservatism or related constructs such as
authoritarianism, attitudes about guns, and so forth (Allport, 1954; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996;
Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Conway et al., 2020; Cook et al., 2018; Crowson, 2009; Dallago et al.,
2012; DeLuca et al., 2018; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt &
Sibley, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Hibbing et al., 2014; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, 2006; Jost et
al., 2003; Lavine et al., 1999; Leone et al., 2019; Mcfarland, 2005; Oosterhoff, 2015; Park &
Isherwood, 2011; Peterson et al., 1993; Scherer et al., 2015; Shook et al., 2017; Stroebe et al.,
2017; Van Hiel et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Weber & Federico, 2007; White et al.,
2020). This proposition makes intuitive sense (though perhaps less so among conservatives, e.g.,
Gilson, 2018). Many conservative views seem readily explained by fear, including keeping guns
for protection, keeping criminals locked away, keeping immigrants out, keeping the military
strong, keeping police unencumbered, and keeping the existing order strong. The intuition is also
2

popular among the general public, popping up in news media (e.g., Ball’s, 2016, Atlantic article
Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear) and social media, such as in this anonymized 2019 tweet:
Conservatives are driven by fear. It rules their lives. Listen to language they use about
immigrants, POC [people of color], new ideas, or any religion that isn’t theirs (itself a
system of fear control). They need guns for “protection” and crave authoritarians, even
wannabes like Trump.
This tweet describes a centuries-old connection between fear and authoritarianism first
articulated by the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, and it continues to animate research on
right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and other political constructs. Hobbes
(1651) argued that however cruel a leviathan a King might become, citizens must submit to the
monarch to stop societal descent into a worse state of nature (i.e., anarchy) where life is nasty,
brutish, and short—perhaps the most famous line in political philosophy. Duckitt’s (Duckitt et al.,
2002) well-known dual process model formalizes this connection saying, “high RWA [right-wing
authoritarianism] expresses the motivational goal of social control and security, activated by a
view of the world as dangerous and threatening.” One should submit to authority, in other words,
because the world is a dangerous place.
Driving the proposition coupling dangerous world belief and political conservatism is also
large and accumulating empirical literature, including many complementary experimental and
observational studies in the broader family of fear-related constructs (e.g., Cook et al., 2018; Jost
et al., 2004; Landau et al., 2004; Willer, 2004). For example, Cohen and colleagues (2005) found
that mortality reminders increased support for conservative politician George W. Bush. Oxley and
colleagues (2008) famously tied conservatism to physiology, including skin conductivity (though
this recently failed to replicate; Bakker et al., 2020).
More pertinent to the proposition in question, however, is research measuring belief in a
dangerous world directly. Sharing Hobbes’ intuition, Altemeyer (1988) developed a belief in a
dangerous world scale to examine the roots of political ideology, particularly right-wing
authoritarianism. After examining how permutations of Altemeyer’s items performed in 46
3

samples in the USA, New Zealand, Canada, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and South Africa (N =
12,939), Perry, Sibley, and Duckitt (2013) offered an improved 10-item Belief in a Dangerous
World (BDW) scale. Nearly all political psychology research examining belief in a dangerous
world operationalizes this primal using a variant of this scale. This literature repeatedly shows that
BDW scale scores correlate positively with increased conservatism and conservative tendencies
(Shook et al., 2017; Stroebe et al., 2017; many others cited above). Correspondence with BDW
scale scores has even become a criterion for validating conservativism measures (Choma &
Hanoch, 2017; Crowson, 2009; White et al., 2020). While Duckitt and others (e.g., Federico,
Hunt, and Ergun 2009) often interpret the BDW scale as a measure of the social world and
theorize on that narrower basis, many do not. Leeuwen and Park (2009, p. 169) aptly summarize
the cross-sectional research saying, “If you are someone especially concerned about dangers,
you are probably politically more conservative.” On this foundation, researchers have theorized
about the roots of political ideology.
This investigation reports data suggesting conservatives and liberals see the world as
more or less equally dangerous; researchers were misled because the BDW scale highlights
dangers conservatives fear while neglecting dangers liberals fear; and other world beliefs offer a
more promising foundation to theorize about political ideology. These suggestions require
contextualizing dangerous world belief as a member of a larger category of world beliefs.
A Larger Category of World Beliefs
The most studied world belief to date is belief in a just world (often called BJW). Belief in
a just world is the idea that the world is a karmic place where individuals get what they deserve
and deserve what they get. It too was birthed out of a desire to explain a particular dependent
variable, in this case blame and racism (Lerner, 1965, 1980; Montada & Lerner, 1998; Nesbit et
al., 2012). However, whereas belief in a dangerous world remains mainly a creature of political
research, belief in a just world was eventually connected to dozens of personality and wellbeing
variables (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Clifton et al., 2019). To summarize, those high in
belief in a just world are (a) more hard-working and kind (presumably because the world rewards
4

hard work and kindness); (b) enjoy more success and wellbeing (presumably because they
worked harder and were nicer); and (c) blame victims such as the poor and the sick (presumably
because the unfortunate deserved it).
Other world beliefs may engender this sort of cascading influence across personality and
wellbeing variables, which should occur for precisely the same reason why world beliefs have
been historically overlooked in the literature: the world is a uniquely encompassing place, such
that researchers have been slow to conceptualize “the world” as a place at all. As previously
argued (e.g., Clifton & Kim, 2020), understanding the behavior of any given creature requires that
scientists observe the creature’s behavior in multiple environments. Scientists who observe a
creature in one environment only, such as a chimpanzee in a room, are handicapped observers,
unable to distinguish context-specific behaviors (i.e., state-like reactions to particular
environments, or at least the creature’s beliefs/perceptions of that environment) from organismspecific behaviors (i.e., trait-like expression of that creature’s peculiar temperament). But what if a
creature has beliefs about the character of an environment that, for whatever reason, the creature
never leaves? If so, such beliefs would theoretically drive patterns of action that would manifest
as organism-specific traits while actually being driven by context-specific reactions to underlying
perceptions. Furthermore, if said environment became populated by other creatures who also
never left, but viewed the character of said environment differently, all such creatures would
occupy the position of said handicapped observer, being unable to distinguish context-specific
from organism-specific behaviors. Moreover, if creatures were ignorant of their disagreement
about the place they cohabit—which is probable if beliefs are multiple and implicit—all such
creatures would likely misattribute numerous individual differences to differences in traits, thereby
committing the fundamental attribution error on a massive scale.
If this situation applies to humans, substantial variance in most major human behaviors
and outcomes that psychologists study—neuroticism, agreeableness, optimism, curiosity,
extraversion, gratitude, depression, subjective wellbeing, life satisfaction, meaning in life,
attachment style, trust, and political attitudes, to name but a few—could be powerfully shaped by
5

the cascading effects of beliefs about the most psychologically salient characteristics of the one
place humans never leave. Yet few world beliefs have been studied. Because no effort has been
made to empirically derive all major world beliefs and how they differentiate themselves
statistically, previously identified world beliefs may overlap or be inaccurately labeled, and world
beliefs that remain unidentified may be underlying causes of much-studied outcome variables,
including political ideology.
To address this gap, Clifton and colleagues (2019) conducted the first systematic effort to
empirically map all major beliefs about the basic character of the world as a whole. They labeled
the latent phenomena primal world beliefs or primals to distinguish simple, adjectival, goalrelevant beliefs (e.g., the world is a dangerous place) from metaphysical, incidental, or historical
world beliefs (e.g., the world is composed of 118 chemical elements). The effort was pursued with
no particular dependent variable in mind or strong priors regarding dimensionality. It began with
ten exploratory projects to identify candidate world beliefs. For example, they analyzed over
80,000 tweets beginning with phrases like “the world is”; the 840 most-frequently-used adjectives
derived from 190,000 texts (450 million words); data from 12 focus groups representing
Americans, Chinese, and all major world religions; and over 1,700 instances of world description
gleaned from 385 of history’s most influential sacred texts, philosophical treatises, novels, political
speeches, and films. This led to the identification of 234 items representing candidate primals that
were then subjected to three rounds of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.
Subjects disagreed about the world on 26 normally-distributed meaningful and reliable
dimensions (Figure 1 in supplement). Two had been previously studied: beliefs in a just and
dangerous world. Typically, ~55% of item variability was explained by just three primals—formally
called secondary primals but informally the ‘big three’—consisting of beliefs that the world is Safe
(vs. dangerous), Enticing (vs. dull), and Alive (vs. mechanistic). These three primals
intercorrelate, comprising the three main dimensions of an overarching belief that the world is
Good (vs. bad), the general factor, also called the primary primal. Despite adopting a positive
labeling convention; ‘big three’ Safe is conceptually identical to the common (but not universal)
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interpretation of the BDW scale. Top-loading items on Safe include On the whole, the world is a
dangerous place and Real danger is everywhere, even if we don’t notice it. ‘Big three’ primals are
also themselves multi-dimensional, each breaking out statistically into several lesser primals,
called tertiary primals. ‘Big three’ Safe involves seven of these tertiary primals, as follows: Just—
which is conceptually and empirically identical to Belief in a Just World—as well as the beliefs
that the world is Stable (vs. fragile), Pleasurable (vs. miserable), Harmless (vs. threatening),
Progressing (vs. declining), Cooperative (vs. competitive), and Regenerative (vs. degenerative).
The Primals Inventory measures all 26 primals (1 primary, 3 secondary, and 22 tertiary)
and is currently the most accurate and comprehensive measure of primal world beliefs (for a
review, see Clifton in press-b). It is partly best by default and also because it was developed
using several techniques to prioritize content validity often at the expense of reliability, ensuring
dimensionality would emerge only if latent phenomena actually existed. In one study, many highperforming items were removed to test if subscales relied on signal from the underlying
phenomenon rather than variance defined by bloated specifics (i.e., redundancy-generated
artifacts). In all studies, item order was randomized differently for each participant. Nevertheless,
even though most scales involved only four items at least one of which is opposite-scored,
subscales were reliable, factor structures were stable, and further replication and invariance
testing is forthcoming (Bartholomaeus & Clifton, 2020). Three test-retest studies across 2-weeks,
9 months and 19 months indicated that, outside IQ, primals are among the most stable individual
difference variables psychologists measure. Primals were orthogonal to most demographic
variables yet strongly correlated with many personality and well-being variables in a pattern
consistent with the possibility that a major source of human behavior has been overlooked. Clifton
and colleagues’ (2019) specify eight areas for further research. One is politics.
Primals’ Connection to Politics
Proponents of the proposition coupling conservatism with dangerous world belief have
good reason to suspect that political behavior is a promising domain to observe primals’ impact.
Politics, more than many human endeavors, admit alternative interpretations of facts and even
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the most informed voter must generate opinions on topics where few facts are known. If primals
function as schemas that inform the interpretation of ambiguity (Janoff-Bulman, 1989), individuals
should rely on primals to form many political opinions. For example, consistent with the
proposition in question, increased spending on the military may seem more prudent the higher
one’s base rate for national security threats. In this way, a primal shapes policy and political
ideology—at least theoretically. But which primals shape politics?
A first step towards answering this question is to examine which primals correlate with
political ideology. The literature predicts that ‘big three’ Safe (vs. dangerous) should strongly
correlate with political conservatism. But pre-registered hypothesis for the current investigation
holds that Safe will be virtually orthogonal to political ideology. This was because two of the very
first studies to use the Primals Inventory suggested (a) incongruence in correlation matrices; (b) a
BDW scale validity issue; (c) orthogonality with conservatism; and (d) strong correlations between
political ideology and other primals.
Incongruence in Correlation Matrices
Outside politics, conservatives do not seem to behave like people who see the world as
dangerous ought to behave. Fifteen sensible correlates of seeing the world as dangerous include
less agreeableness, less curiosity, less optimism, less gratefulness, less trust, and more
neuroticism (personality variables); more negative emotion, more depression, and more anxiety
(clinical variables); and less life satisfaction, less positive emotion, worse relationships, less
meaning in life, less accomplishment, and lower overall wellbeing (positive psychology variables).
These outcomes flow naturally from the perception that that the individual is in a place—like a
warzone or snake pit—where ambiguity probably hides dire and numerous threats. Moreover, in
an initial study of 524 Americans using an early version of the Primals Inventory, correlations
between Safe and all fifteen of these variables were quite large and significant, ranging from r=.43 (agreeableness) to r=.61 (optimism), with replication forthcoming (Clifton et al., 2019; Clifton,
2020b). Yet few of these fifteen variables distinguish conservativism, and those that do usually do
so in the wrong direction (Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 2006). For example, conservatism has been
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repeatedly associated with less neuroticism, less depression, more optimism, and more life
satisfaction (Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012). This incongruousness has puzzled
researchers (Dallago et al., 2012; Van Hiel et al., 2007). Jost and colleagues (2003, p. 362)
wonder, “To the extent that conservatives are more generally fearful than others, one might
expect that they would also exhibit higher levels of neuroticism, but this does not generally seem
to be the case.” One explanation might be Laham and Corless’ (2016) suggestion that
conservatives may not be more fearful than liberals, but fear different threats.
Scale Validity Issue
Though a valuable social attitude measure, the BDW scale may suffer from what
psychometricians since Brigham (1930) call the naming fallacy in which items measuring a
narrow phenomenon are given a broad scale label (Laham & Corless, 2016). Dangers come in
many forms, including natural disasters, predators, war, disease, car accidents, fires, falls,
pollution, and poisoning. BDW scale items mention none of these dangers.1 The focus is instead
the intentional actions of strangers primarily in the form of crime and six of ten items concern
societal and moral decline. This is too narrow. Assuming belief in societal decline is sufficiently
close to belief in world decline (i.e., low scores on the Primals Inventory Progressing subscale),
Progressing is just one of seven components of ‘big three’ Safe. This implies some BDW scale
items may be double-barreled and, more importantly, BDW scale scores may target Progressing
and neglect other components, such as Just and Stable, which a small validity study confirmed
but requires replication (N=122; BDW and Progressing: r=-.72; BDW and Just r=-.34; Clifton et al.
2019).
Safe’s Orthogonality With Conservatism

1

In fairness, the Primals Inventory mentions none of these dangers either (see Table 1 of
supplement for side-by-side comparison). Because Lipkus (1991) demonstrated that measures of
world beliefs can opt out this level of granularity entirely, Primals Inventory items concern broad
qualities, such as danger, fragility, decline, and so forth. But if the measurement strategy involves
pooling items about particular dangers, a variety of dangers must be examined.
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The BDW scale’s selective representation of dangers only becomes a serious problem
for political ideology research unless examined political ideologies happen to score (a) oppositely
on those dimensions and (b) equally on overall dangerous world belief. In the same initial study of
524 Americans, this too was found to be the case. Conservatism was negatively related to
Progressing, positively related to Just, and almost perfectly orthogonal to the general belief that
the world is Safe (r=-.03, p<.05; Clifton et al. 2019). This is highly inconsistent with previous
research and also requires replication.
More Predictive Primals
If belief in a dangerous world is not related to political conservatism, might other primals
be more relevant? In early studies, most primals were as uncorrelated to conservatism as Safe.
Yet conservatism was positively related to Intentional, Just, Alive, Acceptable, and Hierarchical,
and negatively to Worth Exploring, Progressing, Interconnected, and Cooperative. By a
considerable margin, the belief that the world is Hierarchical was most related.
The Belief that the World is Hierarchical
Hierarchical is not the belief that hierarchies are common or commonly emerge—on that
most people would agree—but that hierarchy is inherent and natural to all things such that
everything can be meaningfully ranked by differences in real value. In other words, much like how
belief in a dangerous world concerns the prevalence of threat, Hierarchical concerns the
prevalence of differences that matter. An example top-loading forward-scored item states
Humans, animals, plants, and pretty much everything else can be organized by how important or
good they are. This perspective is epitomized by the medieval philosophy of The Great Chain of
Being depicted by Fray Diego de Valades (1579; Figure 2 in supplement) which organizes all
entities along a superior-inferior dimension, including angels, humans, birds, fish, animals, and
plants. Those who hold the world as nonhierarchical, in contrast, see most differences as surfacelevel, artificial, and typically meaningless. An opposite-scored item reads, Most things aren’t
better or worse. It’s hard to organize the world into hierarchies, rankings, or pecking orders that
reflect true differences.
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Hierarchical has unusual psychometric properties. Whereas most candidate primals
emerged across exploratory analyses of tweets, focus groups, and so forth, Hierarchical emerged
almost exclusively from historical texts. Whereas most candidate primals involved obvious
correlates (e.g., Good and optimism), Hierarchical was identified with no political implications in
mind. Whereas most tertiary primals correlate strongly with Good, Safe, Enticing, or Alive,
Hierarchical is among the few that stand apart. Finally, whereas most primals are highly
predictive of many variables, Hierarchical appears to be a poor predictor of most everything
besides political ideology. Orthogonality with demographic variables like income suggests that
Hierarchical scores do not reflect motivated reasoning to justify personal status. Orthogonality
with social desirability suggests that scores likely do not reflect sensitivity to appearing prejudiced
(perhaps stronger among liberals). Orthogonality with most personality, clinical, and wellbeing
variables (e.g., neuroticism and depression) makes Hierarchical a better fit for driving
conservatism than dangerous world belief because no strong theoretical reason connects
Hierarchical to these other variables. There would be no incongruence in the correlation matrix.
A relationship between Hierarchical and conservatism complements existing political
ideology research, including work on right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation,
and moral foundations. Birthed out of a desire to explain the rise of fascism in the early 20th
Century (Adorno et al., 1950), the definition of right-wing authoritarianism has evolved over the
decades. Today it is generally understood as an affinity for established authorities within the
group and an aversion to out-groups (e.g., Whitley Jr., 1999). Relatedly, social dominance
orientation concerns the preference that groups be organized along a superior-inferior dimension
with one’s own group at the top (Pratto et al., 1994). Haidt and Joseph (2007, p. 382) suggested
that five moral foundations (i.e., values) may shape political ideology.
1. Care/harm – Protect and care for young, vulnerable, or injured kin
2. Fairness/cheating – Reap benefits of dyadic cooperation with non-kin
3. Loyalty/betrayal – Reap benefits of group cooperation
4. Authority/subversion – Negotiate hierarchy, defer selectively
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5. Sanctity/degradation – Avoid microbes and parasites
Loyalty, authority, and sanctity tend to distinguish conservatives, with right-wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation distinguishing conservatives even more so (Graham et al.,
2009). The belief that the world is Hierarchical is conceptually related yet distinct from these
constructs because Hierarchical (a) does not involve a preference for what should be (i.e., is not
a value) and (b) concerns the world generally, not merely human inter-group or intra-group
relations. Similarly to how the belief that intelligence is improvable has been shown to be a
loosely-related instantiation of the broader belief that the world is Improvable, right-wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation may be human group-specific instantiations of
Hierarchical (Clifton et al. 2019).
If, in addition to Hierarchical, conservatives see the world as more Just, then perhaps
what is higher in the hierarchy and lower in the hierarchy is thought to deserve its station. Other
politically-relevant primals might further shape how reality is interpreted. In this way, a primalscentric account of political ideology was emerging based on Hierarchical rather than dangerous
world belief. However, the relative value of seemingly important but less predictive primals
remained unclear.
To summarize, it is widely accepted that political conservatism correlates with and is
increased by the belief that the world is dangerous. But preliminary results using a more nuanced
measure suggested otherwise; that previous findings were misleading due to a scale validity
issue; and that other primal world beliefs are more promising than belief in a dangerous world.
Therefore, hypotheses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework, summarized as
follows:
•

Safe (along with most primals) would continue to poorly predict political ideology.

•

Hierarchical (and a few others) would be far superior predictors.

•

The BDW scale would continue to over-represent ways conservatives see the world
as dangerous and under-represent ways liberals see the world as dangerous.

These hypotheses are examined in the following two studies.
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Study 1: Which Primals Explain Variance in Political Ideology?
Study 1 examines eight samples to more firmly establish which primals relate to political
ideology and which do not.
Samples
Sample 1: AH.Org.
AuthenticHappiness.Org is a website where the public can voluntarily participate in
wellbeing research. Of 1,067 completed surveys from November, 2015 to April, 2019, 61 were
excluded for failing attention checks and 233 for identifying as non-political, leaving 773 (Mage=44
years, SDage=15). They were 81% female, 75% white, and 66% college graduates.
Sample 2 and 3: YM.Org Americans and non-Americans
YourMorals.Org is a website where the public can voluntarily participate in political
research. Of 2,331 complete surveys from November, 2018 to August, 2019, 429 were removed
for failing attention checks and remaining split into two samples: 1,422 Americans and 480 nonAmericans (this split was not pre-registered because the author did not realize many subjects
would be non-American). Americans (Mage=36 years, SDage=14) were 65% male, 75% in or had
completed college, 378 Republican/Republican leaning, and 736 Democrat/Democrat leaning.
Non-Americans (Mage=33 years, SDage=13) were 60% male; 72% in or had completed college;
65% from the U.K., Australia, or Canada; with 61 countries represented. Additional subjects were
excluded from various analyses below due to missing data, as specified. Terms “conservative”
and “liberal” were explained when appropriate because they can have different meanings in nonAmerican contexts.
Sample 4: Immigrants
American immigrants from India (n=47), West Africa (n=45), and South Korea (n=53)
were recruited Spring 2019 via (a) flyers around the University of Pennsylvania; (b)
undergraduate social media networks; and (c) immigrant student groups in the Philadelphia area.
Subjects received $5 Amazon gift cards. Initial analysis indicated Primals Inventory scales were
highly unreliable among Indians, suggesting need for cultural adaptation of the instrument, and
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were removed before further analysis, leaving 98 subjects. All were non-white, 71% 2nd
generation immigrants (primarily college age), 72% female, and 19 self-identified conservatives.
Sample 5: Philly Pros
Of 120 Philadelphia-area lawyers, car salespersons, and police officers recruited from
January 2018 to March 2019, 10 were excluded for failing attention checks and 20 for identifying
as non-political, leaving 80 (Mage=48 years, SDage=12). These were 80% white, 73% male, 40%
Republican/Republican leaning and 60% Democrat/Democrat leaning.
Sample 6: Undergraduates
Of 497 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates participating for course credit in
Spring 2018, 24 were removed for failing attention checks and 152 for identifying as non-political,
leaving 321 (Mage=20 years, SDage=1). They were 50% white, 60% Freshmen/Sophomores, and
76% female, with 57 Republican/Republican leaning and 264 Democrat/Democrat leaning.
Sample 7: 2019 mTurkers
Of 705 subjects recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk in December 2019, 94 were
removed for duplicative IP addresses or failing attention checks, leaving 611 (Mage=37 years,
SDage=12 years). They were 51% male, 71% white, and 82% college graduates.
Sample 8: 2015 mTurkers
All samples above were administered during the Trump administration. To examine more
diversity across time, this study includes the earliest sample in which Primals Inventory items
were ever administered. Of 930 mTurk subjects recruited October 2015 (Study 1 in Clifton et al.,
2019), 175 were excluded for identifying as non-political, leaving 755 (Mage=37 years, SDage=12).
They were 57% female, 81% white, and 54% college graduates.
Measures
The Primals Inventory involves 99 items, with 39 reverse-scored. It measures the 26
primal world beliefs identified in Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) effort to map major primals
humans hold. Table 2 in supplement displays descriptive statistics. Preregistered hypotheses
highlight the 29-item Safe subscale (16 items are reverse-scored) and 5-item Hierarchical
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subscale (1 reverse-scored). In six samples, political ideology was measured using minor variants
of a typical single item measure—Which of the following best describes your political
orientation?—with six or seven response options from Very Liberal to Very Conservative. In
Sample 5 and 6, party affiliation was used as a proxy for political ideology.
Analysis
Except for sample 8, hypotheses were identified on the Open Science framework before
data was analyzed. To determine which primals correspond to political ideology, the percentage
of variance (r2) in political ideology explained by each primal was examined. Because political
ideology was ordinal and skewed in some samples, r2 was computed using Kendall’s τ b (a
nonparametric test) and converted using instructions from Walker (2003) and Strahan (1982). PI99 data was ipsatized consistent with previous research. Sample-weighted mean % variance
explained in Figure 1 does not include the two samples using party as a proxy for political
ideology (6 sample total: N=3,333), though the impact of this exclusion was examined, as well as
the role of YourMorals.org samples where Hierarchical explained higher variance.
Results
As Figure 1 shows, Safe explained .9% of the variance in political ideology across
samples (95% CI: [.3%, 1.5%]) while Hierarchical explained 15% (95% CI [7.0%, 23.0%]). This
puts Safe in the middle of a group of 15 primals explaining between 0% to 1.5% of variance in
political ideology, all with narrow confidence intervals, which were labeled the primals of virtual
agreement across the political spectrum. In Sample 5, 6, and 7, the correlation between Safe and
conservatism was positive, indicating subjects who were more conservative saw the world as
safer than their liberal counterparts. The next five primals were labeled the primals of mild
disagreement, ranging from 2% to 3.5% of variance explained, followed by five primals of
moderate disagreement, ranging from Just (5%) to Intentional (11.5%). Worth Exploring at 6.9%
was negatively related. At 15%, Hierarchical was labeled the primal of marked disagreement
between political ideologies. When the two samples using party affiliation as a proxy for political
ideology were included in the mean (N=3,734), variance explained decreased on average 0.2%
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across primals, with Hierarchical and Safe falling to 13.8% and .4%, respectively. The relative
ranking of most primals was also not dependent on the two samples recruited from
YourMorals.org where Hierarchical explained especially high variance: 28.4% and 31.5%,
respectively. When excluding these samples, Hierarchical remained the most predictive while
dropping considerably from 15% to 8.1% and Safe was impacted marginally, dropping from .9%
to .8% variance explained. Table 3 in supplement provides sample-specific results.
Figure 1
% of Variance Explained in Political Ideology by Each Primal With 95% Confidence Intervals
Hierarchical (+)
Intentional (+)
Acceptable (+)
Alive (secondary)(+)
Worth Exploring (-)
Just (+)
Interconnected (-)
Needs Me (+)
Progressing (-)
Cooperative (-)
Harmless (-)
Beautiful (-)
Interactive (+)
Changing (-)
Meaningful (+)
Funny (-)
Safe (secondary)(-)
Enticing (secondary)(-)
Regenerative (-)
Interesting (-)
Pleasurable (-)
Improvable (-)
Good (primary)(-)
Stable (+)
Abundant (+)
Understandable (+)
0%

15.0%

0.9%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

22%

Note. (-) indicates negative relationships with conservatism. Because two of eight samples were
excluded from weighted average for using party as a proxy for political ideology, total N=3,333.
Discussion
Study 1 replicated in eight samples more diverse and together seven times larger
(N=3,734) than that used previously.
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Did Safe remain a poor predictor of political ideology?
Increased conservatism was repeatedly associated with little difference in the belief that
the world is dangerous. In the only sample where Safe explained more than 2% of the variance in
political ideology (9.1% in Sample 5: Philadelphia-area professionals), the relationship was
positive, indicating it was Democrats who saw the world as dangerous. This one sample is also
not responsible for Safe’s low mean variance explained (.9%) since Sample 5 was excluded from
how the mean was calculated for relying on party information as a proxy for political ideology.
Such results are surprising for being inconsistent with previous research coupling conservatism
and belief in a dangerous world.
Do conservatives and liberals see the world differently?
The majority of primals were labeled primals of virtual agreement across the political
spectrum. These include the beliefs the world is Abundant, Stable, Interesting, Changing,
Understandable, Safe, Pleasurable, Regenerative, Enticing, Interactive, Meaningful, Beautiful,
Funny, Improvable, and generally Good. Such near orthogonality conflicts with not just the
dangerous world proposition, but various other theories of political ideology. This includes Ball’s
(2016) suggestions that conservatives tend to see the world as a bad place and constantly
changing (which should be reflected by lower Good and Changing scores ); and Duckitt’s (e.g.,
Duckitt et al., 2002) suggestion that conservatives see the world marked by instability (which
should be reflected by lower Stable scores). When it comes to primals, liberal and conservative
subjects saw the world similarly in most respects.
Did Hierarchical remain the best predictor of political ideology?
Hierarchical explained 15% of the variance in political ideology, much more than any
other primal and sixteen times more than Safe. Still, heterogeneity was considerable. Despite a
future expected range between 7% and 23%, in one sample (Sample 5), τ was nonsignificant,
suggesting that even Hierarchical will not always be relevant. Furthermore, covariance was
especially high because of Sample 2 and 3, where it explained ~30%. This may be because
YourMorals.Org subjects are more politically-minded than those recruited from
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AuthenticHappiness.Org and because the YourMorals.org political ideology measure included not
only the 7-point very liberal to very conservative response options, but three ‘opt-out’ type
response options (Libertarian, other, and Don’t know/not political) where other samples had one
option. This may have excluded more subjects lacking definite opinions, resulting in less error.
Regardless, if one assumes that these samples were outliers and removes them from analysis,
Hierarchical remains the primal most associated with political ideology and Safe remains a poor
predictor.
What primals seem to offer the best bases for theorizing about political ideology?
Hierarchical was followed by five primals each explaining at least five times more
variance in political ideology than Safe. Among these, Alive is discounted because higher
correlations with Intentional (one of three tertiary primals associated with Alive) indicates that the
secondary level is not the appropriate level of granularity to consider (see advice from Clifton, in
press-b). Moreover, because Intentional (the 2nd most predictive primal) could be partly an artifact
of increased religiosity among conservatives and Acceptable (the 3rd most predictive) may involve
some construct overlap with conservatism, Hierarchical’s prominence is remarkable, further
justifying its status as the sole primal of marked disagreement across the political spectrum.
The next group of primals, the primals of mild disagreement, include Interconnected,
Needs Me, Progressing, Cooperative, and Harmless. Based on variance explained, these primals
may not be central to political ideology while still providing insight into how hierarchy is
sometimes perceived. For example, in a recent Primals Inventory translation effort, Stahlmann
and colleagues (2020) found evidence of a novel secondary primal in a German sample (N=592).
Labeled Communal, this belief combines many of the same tertiary primals that predict political
ideology in Study 1—providing some cross-cultural validation—but with greater emphasis on
Cooperative such that the hierarchy is seen as itself resulting from a process of ruthless struggle.
The finding least consistent with pre-registered hypotheses concerned Progressing which
explained only 2.6% of the variance in political ideology. Nevertheless, the author proposes that
Progressing be incorporated into a primals-centric account of political ideology until further
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research across time periods confirms its unimportance. Seven of the eight samples were
collected during a time of prosperity for humans generally (during the economic boom just prior to
the Covid-19 pandemic) but a terrible period for liberals specifically, in Trump’s America and the
rest of the English-speaking world (e.g., Brexit). Yet a notable comparative tendency among
liberals to see the world as getting better was preserved. To explore the impact of contemporary
events, the author compared two similar national USA samples recruited the same way from the
same source (mTurk): Sample 7 was recruited early December 2019—just over three years into
the Trump presidency and at the height of the presidential impeachment drama—and Sample 8 in
late October 2015—late in Obama’s 7th year in office and three months before any 2016
Presidential primaries. Then candidate Trump was an intermittent poll leader and broadly
considered a temporary phenomenon. In 2019, Progressing explained virtually no variance in
political ideology (.2%). Back in 2015, however, it explains 10.3%, statistically tied with
Hierarchical (10.1%). This shift may be a clue that, though primals are generally stable,
Progressing may be more responsive to news events compared to other primals and may be
relevant to political ideology even though sometimes it may appear less relevant.
Thus, if any primals play a role in political ideology, the following six seem most
promising: Hierarchical, Intentional, Just, Worth Exploring, Acceptable, and Progressing.
Study 2: The Broader Nomological Net
If the belief that the world is dangerous is a poor predictor of conservatism, why did
previous correlational research suggest otherwise? Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) small validity
study suggested one possible explanation, but would results replicate? Moreover, do the six
highlighted primals, especially Hierarchical, predict political ideology because they are
repackaging known correlates of conservatism that concern hierarchy-related topics, including
Right-wing authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Moral Foundations (Care/harm,
Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation)? To address
these questions, Study 2 examines the broader nomological net of political psychology variables.
Samples
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Study 2 involved a closer examination of Study 1 samples that included measures of
other political constructs. This included the two YourMorals.Org samples, which for Study 2
purposes were combined because fewer subjects completed relevant measures, and the 611
Americans recruited via mTurk (Sample 7). No YourMorals.Org subjects took the BDW scale.
mTurk subjects completed all measures, including the BDW scale, in the order listed below.
Measures
See descriptive statistics in Table 4 of supplement.
Primals Inventory
For Study 2, in addition to Hierarchical and Safe, the particular interest was Safe’s seven
associated tertiary primals (Pleasurable, Regenerative, Progressing, Harmless, Cooperative,
Stable, and Just).
BDW Scale
Perry, Sibley, and Duckitt’s (2013) BDW scale consists of ten items, including five
reverse-scored items. As discussed above, it measures one variable intended to be a belief about
the social world, though consistent with the scale label it is more often treated as a belief about
the world generally (e.g., van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). See items in Table 1 of supplement.
MF-30
The MF-30 (Graham et al., 2008) measures the five moral foundations (i.e., values) of
Moral Foundations Theory. Subscales include six items administered every fifth item. Three items
use response options extremely relevant to not at all relevant and three items use strongly agree
to strongly disagree. No items are reverse-scored. An example item from the Authority/subversion
subscale is Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism
Most Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scales are permutations of Altemeyer’s 30-item
(1988) scale, including Zakrisson’s (2005) 15-item version used in this study that employs seven
reverse-scored items. An example is Our country needs a powerful leader in order to destroy the
radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today.
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Social Dominance Orientation
To measure Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Pratto and colleagues’ (1994) original
scale was used, consisting of 16 forward-scored items. The first item is Some groups of people
are simply inferior to other groups.
Political Ideology
Study 2 used the same political ideology measure uses in Study 1.
Analysis
Pairwise Pearson rs between primals and BDW scale scores were compared to those
found by Clifton and colleagues (2019, N=122) with significance of differences calculated using a
2-tailed Fisher r-to-z transformation (Table 5 of supplement). Pairwise relationships between the
six primals identified above and RWA, SDO, and Moral Foundations were also examined (Table 6
and 7 of supplement). To further determine how the six primals fit within the nomological net and
also how they compare with Safe scores, 12 exploratory linear regressions were run (summarized
in Table 8 of supplement). These rely on the mTurk sample (N=611), duplicating models in
YourMorals.Org data whenever >300 subjects took relevant measures.
Results
BDW scale scores were strongly related but not redundant with ‘big three’ Safe (r=-.67)
partly because BDW scores unevenly reflected Safe’s dimensionality, emphasizing some primals
(Progressing, r=-.66, and Harmless, r=-.67) and deemphasizing others (Just, r=-.30, and Stable,
r=-.41). The average difference in r across all 26 primals was .06 with one significant difference
(Intentional). Hierarchical and the other primals identified above did not strongly correlate with
known correlates of conservatism, triggering no concerns over construct redundancy. Among 611
mTurkers, both Hierarchical and BDW scale scores were moderately related to RWA, SDO, and
Authority. Among YourMorals.Org subjects, these relationships were higher. Moreover, the
divergence between the BDW scale and Safe mattered when it came to political ideology and its
correlates. The most striking example was in relationship to RWA, which was strongly related to
BDW scale scores (r= .44) but orthogonal to Safe (r=-.03). Safe was not related to conservatism
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(r=.08, p>.05) but BDW scale scores were, though not strongly (r=.20, p<.001). Exploratory linear
regression models indicated that the six proposed primals of political ideology explained 19.3%
(mTurk) and 43.2% (YourMorals.org) of the variance in political ideology. Adding the 20 other
primals neglibly increased variance explained. The six primals explained less than Moral
Foundations explained (29% in the mTurk sample). These 11 variables (six primals and five
moral foundations) explained almost no variance in political ideology not already explained by
RWA and SDO, which together explained 35%. Both the six primals and the five Moral
Foundations explained large portions of variance in RWA, 47% and 52% respectively. Regression
analyses also found that Safe was not merely a poor predictor of political ideology, but that,
among Safe’s seven associated tertiary primals, Just (one of the six proposed primals) was the
sole predictor of any consequence.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) main findings in a sample five times
larger.
Did the BDW scale over-represent ways conservatives see the world as dangerous?
It is increasingly clear that previous correlational research has relied on a scale which
overemphasizes dangers conservatives fear (e.g., decline) and underemphasizes dangers
liberals fear (e.g., injustice) when neither group is much more likely to see the world as generally
more dangerous. Results imply an alternative “Dangerous World Scale” could be readily created
showing liberals as the ones who see the world as dangerous, potentially explaining why previous
correlational research misled researchers. This validity misstep warrants re-evaluation of
research that has relied on the BDW scale to operationalize belief that the world is dangerous,
including non-political research (e.g., Murray and Schaller 2012; Miller, Zielaskowski, and Plant
2012; Schaller, Park, and Faulkner 2003; Schaller, Park, and Mueller 2003). Moreover, above
findings also call into question the centuries-old Hobbesian connection between the belief that the
world is dangerous and right-wing authoritarianism. If conservatives do not actually see the world
as more dangerous, their well-documented affinity for authority must come from somewhere else.
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Are the six more promising primals redundant with existing political constructs?
Study 2 results indicate yes and no. No because the six primals identified in Study 1 are
clearly not redundant with Moral Foundations, RWA, or SDO. Hierarchical correlated with RWA at
only r (620) =.39 and with SDO at only r (620) =.32. Such modest relationships suggest that rightwing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation can be understood as human-specific and
human-group-specific instantiations of a much broader belief about the world. In correlating
positively with Authority, Sanctity, and Purity and negatively with Care and Fairness, Hierarchical
correlates to moral foundations similarly to how conservativism correlates to moral foundations.
However, the answer is also Yes because the six primals identified in Study 1 explained almost
no variance in political ideology not already explained by RWA and SDO. Indeed, RWA also
explained the same variance in political ideology provided by Moral Foundations. With all these
constructs competing to explain the same variance in political ideology, the question is, what
causes what?
General Discussion
This investigation challenges a central proposition in the political psychology literature
while providing an explanation for why previous research may have been misleading. In short,
researchers have thought that conservatives and liberals inhabit two perceived worlds where
opposite political behaviors make more sense: some see the world as a dangerous place full of
threats (conservatives), driving policy preferences such as keeping criminals locked away,
keeping immigrants out, and keeping guns for protection. Some see the world as safer (liberals),
allowing more room for being forgiving, welcoming, and weaponless. But above results show that
conservatives and liberals see the world as about equally dangerous and previous studies seem
to have found otherwise because the main measure of dangerous world belief happened to
highlighted threats conservatives fear while neglecting threats liberals fear.
This is consonant with emerging research on other threat-relevant political constructs (for
a review, see Duckitt, 2020). In some large samples (total N=24,391), conservatives more
concerned by threats of commission (i.e., aggression), liberals were more concerned by threats of
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omission (i.e., neglect), with no overall difference in threat sensitivity (Kahn et al., 2020). A metaanalysis of 134 samples (N=369,525) found statistically significant yet fairly trivial relationships
between conservatism and mortality salience (r=.08), subjective threat perception (r=.12), and
objective threat experience (r=.07), and a nonsignificant relationship to fear of death (r=.02; Jost
et al., 2017). Likewise, in the present investigation, the belief that the world is dangerous
explained only .9% of the variance in political ideology, placing it nearly in the middle a large
group of fifteen primal world beliefs—just below the belief the world is Funny at 1.0%—sharing so
little variance with political conservatism that they were dubbed the primals of virtual agreement
across the political spectrum.
Six primals, however, notably distinguished political ideology, as follows:
•

Hierarchical (vs. nonhierarchical) is the belief that most things have differential value
and can be ranked (positively related to conservatism, explaining 15.0% of variance).

•

Intentional (vs. unintentional) is the belief that most things happen for an underlying
purpose (positively-related, 11.5%).

•

Acceptable (vs. unacceptable) is the belief that the world and most things in it are
best accepted as is (positively-related, 9.2%).

•

Worth Exploring (vs. not worth exploring) is the belief that everything is worth trying
or doing, at least once (negatively related, 6.9%).

•

Just (vs. unjust) is the belief that the world is a fair place where you typically get what
you deserve, for good or ill (positively-related, 5%).

•

Progressing (vs. declining) is the belief that the world is getting better instead of
worse (negatively-related, 2.6%).

These primals may distinguish political ideologies because they describe two other perceived
worlds in which opposite political behaviors make sense.
Two Other Perceived Worlds
While all individuals see the universe as full of different things, individuals may
systematically interpret the meaning of difference differently. One group (conservatives) may tend
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to assume differences are important, reflecting an underlying value structure that is not just
natural and pervasive, but even cosmically ordained. What has more value is treated fairly—and
thus finds its way to the top—and what has low value and not worth exploring is too treated
fairly—and finds its way to the bottom. For this reason, the current state of affairs—whatever it
is—should probably be accepted as it is, not because it can’t be changed, but because it probably
shouldn’t be. Unfortunately, however, change is part of life and the world’s hierarchies are being
slowly eroded. Thus, constraining change to the status quo and accepting inequality is just
common sense (i.e., the two parts of conservatism as commonly defined).
Another group (liberals) may tend to assume differences are unimportant, reflecting
superficial, arbitrary differences in kind that rarely entail differences in value. Because everything
is roughly equal, everything is equally deserving and worth exploring. Thus, they see existing
hierarchical structures—in society, nature, and anywhere else—as typically unjust, oppressive,
not acceptable as it is, and certainly not ordained by some cosmic force. Those on top rarely
deserve their luck and those on the bottom rarely deserve their misfortune. Fortunately, however,
change is a part of life, and this dismal state of affairs is slowing improving. Thus, accelerating
change to the status quo and rejecting inequality is just common sense (i.e., the two parts of
liberalism as commonly defined).
The notion that political ideology stems in part from these two perceived worlds—
shorthanded hierarchy theory—offers intuitively appealing explanations of many conservative
policy preferences. For example, punitive measures consistent with historical standards of
punishment appear sensible if criminals presumably get what they deserve as part of society’s
natural order. Excluding immigrants appears sensible when it is presumed that real, natural, and
meaningful distinctions underpin nationality. The dangerous world proposition does offer a better
explanation of increased gun ownership, but in this case no explanation is needed. Stroebe,
Leander, and Kurlanski (2017) found that BDW scale scores to be unrelated to gun ownership,
being orthogonal to rifle ownership (r(399)=-.02, p>.05) and weakly related to handgun ownership
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(r(399)=.10, p<.05). If an explanation is needed, it is why those who see the world as dangerous
are hardly bothering to arm themselves.
Hierarchy theory offers a superior explanation of why many correlates of conservatism
arise. This includes a distaste for political correctness (which can be seen as glossing over
differences); increased religiousness (because purpose underlies events); a general appreciation
for wealthy persons (whose greater income implies greater value); tendencies towards
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (which treats differences as important); and
personality characteristics such as low Openness (because many things are not worth exploring)
and high conscientiousness (because the world rewards fairly; e.g., Carney et al., 2008; Jost,
2006). Turning to moral foundations, the dangerous world proposition poorly explains why
conservatives score lower on care/harm because, in increasingly dangerous places, people
typically become more concerned about safety issues, not less. Hierarchy theory, moreover,
makes sense of why conservatives place greater value on loyalty, authority, and sanctity given
their view of a just, even cosmically-ordained, hierarchy. A Hobbesian explanation tying the belief
that the world is dangerous to authoritarianism can be constructed, but it is circuitous. When
seeking to explain attitudes towards existing social hierarchies, the simpler explanation is
probably the one involving general assumptions about hierarchy than general assumptions about
danger. Finally, personality-based theories of political ideology, including the dangerous world
proposition, have historically struggled to explain both parts of conservatism as commonly
defined in psychological research as the tendency to (a) preserve the established order and (b)
tolerate inequality (Hirsh et al., 2010). Hierarchy theory readily explains both. If differences
reflects true value, considerable social inequality is not just appropriate but inevitable.
Limitations
One point of contention may be definitional. The term world in primal world beliefs refers
to “an individual’s broadest psychologically meaningful habitat” (Clifton et al., 2019, p. 83). Most
researchers typically use world more narrowly. For example, in depression research, Beck (e.g.,
Beck et al., 1979) labeled one leg of his Cognitive Triad beliefs about the world when he primarily
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meant beliefs about familiar persons in one’s immediate social context, such as a spouse or boss
(personal communication, March 1st 2019). Duckitt (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002) and other BDW
researchers also define the world socially, though in their case primarily meaning strangers and
their intentional actions. There may be a variety of research for which it is inappropriately
retroactive to apply Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) definition.
The causal implications of hierarchy theory is conjecture. While it looks like these are the
six primals of political ideology, and it seems clear that they describe two worlds in which
opposite political behavior makes sense, their correlational relationship to political ideology might
be due to causality going in the other direction (e.g., primals could be post hoc rationalizations of
a prior political commitments) or third variables (e.g., religiosity). Both the dangerous world
proposition and hierarchical theory relies on cross-sectional research, which has limited value.
Other study limitations include the reliance on the Primals Inventory’s Hierarchical
subscale which, having been introduced alongside 25 other constructs, would benefit from more
focused psychometric validation to determine the validity of the author’s interpretation. Though
Safe explained only .9% of the variance in political ideology, further research using multi-variate
approaches will likely identify contexts in which the belief the world is dangerous is more relevant.
Studies rely on a commonly used but simplistic 1-item measure of political ideology when
unidimensional left-right understandings of political ideology are limited (Feldman, 2013). In most
samples, there were more liberals than conservatives, which may indicate selection bias and
overweighting the importance of primals delineating degrees of liberalism. Above findings are
directly relevant to belief in a dangerous world research only, not other members of the threatrelevant family of constructs that Laham and Corless (2016) identifies. Finally, hierarchy theory is
at best only a partial explanation of political ideology, since much variance in political ideology
remains unexplained.
Future Directions
Hierarchy theory has a variety of implications for understanding human cooperation.
Contemporary political messaging
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Hierarchy theory suggests strategies for political campaigning, messaging, and strategy,
especially among Republicans most mischaracterized by the dangerous world proposition. If a
politician’s goal is to widen one’s base and attract independents, the most effective strategy may
be to appeal to primals about which there is more agreement. Obama’s 2008 campaign
messages “Yes, We Can,” “Change We Can Believe In,” and “Hope,” imply that change is
possible, which is presumably more appealing to those scoring high on Improvable, one of the 15
primals of virtual agreement across the political spectrum. However, if a politician seeks primarily
to mobilize a base of supporters, messages appealing to primals that distinguish those supporters
may be preferred. Many USA Republican presidential campaign messages, for example, call for a
return to a better time in the past. Examples include Make America Great Again (2016 Trump
campaign); Are You Better Off Than You Were Four Years Ago and It’s Morning Again in America
(1980 and 1984 Reagan campaigns); and He’s Making Us Proud Again (1976 Gerald Ford’s
campaign). Such messages presumably appeal less to those who believe the past was worse
than the present (i.e., those scoring high on Progressing; i.e., liberals). Likewise, slogans
suggesting that intergroup or interpersonal differences are inconsequential may do poorly among
those scoring high on Hierarchical. Example messages from the 2020 Democratic presidential
primary include We’re All in This Together (O’Rourke), We Rise (Booker), and For Everyone
(Biden). Indeed, a great deal of liberal American political messaging, from Clinton’s 2016
message Forward Together to William Jennings Bryant’s Equal Rights to All, Special Privileges to
None, should be relatively unappealing to those scoring high on Hierarchical, many of whom may
expect that some people deserve special privileges. If so, messages of equality might help in
primaries, but hurt in general elections. As a way of testing hierarchy theory versus the
dangerous world proposition, experiments could compare the appeal of slogans about threat to
slogans about difference.
Historical events
If hierarchy theory helps explain contemporary clashes between the forces of change and
preservation, it may provide insight into how that contest has played out historically. Consider the
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following example: Seligman (2019) suggests that the first millennia of the common era was
marked by very little material progress. Then, starting in Western Europe circa 1450, an explosion
of progress begins, spreads globally, and continues through the present. He asks, why the
sudden growth? One piece of the puzzle may involve hierarchy theory. The worldview of the
Medieval period is epitomized by de Valades (1579) Great Chain of Being (Figure 2 in
supplement), Catholicism, the divine right of kings, and feudalism. Feudalism rests on a series of
obligations between superiors and inferiors, with God at the top, sanctioning the hierarchy as
divinely ordered. Not merely one’s station, but experiences of all types, are interpreted as the
deserved consequence of sin or good deeds (Ziegler, 2013). Medieval Europeans lived in the
shadow of decaying Roman buildings, including structures they no longer knew how to build and
infrastructure they continued to rely on, especially roads. The daily water supply of 12th century
Latin Caesarea, for example, was supplied by several miles of Roman aqueducts built ~1,000
years prior (Reifenberg, 1950; Riley-Smith, 1990). Top Medieval thinkers (e.g., Aquinas,
Averroes) were not considered great for new ideas, but for contextualizing old ones. Together,
this suggests a society where individuals regardless of status would have likely scored high on
Hierarchical, Intentional, Just, and Acceptable, and low on Worth Exploring and Progressing.
Then came the Black Death in the 14th century which killed one third of Europeans, a scale of
unprecedented loss in European history. Plague paid no respect to different persons, killing rich
and poor, pious and evil alike. The resulting vast societal re-organization and social mobility
further highlighted the meaningless of sacrosanct distinctions (Ziegler, 2013). Massive labor
shortages resulted in massive wage increases, putting nobles at the mercy of peasants who
increasingly negotiated better terms or left manors for the first time in generations. Layered on
were the great changes of the Reformation, the Renaissance, Humanism, the discovery of an
entirely unknown and promising continent, and the emergence of a powerful merchant class (e.g.,
the Medici) that defied traditional hierarchies. All this may have contributed to the primals of
conservatism losing its grip on some segments of society.
Future human cooperation
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This article began by noting that cooperation is a signature human adaptation but many
cooperative efforts fail because of a conservative-liberal fault-line. If hierarchy theory is correct
and primals reasonably malleable, two question follows. First, should societies seek to
homogenize members’ primals to maximize cooperative potential? Perhaps someday this may be
a reasonable course, but certainly not yet. Primals research is in its infancy. Researchers have
little idea whether and how primals can be changed or the net effects of change. It may be foolish
(and unkind), for example, for liberals to try to decrease Just when previous research has tied low
belief in a just world to depression and many other unwanted outcomes. However, as studies
proceed, primals research does offer three things of immediate practical value for increasing
cooperation: a measure that people can use to identify their own primals, terminology with which
to discuss deeper disagreements that may (or may not) underlie political differences, and a
modicum of increased understanding of where the other side is coming from—small but perhaps
worthwhile contributions at this polarized time.
Second, if societies should eventually seek to homogenize its primals to maximize
cooperative potential, in what direction? The path of societies seeking to lock in gains at the
expense of future progress might be increased beliefs that the world is Hierarchical, Just,
declining, not worth exploring, Intentional, and Acceptable. However, for societies prioritizing
long-term progress, the path is less clear. If groups homogenize to believe that differences are
meaningless, all outcomes unfair, and so forth, problems may result, such as grand short-sighted
social experiments that fail (e.g., the French Revolution). Perhaps the ideal human society finds
ways to manage—rather than eliminate—the inevitable tensions that arise between those who
wish to preserve the current order, and those wanting to change it.
Concluding Remarks
The basic notion underpinning the psychological relevance of primal world beliefs is
nothing new, being traceable to debates among Ancient Greek philosophers such as Heraclitus
and Pythagoras. The basic notion is as follows: similarly to how perceptions of local environments
leads to certain behaviors, perceptions of the global environment could lead to certain behaviors.
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Over the last several decades, researchers applied this basic notion to political ideology, noting
that dangerous world belief describes a pair of worlds in which many opposite political behaviors
make sense. Confidence grew as correlational studies repeatedly tied dangerous world belief to
political ideology, and experimental work in threat-related literatures found many complementary
results. Still, some found it puzzling why, outside political contexts, conservatives did not seem to
behave like people who see the world in this way ought to behave, and recently other literatures
began unearthing less consonant findings (Duckitt, 2020; Laham & Corless, 2016).
Hoping further description might lead to explanation, the current investigation leverages
the first reasonably comprehensive measure of primal world beliefs to identify which primals
correlate to political ideology and which do not. The resulting profile shows three things. First,
conservatives and liberals see the world as about equally dangerous. Second, previous literature
had found otherwise because a previous measure highlights threats conservatives fear and
neglects threats liberals fear. Third, six other world beliefs each explain several times more
variance in political ideology than belief in a dangerous world and also describe a novel pair of
worlds in which opposite political behaviors make sense. Because this research involves
replication, preregistration, multiple samples, a few thousand subjects, and a more nuanced
measure, researchers can have some confidence in these descriptive conclusions, if not the
explanation they suggest. After all, just because behaviors are consonant with a belief does not
mean the belief caused the behavior. Yet the same could be said of the dangerous world
proposition. Hierarchy theory swaps out the primals, but the basic notion that made the
dangerous world proposition attractive in the first place remains unchanged.
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CHAPTER 2 - TESTING IF PRIMAL WORLD BELIEFS REFLECT EXPERIENCES—AT LEAST
SOME EXPERIENCES IDENTIFIED AD HOC

Abstract
Do negative primal world beliefs reflect experiences such as trauma, crime, or low socioeconomic status? Clifton and colleagues recently suggested that primals—defined as beliefs
about the general character of the world as a whole, such as the belief that the world is safe (vs.
dangerous) and abundant (vs. barren)—may shape many of the most-studied variables in
psychology. Yet researchers know very little regarding why individuals adopt their primals nor the
role of experience in shaping primals. Many theories can be called retrospective theories; these
theories suggest that past experiences lead to the adoption of primals that reflect those
experiences. For example, trauma increases the belief that the world is dangerous and growing
up poor increases the belief that the world is barren. Alternatively, interpretive theories hold that
primals function primarily as lenses on experiences while being themselves largely unaffected by
them. This chapter identifies twelve empirical tests where each theory makes different predictions
and hypothesizes that retrospective theories are typically less accurate. I end noting that, even if
retrospective theories are typically inaccurate, that does not imply experiences do not shape
primals. I end by offering a conceptual architecture—the Cube Framework—for exploring the full
range of human experience and suggest that, though psychologists have historically focused on
negative, externally-imposed experiences of short-duration (e.g., trauma), positive, internallydriven, and longer-term experiences are also worth considering.
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Introduction
After psychologists introduce new constructs, such as learned helplessness or grit
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), many
researchers eventually ask an important question: Which experiences influence (or are influenced
by) my construct? Having recently introduced a construct (Clifton et al., 2019), I too turned to this
question, beginning with a literature search for a tool that would enable systematic theorizing
about a broad range of experiences in relation to my construct. What I found instead were a few
organizing frameworks unsuited to this particular task of general theorizing (e.g. Duerden et al.,
2018) and a handful of largely overlapping clinically-oriented checklists dominated by a particular
type of involuntary, negative experiences of quick duration, such as injury or death of a family
member (e.g., the Social Readjustment Rating Scale by Holmes & Rahe, 1967; the Life
Experiences Survey by Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). Moreover, despite positive
psychology’s promising departure from psychology’s historical focus on negative experiences
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the positive psychology literature has yet to produce
commensurate checklists of positive experiences. Thus, absent the tool I sought, I conducted the
sort of ad hoc process that is common among researchers. In this process, hypotheses emerge
concerning those experiences the researcher happens to think of, often ones already examined in
relevant literatures or ones intersecting personal experience. This process has weaknesses.
Chief among them is that research can never support a reasonably adequate understanding of
the role of experience if no reasonably comprehensive range of things one personally encounters,
undergoes, or lives through—Miriam-Webster’s definition of experiences—is ever considered.
Thus, after discussing a newly introduced construct and engaging in a typical process of ad hoc
literature-driven hypothesis generation, I conclude this chapter with an atypical offering: a simple
yet comprehensive conceptual framework for considering the full range of human experiences
called the Cube Framework.
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The New(ish) Construct: Primal World Beliefs
For decades a few literatures have independently examined the possibility that particular
dependent variables, such as political ideology and recovery from trauma, may stem from
individual differences in generalized beliefs about the sort of world this is (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt,
2013; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). The most studied of these beliefs is belief in a Just world, which is
the belief that the world is a place where one gets what one deserves and deserves what one
gets. Originally identified by Lerner (1965, 1980) to study the roots of blame and racism, Just has
since been tied to dozens of variables that Just is thought to causally influence. In sum, those
higher in Just tend to be kinder (presumably because the world rewards kindness); more hardworking (presumably because the world rewards hard work); more successful (because they’ve
worked harder, were nicer, and are motivated to post-hoc justify success); and blame victims like
the sick and poor (presumably because they probably got what they deserved). Clifton and
colleagues (2019) recently pulled these world belief literatures together, calling beliefs about the
basic character of the world primals or primal world beliefs, and engaged in an extensive
empirical process to map all major primals. We found that Just was one of 26 different primals
most of which had never been studied (see Figure 1 in appendix) and many of the new primals
are more predictive of human behavior than Just, such as the belief that the world is Beautiful (vs.
ugly) and Pleasurable (vs. miserable).
This suggests the plausibility of a truly remarkable scenario described by Clifton and Kim
(2020, p. 1). In sum, understanding the behavior of any creature requires observations of that
creature in multiple environments. But humans can only ever observe each other in one
environment: the world. Not realizing we profoundly disagree about this world along many
dimensions, human efforts to understand each other’s behavior should lead inevitably to a
specific type of failure: overexaggerating the importance of dispositional differences (i.e., the
fundamental attribution error). Thus, it is theoretically possible that psychologists have overlooked
a major source of variation of most of the most-studied variables in psychology. Clifton and
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colleagues (2019) identify dozens of variables, such as BIG 5 personality traits and subjective
wellbeing, that are perhaps impacted.
As research exploring the causal role of primals continues, it is worth asking a related but
separate question: Where do primals come from? Specifically, which experiences shape (and are
shaped by) primal world beliefs? The former question is broad and requires, among other things,
a deep discussion of genetics and the ontology of personality traits, which is out of scope. This
chapter concerns the more specific latter question about identifying relevant experiences.
Distinguishing Retrospective and Interpretive Theories
Theories of how experiences shape primal world beliefs often fall into two broad types:
retrospective theories and interpretive theories. Retrospective theories suggest that experiences
play a key role in shaping primals such that primals often reflect the content of the individual’s
background. In this view, for example, the rich are likely to see the world as more Abundant, the
poor are likely to see the world as more barren (i.e., low Abundant scores), and experiencing
dangerous environments locally should cause one to see the world as more dangerous globally.
This is consistent with an intuitively-appealing theory animating much of the pre-existing literature
on primals originally posed by traumatologist Janoff-Bulman (1989) and adopted by several
others (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; Kauffman,
2002; Boelen, van den Hout, & vanden Bout, 2006). This theory holds that traumatic events
dramatically increases the belief that the world is dangerous (i.e., low Safe scores on the Primals
Inventory). Since our (Clifton et al., 2019) identification of several previously unidentified primals, I
have observed anecdotally at talks and conferences that similar retrospective intuitions emerge to
explain primals’ origins. For example, many researchers intuit that privileged racial groups will
see the world as more Just and Abundant than underserved racial groups. What all these
retrospective theories and intuitions have in common is the notion that past experiences
characterized by X quality pushes the individual towards seeing the world as characterized by X
quality to such an extent that primals reveal not just one’s beliefs but also one’s demographics.
Interpretive theories posit that, rather than a mirror reflecting one’s experiences, a primal
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functions as a lens used to interpret experiences while being itself largely uninfluenced by them.
For example, an interpretive theory of how the primal Abundant relates to personal wealth would
predict that being rich (or poor) would have little to no impact on the belief that the world is
Abundant. Likewise, experiencing dangerous environments or trauma (or safe environments)
would have little to no impact on the belief that the world is Safe. Though such interpretive
theories are reasonable, it’s fair to say that they are typically not as intuitively appealing as their
retrospective counterparts.
Nevertheless, I hypothesize that interpretive theories are generally more accurate than
retrospective theories, though likely with some moderate exceptions such as childhood trauma
and chronic pain. My rationale stems from the central point of Janoff-Bulman’s (1989) original
article, subtitled Applications of the Schema Construct, where she suggests that world beliefs
likely operate as schemas.
Though definitions of schema vary (van der Veer, 2000), the paradigm has been central
to belief research for decades (e.g., Crum, 2013; Dweck, 2017; Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005).
The term usually refers to pre-existing mental models about an object used to generate
expectations, assist interpretation and memory reconstruction, and guide interaction (e.g., Piaget,
1926; Brewer, 2000; Rumelhart, 1980; Nash, 2013; Bernstein, Roy, Skrull, & Wickens, 1991;
Janoff-Bulman, 1989). For example, Davis (1991) found that a schema for an egg involves at
least 45 different modifiers such as nutritious, delicate, and laid in nests.
In addition to introducing the idea of schemas (1926), Piaget theorized how schemas
would typically relate to experiences (1971). When facing evidence of a schema violation, Piaget
posits two options—accommodation (revising one’s schema) or assimilation (reinterpreting the
new information to minimize its importance)—and assimilation would be overwhelmingly favored.
Decades of research confirms this. When facing schema-inconsistent information, individuals
tend to ignore it, reject it, reinterpret it, or adopt other rejection-seeking behavior (e.g., Brewer,
2000; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Hastie, 1981; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). As schema’s
influence perceptions, the new information will often serve as “evidence” for the veracity of the
46

original schema (e.g., Vernon, 1955; Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000), thus creating a selfsupporting feedback loop. In addition to altering percepts directly, a schema’s influence on
behavior can also lead to actual outcomes that provide further “evidence” of the original schema,
creating a self-fulfilling feedback cycle (e.g., Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000). In these ways,
schemas contribute to the phenomenon termed confirmation bias (e.g., Nickerson, 1998; Merton,
1948; Jussim, 1986).
Though Janoff-Bulman (1989) acknowledged that “the tendency is towards assimilation
rather than accommodation,” she thought trauma would be an exception that would reliably and
dramatically alter world assumptions, including what we (Clifton et al., 2019) call primal world
beliefs. Her (1992) book on trauma was entitled Shattered Assumptions and her theory is
sometimes called shattered assumptions theory. Yet Kaler and colleagues (2008) found that in
only about a quarter of those recently traumatized was there any reliable change in world beliefs
and—moreover—these were equally divided between those coming to see the world as more
negatively and those coming to see the world more positively. Indeed, as Mancini, Prati, and
Bonnano (2011) note, despite the popularity of shattered assumptions theory, there is little
evidence much shattering happens. This is partly due to the absence of control groups, but also
the smallness of observed effects which, when it is observed at all, is typically small, even among
Holocaust survivors (e.g., Prager & Solomon, 1995). Indeed, if those who experienced first-hand
the mass systematic internment, deprivation, torture, and slaughter during the Holocaust—
arguably one of the most traumatic events in history—do not see the world as that much worse
than those who escaped the experience, then retrospective explanations of how negative primals
arise probably has less to offer than intuition suggests.
Yet, as Mancini, Prati, and Bonnano (2011) point out, shattered assumptions theory
remains popular among researchers and clinicians—even lay people—likely in part because of its
intuitive appeal. Indeed, after encountering similar patterns of retrospective intuitions in
connection to newly-identified primals, I have come to suspect several biases are at play,
including an actor-observer bias wherein individuals tend to condescendingly imagine that other
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people cannot help but believe the things they do because of their backgrounds while our own
primal world beliefs stem from something more objective and clear-eyed (Clifton, in press).
Others are on a journey; I have arrived.
It may be that, rather than experiences influencing primals in a straightforward way,
individuals use past experiences to justify whatever primal they already hold. For example, if one
sees the world as a dangerous place and gets into a car accident, perhaps on average he will
eventually frame that experience as evidence of what he knew all along. Likewise, if one who
sees the world as a safe place and gets into a car accident, perhaps on average she will
eventually frame this experience as exceptional, having occurred for local, particular, and
temporary reasons. Indeed, because the world is a giant dataset, there is much information that
can be garnered in support of any primal. And if primals direct attention and resist assimilation as
the schema literature suggests, researchers should expect such garnering to occur, and thus
retrospective theories to be generally inaccurate.
Could a theory explaining how experiences relate to primals be both non-retrospective
and non-interpretive? Perhaps. However, whereas retrospective theories could be completely
false without fundamentally altering current assumptions about primals and their nature, the same
is not true of interpretive theories. Fundamental to researcher’s (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Clifton et
al., 2019; Clifton & Kim, 2020; Clifton, in press) understanding of primals is the same assumption
underlying researcher’s conceptions of beliefs generally (e.g., Crum, 2013; Dweck, 2017; Beck,
1963, 1964, 1967, 2005). Namely, that beliefs influence thought and behavior largely via
ambiguity interpretation. If primals were found to exert no influence on the interpretation of one’s
personal experiences, then primals are either (a) exclusively symptoms rather than causes of
primals’ numerous personality and wellbeing correlates; (b) primals’ impact on these outcomes
are unmediated by interpretation; or (c) primals do influence the interpretation of some new
information but, for some reason, not new personal experiences. Given current research, these
options seem unlikely.
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Twelve Hypotheses
To determine whether retrospective or interpretive theories are typically more accurate
across different primals and different experiences, multiple hypotheses in which each theory
makes diverging predictions must be examined. Table 1 specifies twelve hypotheses which were
selected according to three criteria.
•
•
•

The measurability of the relevant life experience
The involuntariness of the experience (to avoid confounding causal relationships)
The clarity of alternative retrospective and interpretive predictions

Multiple hypotheses are necessary because some involve disputable assumptions that others do
not. For example, perhaps the most dubious assumption underlies hypotheses #4: Is the world
really more dangerous for women than men when men are more likely to be killed violently and
die on average five years sooner (e.g., Rochelle, Yeung, Bond, & Li, 2015)? Perhaps, but among
a variety of threats that disproportionately impact women, it is indisputable that most women
spend life surrounded by biologically stronger, faster, more aggressive individuals who are
motivated to assault them, often do, and whose denials are traditionally more likely to be believed
over women’s accusations (e.g., Lassek & Gaulin, 2009). Thus, if researchers were to find that
nevertheless women and men see the world as equally Safe, that can be considered inconsistent
with a retrospective theory of how Safe develops, though not compelling unless other hypotheses
relying on different assumptions are also examined.
All twelve hypotheses can be determined by interpreting correlational effect sizes, with
thresholds for interpretation varying depending on the hypotheses. However, based on
commonly-used thresholds (e.g., Cohen, 1992), the threshold of r>.30 that Kaler and colleagues
(2008) used to examine a retrospective theory, and my own research experience, I suggest the
following admittedly arbitrary thresholds for pairwise relationships:
•
•
•
•

r > .30 can be considered clearly consistent with the retrospective prediction and
clearly inconsistent with the interpretive prediction
.295 > r > .20 can be considered weakly consistent with the retrospective prediction
and weakly inconsistent with the interpretative prediction
.195 > r > .10 can be considered weakly inconsistent with the retrospective prediction
and weakly consistent with the interpretive prediction
.095 > r > -.095 can be considered clearly inconsistent with the retrospective
prediction and clearly consistent with the interpretive prediction.
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Because the twelve hypotheses seek to derive conclusions from orthogonality, I would remind the
reader that, while correlation does not indicate causation, under certain assumptions
orthogonality does suggest causality’s absence or trivialness. Of course, researchers should
check those assumptions, particularly curvilinearity, possible third variable confounds, indirect
pathways, and counterbalancing effects. For example, Mancini, Littleton, and Grills (2016) found
that the negative psychological impact of the Virginia Tech shootings was mitigated by the
countervailing effects of increased social support which may influence, among other things,
beliefs about the world (Mancini, 2019). Nevertheless, if primals do not reflect backgrounds in a
straightforward manner as evidenced by bivariate analysis, this would suggest that retrospective
theories are inaccurate even if further analysis reveals confounds, indirect pathways, or
counterbalancing effects. Retrospective theories are by definition not nuanced in this way.
Previous research sheds light on several of these 12 hypotheses, especially trauma
research. For example, converting Prager and Solomon’s (1995) results to a Pearson’s r
suggests that that subjects who experienced the Holocaust saw the world as less benevolent at
r(158)=.31. This is clearly consistent with the retrospective prediction and clearly inconsistent with
the interpretive prediction—but barely so. Using the World Assumptions Scale, Kaler and
colleagues (2008) found in a sample of 735 undergraduates that increased lifetime trauma
correlated with world benevolence beliefs at r=-.14 and recent trauma did not seem to have any
impact on these beliefs. Given the severity of the Holocaust compared to, say, getting mugged,
could it be that r=.31 approximates an upper-limit average trauma effect?
However, because hypotheses concern several primals that only the Primals Inventory
measures and because the Primals Inventory is a more nuanced measure of primals (for a
detailed discussion see Clifton, in press), it is ideal if all twelve hypotheses are examined using
the Primals Inventory. To some extent this too has been done. On pages 310-323 of Clifton and
colleagues (2019) supplement is a large correlation matrix showing some pertinent relationships
among 524 Americans, ages 18–75 (M=37), who were approximately 50% women and 50%
college graduates.
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•
•
•
•
•

Concerning Hypothesis #4, women did not see the world as more dangerous than
men (r=.01, p>.05)
Concerning Hypothesis #5, growing up poor did not correlate with seeing the world
as less Abundant (r=-.07, p>.05)
Concerning Hypothesis #6, those in families with higher incomes did not see the
world as more Abundant (r=.05, p>.05).
Concerning Hypothesis #9, growing up poor did not correlate with seeing the world
as less Pleasurable (r=-.06, p>.05).
Concerning Hypothesis #10, high family income did not correlate with seeing the
world as more Pleasurable (r=.03, p>.05).

These results are, based on above thresholds, clearly inconsistent with retrospective predictions
and clearly consistent with interpretive predictions. But these results also come from one sample
in which only a preliminary version of the Primals Inventory was used, literally thousands of
correlational relationships were examined without correcting for multiple comparisons, above
hypotheses were not pre-registered, and most of the twelve hypotheses were not examined.
Much remains unclear.
Table 1
Twelve Alternative Retrospective and Interpretive Predictions
Primal
1
2

Experience
Retrospective Prediction
Childhood trauma Trauma often increases the belief
that the world is dangerous.
Therefore, increased trauma
Adulthood trauma should correlate substantially with
lower Safe scores.
Neighborhood
crime rates

3
Safe
(vs.
dangerous)

Sex

4

Childhood SES
5

Abundant
(vs. barren)

Living in dangerous places
increases the belief that the world
is dangerous. Therefore, living in
a more dangerous zip code based
on crime statistics should
correlate with lower Safe scores.
Being physically weaker than
many around you—especially
people who are motivated to
assault people like you, often do,
and whose denials are likely to be
believed over your accusations—
leads to seeing the world as more
dangerous. Therefore, being
female should correlate with low
Safe scores.
Growing up poor often results in
seeing the world as a more barren
place with fewer resources and
opportunities. Therefore, low
childhood socio-economic status
(SES) should correlate with low
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Interpretive Prediction
The primal Safe is used to interpret
trauma while being itself little
affected by it. Therefore, increased
trauma should be marginally
related or orthogonal to Safe
scores.
The primal Safe is used to interpret
dangerous situations while being
itself marginally affected by them.
Therefore, living in a dangerous zip
code should be marginally related
or orthogonal to Safe scores.
The primal Safe is used to interpret
situations in which one is
susceptible to dangers while being
itself marginally affected by them.
Therefore, being female should be
marginally related or orthogonal to
Safe scores.

The primal Abundant is used to
interpret material circumstances in
childhood while being itself
marginally affected by such
circumstances. Therefore, low
childhood SES should be

Abundant scores.

marginally related or orthogonal to
Abundant scores.
Family income
Being poor often results in seeing The primal Abundant is used to
the world as a more barren place interpret material circumstances
with fewer resources and
while being itself marginally
6
opportunities. Therefore, low
affected by it. Therefore, low family
family income should correlate
income should be marginally
with low Abundant scores.
related or orthogonal to Abundant
scores.
Neighborhood
Living in a poor neighborhood
The primal Abundant is used to
mean income
often results in seeing the world interpret material circumstances
as a more barren place with fewer while being itself marginally
resources and opportunities.
affected by it. Therefore, living in a
7
Therefore, living in a lowerlower-income neighborhood should
income neighborhood should
be marginally related or orthogonal
correlate with low Abundant
to Abundant scores.
scores.
Chronic pain
Being in chronic physical pain
The primal Pleasurable is used to
often results in seeing the world interpret experiences of pain while
as a more miserable and
being itself marginally affected by
8
uncomfortable place. Therefore, it. Therefore, experiencing chronic
chronic pain exposure should
pain should be marginally related
correlate with low Pleasurable
or orthogonal to Pleasurable
scores.
scores.
Childhood SES
Higher SES while growing up
The primal Pleasurable is used to
corresponds with having more
interpret pleasurable experiences
frequent and intense pleasurable in childhood while being itself
experiences in childhood, which marginally affected by it. Therefore,
Pleasurable
9
often results in seeing the world high childhood socio-economic
(vs.
as a more pleasurable place.
status should be marginally related
miserable)
Therefore, higher childhood SES or orthogonal to the belief that the
should correlate with Pleasurable world is pleasurable.
scores.
Family income
Higher family income corresponds The primal Pleasurable is used to
with having more frequent and
interpret pleasurable experiences
intense pleasurable experiences, while being itself marginally
which often results in seeing the affected by them. Therefore, family
10
world as a more pleasurable
income should be marginally
place. Therefore, higher family
related or orthogonal to
income should correlate with
Pleasurable scores.
Pleasurable scores.
Change in
Experiencing decline in personal The primal Progressing is used to
personal SES
SES often results in seeing the
interpret decline in SES while
from childhood to world as declining. Therefore,
being itself marginally affected by
11
adulthood
decline in SES from childhood to it. Therefore, decline in SES from
adulthood should correlate with
childhood to adulthood should be
lower Progressing scores.
marginally related or orthogonal to
Progressing
Pleasurable scores.
(vs.
Change in
Living in a declining neighborhood The primal Progressing is used to
declining)
neighborhood
often results in seeing the world interpret neighborhood decline
mean income
as declining. Therefore, living in while being itself marginally
12
an area that is in economic
affected by it. Therefore,
decline should correlate with
neighborhood decline should be
lower Progressing scores.
marginally related or orthogonal to
Progressing scores.
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Where Should Researchers Look Instead?
If researchers find that retrospective theories are generally inaccurate, does that mean
that experiences do not shape primals? No. Interpretive theories only presume that primals do not
reflect the content of past experiences in a straightforward manner, but experiences come in
many shapes and sizes and might influence primals in a variety of less straightforward ways.
Where might researchers look next? What experiences should researchers focus on?
These questions are impossible to answer without a reasonably exhaustive framework by
which a breadth of human experiences can be considered. After recently introducing the primals
construct (Clifton et al, 2019), I asked the same question that many researchers before me have
asked: Which experiences influence (or are influenced by) my construct? Failing to unearth some
sort of comprehensive framework or measurement tool that identifies a broad range of
psychologically important human experiences that I could use as a basis for systematic theorizing
about experiences in relation to my construct, I created the following Cube Framework. I provide
it here to aid other researchers examining other constructs, to highlight areas for further research
on the primals construct, and to invite comment before building a more comprehensive
experience checklist than is currently available.
Three Dimensions of the Cube Framework
There are three major psychologically salient continuous dimensions by which all
experiences vary. For practicality, the Cube Framework simplifies these dimensions into
dichotomies. The point is not to know precisely where a particular experience falls on a dimension
but for the researcher to have a tool to guard against the consideration of only a narrow slice of
human experience.
Chronic-acute
All experiences happen in time. Thus, all experiences can be sorted into more acute
experiences that take moments/days/weeks and more chronic experiences that take
months/years/decades. Previous experiences checklists have generally ignored chronic life
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experiences, such as having a chronic illness or negative boss. However, demographic
information is often important precisely because it captures chronic experiences, such as being
male or poor.
Internal-external
All experiences are to varying degrees under the individual’s control. Several literatures
draw attention to the psychological importance of this distinction including learned helplessness,
attribution theory, optimism/explanatory style, personality, locus of control, and incremental theory
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Harvey et al., 2014; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Lewin,
1936; Rotter, 1966; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). Though many experiences, such
as going to college, can be either internally driven or more externally imposed, many experiences
can be fairly readily categorized as more often one or the other. A death in the family or inheriting
a fortune, for example, are experiences that are usually externally imposed.
Positive-negative
All experiences vary by subjective desirability (good, neutral, or bad). Though most
difficult to measure objectively, this dimension is also the most psychologically impactful. There is
a massive gulf, after all, between a good childhood and a bad childhood, a good sex life and a
bad sex life, and so forth. However, like the internal-external dimension, exactly where any given
experience falls on the positive-negative dimension may be up for debate. Nevertheless, many
experiences will be readily characterizable. Death and injury, for example, can be thought of as
negative. Receiving a promotion or falling in love can be considered positive.
Eight Experience Types in the Cube Framework
The permutations of these three dimensions reveals eight types of human experience
(Figure 2).
Bad choices
Acute, internally-driven, negative experiences—bad choices—may include losing one’s
savings in a poor investment, stealing, cheating, sexually assaulting someone, sleeping with a
friend’s spouse, deciding to drive home drunk, or joining a cult.
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Bad habits
Chronic, internally-driven, negative experiences—bad habits—may include a gambling
habit, smoking, pessimism, distrust, overeating, overspending, continually returning to an abusive
partner, or staying in a cult.
Bad luck
Acute, externally-imposed, negative experiences—bad luck—may include natural
disasters, car accidents, stroke, fire, and sudden deaths in the family. The large majority of
experiences mentioned by the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) and the
Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978) consists of such bad luck
experiences. Studying them is clearly worthwhile, but they represent only a narrow slice of life.
Bad times
Chronic, externally-imposed, negative experiences—bad times—may include being
raised by a negative parent, growing up receiving person praise rather than process praise
(Kamins & Dweck, 1999); coping with chronic pain, being unemployed, having an unkind boss,
involuntarily fighting in a war, or living in a society prejudiced against your gender or race.
Good choices
Acute, internally-driven, positive experiences—good choices—may include falling in love,
identifying your mission in life, taking a backpacking trip across Europe, or converting to a
religion.
Good habits
Chronic, internally-driven, positive experiences—good habits—may include staying
physically active, mastering a skill, engaging in some life-giving activity like ballroom dancing or
playing in the local philharmonic, chronically believing the best about others, being an avid
reader, gardening, spending time outdoors, being in a committed relationship, being an avid
traveler, taking care of a dog, volunteering for charity, or raising children.
Good luck
Acute, externally-imposed, positive experiences—good luck—may include inheriting a
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fortune, winning the lottery, getting adopted, being recruited for a job, being granted a pardon, or
receiving a voucher to go to a better school.
Good times
Chronic, externally-imposed, positive experiences—good times—may include living in a
peaceful society, being raised by a highly supportive parent, receiving a four-year liberal arts
education, enjoying sustained access to medical care, or being mentored by a teacher.
Figure 2
The Cube Framework Uses Three Dimensions to Define Eight Experience Types

Suggestions for Applying the Cube Framework
Instead of listing out all human experiences, the Cube Framework provides a method that
researchers can use to systematically theorize about a diversity of experiences. I suggest using it
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in two ways. First, the researcher can ask themselves eight questions about each experience
type. For example, What good choices might influence or be influenced by my construct? Yet
examining experiences by only type risks the Cube Framework becoming a filter such that only
experiences that fit neatly within each type are considered. Addiction, depression, and obesity, for
example, are clearly chronic and negative (and important to study) but less clearly categorized
along the internal-external dimension, and thus may not emerge from eight questions about the
eight types. Therefore, second, I suggest that psychologists also theorize by dimension, one
dimension at a time. For example, when considering the acute-chronic dimension I might ask
myself: What experiences that relate my construct might happen in a moment...in an hour…in a
day…in a week, in a month…in a year…in a decade…or last a lifetime? Using both by-type and
by-dimension approaches ensures that a diversity of experiences are considered.
The Cube Framework allows flexibility because it is able to incorporate any additional
fourth dimension the researcher might deem important. For example, there is arguably at least
one other psychologically-important dimension on which all experiences vary that the Cube
Framework does not incorporate: the age at which an experience occurs in the life of the person.
The Cube Framework does not include this dimension because I found adding it led to the
identification of relatively few novel hypotheses, lowered the utility of the framework by
complicating it, and, most importantly, age is a characteristic of the person rather than the
experience. However, if a researcher wishes to ensure diversity along this or any other fourth
dimension, researchers can consider not one cube but two cubes, with each cube labeled
according to the fourth dimension, such as Childhood Experiences and Adulthood Experiences.
Then the researcher can consider childhood bad times separately from adulthood bad times,
childhood good choices separately from adulthood good choices, and so forth.
Applying the Cube Framework to Primals Research
With the big exception of research over the last two decades in positive psychology,
psychologists have historically focused on acute, externally-imposed, negative (i.e., bad luck)
experiences like trauma and neglected experiences that last longer, are internally-driven, and
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positive. Thus, when considering which experiences might influence primals, positive and chronic
experiences (good times and good habits), such as having a highly-supportive parent or teacher,
might be worth further examination. Positive acute experiences, such as powerful moments of
transcendence, are also promising.
Furthermore, if retrospective theories are typically inaccurate—if exposure to X quality
typically has no impact on ways of thinking about the world generally—then perhaps exposure to
alternative ways of thinking about X quality is what matters. This exposure might occasionally be
self-driven by the philosophically adventurous but more typically result from personal social
interactions with mentors, friends, colleagues, therapists, parents, or others who see the world
differently. Exposure may also occur through storytelling via, for example, movies and novels. For
example, a premise of the 2003 and 1999 hit films Love Actually and American Beauty is that
love and beauty are everywhere, even in the midst of pain and suffering—even perversion. Be it
via real-life encounters or fictional stories, encounters with alternative lenses on reality may
sometimes result in one coming to prefer them. Informal social pressures may also be at work.
For example, one primals research study awaiting duplication indicates that students are more
likely than the general public to see the world as dangerous. Is this because the student context
is a particularly dangerous one—the retrospective explanation? Likely not. Instead, perhaps the
task itself or particular subcultures implicitly encourage—teach—this primal through a variety of
formal and informal incentives and social mechanisms. If exposure to different lenses on reality
impacts which lenses individuals choose for themselves, perhaps researchers will find that one
experience that often impacts primal world beliefs is the simple act of taking the Primals
Inventory, learning what primals one holds, and discovering one has options.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have asked the typical question a researcher asks after introducing a
construct: Which experiences influence (or are influenced by) my construct? In the case of
primals, I discussed two broad possibilities. The first holds that primals generally reflect our
backgrounds in a fairly straightforward manner (retrospective theories). The second suggests that
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primals are used to interpret experiences while being themselves marginally influenced by them
(interpretive theories). This chapter then specified twelve empirical tests to shed light on which
approach is typically more accurate, which I hypothesize will most often be interpretive theories
despite having less intuitive appeal and running counter to some existing theory. If future
empirical research confirms this, researchers will have to look elsewhere to determine which
experiences might impact primals. To facilitate that search, I have provided the Cube Framework
as a tool for methodically considering a range of human experiences and generating hypotheses.
My own use of it suggests that a promising place to look will be chronic and positive experiences,
such as having a supportive and esteemed parent or mentor who implicitly or explicitly
encourages certain primals, as well as acute and positive experiences, such as transcendent
experiences.
In closing, however, I confess some pessimism. It may be that few naturally-occurring life
experiences reliably influence primals. Perhaps primals typically emerge early in life for
idiosyncratic reasons in a process non-deterministically yet strongly impacted by genetics.
Primals could then perpetuate themselves through mechanisms associated with schemas. This
would not mean, however, that primals cannot be changed by experiences, just that they
generally are not. Researchers already know that beliefs very similar to primals can be reliably
altered through Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (e.g., Beck, 2005). Thus, even if experiences that
influence primals cannot be found, perhaps they can be designed.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE VALUE OF SEEING THE WORLD AS A BAD PLACE: A CROSSSECTIONAL SEARCH FOR UNICORNS

Abstract
Preliminary studies suggest that negative primal world beliefs, which are basic beliefs about the
world’s typical character such as the world is dangerous and the world is barren, are strongly
correlated with lower wellbeing. Theory suggests that some covariance is likely explained by
primals shaping wellbeing. Thus, a critical next step is manipulating primals to test causality.
Future interventions may fail to successfully alter primals, however, without addressing certain
meta-beliefs—beliefs about beliefs—that likely bolster negative primals. This chapter examines
prospective meta-beliefs, which are assumptions that a negative primal offers a means for
achieving future goals, such as seeing the world as dangerous keeps people safe. Study 1
(N=180) establishes prevalence for such prospective meta-beliefs by showing that many parents
aim to teach negative primals to their children. I then search within six samples representing 48
occupation groups (Study 2, N=4,535) for contexts where, on average, such meta-beliefs hold
true, at least concerning job success, job satisfaction, negative emotions, depression, suicide,
physical health, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. This search finds six instances in
which a negative primal correlated with positive outcomes—each involving small sub-samples
and modest effect sizes—and 1,854 instances in which negative primals correlated with negative
outcomes—many in sizeable samples with large effect sizes. This pattern suggests that many
prospective meta-beliefs are false, which could be incorporated into interventions designed to
undermine these prospective meta-beliefs and the negative primals they presumably support.
This chapter also helps establish the direction and size of correlational relationships between
primals and important clinical and wellbeing outcomes, which is useful for theory-building and
identifying promising areas for future research.
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I always think everything could be a trap—which is why I’m still alive.
—Prince Humperdink, The Princess Bride, 1987

Introduction
Clifton and colleagues (2019) recently discovered that humans disagree about the
world’s most basic qualities along many more dimensions than previously realized—26 in total,
including the belief that the world is beautiful, dangerous, just, interconnected, and even funny.
Calling these beliefs primals or primal world beliefs, they found that most primals group into three
main beliefs—informally called the ‘big three’—the beliefs that the world is Safe (vs. dangerous),
Enticing (vs. dull), and Alive (vs. mechanistic), which in turn group into the general factor, the
overall belief that the world is a Good place. Each belief is statistically distinct, stable across time,
and largely orthogonal to demographic variables, as well as highly correlated to many personality
and wellbeing variables.
However, the claim about wellbeing correlates comes with an asterisk. Prior to Clifton
and colleagues’ (2019) work, only one primal—Just, often called BJW or Belief in a Just World—
had received broad research attention, which established that Just has many wellbeing-related
correlates (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019). Those high in belief in a just world tend to be more
successful and productive, presumably because of the expectation that hard work will be
rewarded, with high Just scores being tied to everything from better grades to higher GDP
(Dalbert & Stoeber, 2005; Furnham, 1993). Those high in belief in a just world also enjoy much
higher wellbeing. For example, Dzuka and Dalbert (2006) found that senior citizens of East
Slovakia enjoyed much higher life satisfaction when they also saw the world as just (r(122)=.45,
p< .001) and this relationship is even stronger in the general adult population (e.g., r(422)=.57,
r(80)=.67, r(80)=.54, p<.01; Otto, Glaser, & Dalbert, 2009).
However, prior to Clifton and colleagues (2019) work, most primals remained unidentified
and, so far, only two studies have used the 99-item Primals Inventory—currently the only
comprehensive measure of primals—to examine primals’ wellbeing correlates. In Clifton and
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colleagues’ (2019) foundational paper validating the Primals Inventory, one study of 524
mTurkers completed a preliminary 94-item version to examine correlations between primals and
health, negative emotion, depression, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing, with most
results undiscussed and buried in a 507-page supplement. In the other study (N=404), Stahlmann
and colleagues’ (2020) examined primals relationship to life satisfaction in the course of validating
a German 66-item version of the Primals Inventory. Both studies unearthed moderate to large
relationships between primals and wellbeing that are worth replicating and warrant discussion.
Moreover, researchers note that, consistent with current depression theory, schema
theory, personality theory and the success of established interventions such as Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy, considerable covariation between primals and wellbeing is likely to be
explained by primals influencing wellbeing correlates (Clifton et al., 2019; Stahlmann et al., 2020;
Beck, 1964, 2005; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Dweck, 2008, 2017; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al.,
2012). Considerable covariance, however, might also be explained by the primal being an
indicator of the outcome variable, not a cause. For example, seeing the world as a barren place
could lead to depression or be a symptom of depression. To resolve this issue, experimentation is
necessary, which will require interventions capable of altering primal world beliefs—perhaps a tall
order, given how fundamental primals appear to be.
One step towards designing effective interventions may be addressing two types of metabeliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs) that bolster negative primals. Retrospective meta-beliefs
suppose that one has little choice but to hold a primal because certain experiences are thought to
irrevocably shape the individual’s identity (i.e., a causality claim) and most individuals who have
the experience share a similar identity (i.e., a probability claim). For example, a primals study
subject has commented, “I know many of my opinions [primals] are biased due to growing up and
currently being very poor. It has colored my perception of the world and I know of no way to
change that.” In this view, it is presumed that others with similar backgrounds often share the
same primals.
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While retrospective meta-beliefs concern the past, prospective meta-beliefs concern
future utility. During seven years studying primals, I have encountered many prospective metabeliefs that connect negative primals to positive outcomes. Six of the perhaps more common are
listed in Table 2. They associate negative primals with being happier, healthier, more successful,
more knowledgeable, more respected, and more helpful to society. Like retrospective metabeliefs, prospective meta-beliefs often involve causal and probabilistic components (e.g., “my
negative primals help me do better at my job” versus “people with more negative primals are
usually better in my job”). Since these outcomes are measurable, both components are testable,
and the probabilistic components readily testable via correlational research.
Table 2
Six Prospective Meta-Beliefs Purporting the Utility of Negative Primals
Relevant outcome

Anecdotal sources

Paraphrased meta-belief

Job success

Police officer, lawyer,
businessperson

While positive primals might make me feel better,
it’s a luxury I can’t afford because people usually
don’t succeed in my job without a darker view of
things.
More often than not, seeing the world as this
amazing place leads to disappointment with what
you get, both at work and home, which can make
you depressed, lose hope, and even get suicidal—
best keep expectations low.
Seeing the world as safe where everyone sings
‘Kumbaya’ leaves people vulnerable to predation,
physical threat, germs, illness, and even death—
you gotta stay vigilant.
Indulging a fantasy rarely helps anyone to achieve
their goals, whatever the goal might be, and the
belief that the world is this wonderful place is a
fantasy.
When people see the world as positive, they’re
judged as naïve, insensitive to the struggles of
those less fortunate, and a poor example to others.
The world has lots of terrible problems, from the
environment to social justice. People who think the
world is already good-to-go don’t work as hard to
make things better—you can’t solve a problem
without recognizing it.

Negative emotions
Police officer, parent, car
(job and life satisfaction, mechanic, student
and suicidal behavior)

Physical health

Police officer, healthcare
worker, soldier, Prince
Humperdink (quoted above)

Perception accuracy

Many individuals holding
negative primals

Reputation costs

Intellectual, activist,
politician, social worker,
literary critic
Environmentalist, religious
missionary, senator, social
worker

Group goals

After checking if, beyond anecdotal evidence, such meta-beliefs are in fact common
(Study 1), this chapter scours six samples representing 48 occupation groups (Study 2; N=4,535)
for instances in which more negative primals were associated with any of eight positive
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outcomes, thereby testing the probabilistic components of several of these prospective metabeliefs. The eight outcomes touch on the first three prospective meta-beliefs in Table 2 and are
as follows: job success, job satisfaction, negative emotion, depression, suicide, physical health,
life satisfaction, and overall psychological flourishing. In conducting this research, Study 2 also
contributes to the literature by more firmly establishing the size and direction of correlational
relationships between primals and wellbeing-related variables.
Study 1: Does Anyone Actually Associate Negative Primals With Positive Outcomes?
Is it really true that a non-trivial portion of the population believes that negative primals
are more helpful than positive primals? To explore this, asking adults about the general utility of
their own primals was not ideal to due a concern that responses might be confounded by
retrospective meta-beliefs. Furthermore, disadvantaged minorities may be more likely to see
value in negative primals because the world is often more against them compared to other
groups. Therefore, on the assumption that parents want what is best for their children’s future, I
asked New York City minority parents to complete an adapted version of the Primals Inventory
designed to measure which primals they wished to teach their children. I pre-registered
hypotheses on the Open Science Framework before analyses were conducted.
Sample
Minority parents living in inner city New York neighborhoods were recruited via a popular
minority youth advancement program in which their children had been enrolled. Of 185 subjects
(Mage=47 years, SDage=8), 84 described themselves as black, 52 as Hispanic, 17 as white, and
the rest as mixed or other. Most were mothers (79%), Democrats (67%), and some form of
Christian (64%). Median annual family income was $80,000.
Measure
Described above, Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) Primals Inventory (PI-99) is currently the
most valid measure of primal world beliefs (Clifton, in press-b). However, to measure prospective
meta-beliefs about primals rather than primals themselves, the PI-99 had to be adapted to
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measure opinions about which primals’ offer the most utility for their children. Thus, PI-99 scale
instructions were edited as follows:
Below are very general statements about the world Parents have the privilege and
responsibility of preparing their children to navigate the real world—not the world we wish
we lived in, but the actual world as it is now. Each statement listed below begins with the
phrase "I help my kids when I teach them that..." Please indicate the extent to which you
agree with each phrase. Please share your sense of agreement or disagreement. When
in doubt, go with what initially feels true of the real world. There are no wrong answers.
There’s no need to overthink.
The stem “I help my kid(s) when I teach them...” then appeared in large bold font every five items,
with items minimally edited to be grammatically correct. In nearly all cases, this merely involved
the insertion of “…that” before items. For example, “...that, oOn the whole, the world is a safe
place.” For the sake of brevity, only select subscales were included. These involved (a) negative
primals hypothesized as most likely to be worth teaching children; (b) subscales representative of
other groups of subscales; and (c) a few other subscales that may be interesting for samplespecific reasons. Thus, I administered 49 items (19 reverse-scored) that allowed me to compute
scores on twelve meta-beliefs concerning the belief that the world is Safe (29 items), Pleasurable
(5 items), Regenerative (4 items), Progressing (4 items), Harmless (5 items), Cooperative (4
items), Stable (4 items), and Just (5 items), Abundant (4 items), Funny (4 items), Hierarchical (5
items), and Improvable (5 items).
Analysis
Because this adaptation of the Primals Inventory was novel, I conducted a reliability
analysis of each subscale before hypotheses were examined, removing items whose inclusion
lowered internal reliability more than α=.01. This resulted in removing one item each from
Cooperative, Stable, Just, Abundant, Funny, Hierarchical, and Improvable. Reliability for
Regenerative was considered too low (α=.50) to justify further examination and was jettisoned. I
then examined descriptive statistics and standard error of the mean. For the sake of this analysis,
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having a score <2.5 was considered as believing in the utility of a negative primal and having a
score <4 was considered as believing in the utility of avoiding a distinctly positive primal. My preregistered hypothesis was that, for Safe and its seven associated tertiary primals, the portion of
the population with scores <2.5 would not be insubstantial (defined as <9.45%) but either
meaningful (between 9.45% and 19.45%), substantial (between 19.45% and 29.45%), major
(between 29.45% and 50%), or a majority (>50%).
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Eleven Meta-Beliefs Among 185 New York City Minority Parents
Belief in the helpfulness of seeing
the world as…
Safe (vs. dangerous)
Pleasurable (vs. miserable)
Progressing (vs. declining)
Harmless (vs. threatening)
Cooperative (vs. competitive)
Stable (vs. fragile)
Just (vs. unjust)
Abundant (vs. barren)
Funny (vs. not funny)
Hierarchical (vs. nonhierarchical)

M

SD

3.10
3.57
2.99
2.44
3.11
2.66
3.11

.62
.75
.91
.87
1.21
1.10
.89

3.64
2.90
2.46

.89
1.14
1.12

SEM Median % <2.5
(interpretation)
.05
3.07 14% (meaningful)
.06
3.60 7% (insubstantial)
.07
3.00 21% (substantial)
.06
2.40
53% (majority)
.09
3.33
32% (major)
.08
2.67
41% (major)
.07
3.25 19% (meaningful)
.07
.08
.08

3.67
3.00
2.50

% <4 Kurt α
osis
92%
.27 .89
64%
.56 .69
85%
.29 .73
94% -.62 .69
65% -.68 .81
83%
-.8 .76
79%
.13 .64

11% (meaningful) 50%
36% (major) 77%
49% (major) 88%

.15
-.49
-.59

.73
.83
.76

Improvable (vs. too hard to improve) 3.97
.72
.05
4.00 2% (insubstantial) 39% 1.55
Note. Possible range on meta-belief scores was 0-5. SEM refers to standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3
The Primal World Beliefs that 185 Parents Considered Most Helpful to Their Children
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Results
Many parents believed that instilling negative primals in their children is the best way to
prepare their children to navigate life, though to different extents depending on the primal (see
Table 3 and Figure 3). Based on pre-registered thresholds, an insubstantial proportion of parents
thought that seeing the world as too hard to improve (2%) or miserable (7%) would most benefit
their children. However, meaningful, substantial, major, and a majority proportions of parents,
ranging from 11% to 53%, expressed the belief that their children would most benefit by being
taught to see the world as dangerous, declining, competitive, fragile, unjust, barren, not funny,
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and full of physical threats. Furthermore, in all but one instance, a large majority of parents
thought that seeing the world as distinctly positive was not ideal, even among only those who saw
more value in the positive primal. For example, 92% of parents thought that seeing the world as
safe to very safe (i.e., scores of 4-5 on a 0-5 scale) would be best for their children and 85% held
that a strong belief that the world is getting better should be avoided.
Discussion
Meta-beliefs purporting the utility of negative primals cannot be a major driver of negative
primals unless such meta-beliefs are to some degree prevalent in the population. Based on the
assumption that parents strongly want their kids to achieve success and wellbeing, Study 1
sought to examine prevalence of theoretically promising primals in a theoretically promising
population. This was done by asking 180 New York City ethnic-minority parents what primal world
beliefs they most want to instill in their children. Strongly left-skewed score distributions would
have suggested near consensus that more positive primal world beliefs offer more utility, and vice
versa for right-skewed distributions. What was found, however, was normal distributions,
suggesting disagreement among subjects, with two points worth highlighting.
First, as hypothesized, a substantial number of parents reported a belief that the best
way to prepare children to navigate life was to teach them that the world is in various ways a bad
place: including that that the world is full of physical threats; does not reward or punish fairly; is
rarely that funny; is full of fragile situations that could easily fall apart; is cut-throat; and is getting
worse. Second, putting aside parents who see negative primals as most helpful and focusing only
on parents in the right side of the distributions, fewer parents considered distinctly positive
primals as offering more utility than slightly positive primals. If this result is minimally
generalizable, this indicates a common conception that seeing the world as slightly good supports
positive outcomes, but seeing the world as distinctively good is too good because very positive
beliefs are actually associated with less desirable outcomes. Could that be true? This question is
explored in Study 2.
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Study 2: Establishing Primals’ Success and Wellbeing Correlates
Study 1 results suggest that a portion of the population believe (a) that negative primals
correspond with achieving success and wellbeing and (b) that distinctly positive primals
correspond with less success and wellbeing than slightly positive primals. Study 2 examines data
from six samples and occupational contexts to determine the plausibility of these two meta-beliefs
when it comes to eight outcomes: job success, job satisfaction, physical health, negative
emotions, depression, attempted suicide, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. A
secondary aim was to build on the initial findings of Clifton and colleagues (2019) and Stallman
and colleagues (2020) to better establish where primals fit within the nomological net. I preregistered the study on the Open Science Framework before two of the six samples were
collected and all analyses conducted. See Table 9 and 10 in appendix for descriptive statistics.
Samples
Sample 1: AH.Org
AuthenticHappiness.Org is a wellbeing-focused website where the general public can
voluntarily participate in self-report survey research and receive scores on completed measures.
From May 20th, 2019 to March 23rd, 2020, a primals measure was taken 5,316 times with 3,925
unique user-IDs involving no missing responses on relevant subscales. Of these, 59% were male,
66% were younger than 45, and 63% were college graduates. Though respondents were in 92
countries, 68% were in the USA; 5% in Australia; 4% each in the U.K., India, and Canada; 2% in
South Africa; 1% in the Philippines; and <1% in each remaining country. Subjects identified
themselves with one of 65 possible occupations which were aggregated into 10 occupation
groups. Of these 3,925 subjects, 1,072 completed the life satisfaction measure, doing so on
average 5.2 months from when they completed the primals measure; 1,118 completed measures
of physical health, negative emotion, and psychological flourishing, doing so on average 1.6
months from when they completed the primals measure; and 1,291 completed the depression
measure, doing so on average 3.6 months from when they completed the primals measure.
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Subsample demographic composition was not notably different than the parent sample. No
subjects provided information on job success, job satisfaction, or attempted suicide.
Sample 2: YM.Org
YourMorals.Org is another website where the general public can voluntarily participate in
self-report research surveys and receive scores on the measures they complete. But instead of
wellbeing research, most studies concern political topics. From November, 2018 to August, 2019,
2,331 people completed the primals measure with 1,727 having no missing responses. Of these
subjects (Mage=34 years, SDage=14), 69% were male and 72% reported being in or completing
college. The respondents were spread across 56 countries, with 74% were in the United States;
7% in Canada; 5% in the U.K.; 4% in Australia; 1% in New Zealand; and <1% in each remaining
country. Subjects identified themselves with one of 59 possible occupations which were
aggregated into 18 occupation groups. Of 1,843 subjects, 1,639 completed a measure of socioeconomic status which could be used as a proxy for professional success and 328 completed the
satisfaction with life measure. A small portion of subjects did not complete measures
concurrently. Subsample demographic composition was not notably different than parent sample.
No subjects in this sample completed measures of job satisfaction, physical health, negative
emotions, depression, attempted suicide, or psychological flourishing.
Sample 3: mTurk
Of 882 American mTurkers who completed a lengthy survey, 192 were excluded for
failing two or more of five validation items, leaving 692 (Mage=36 years, SDage=11). Of these, 56%
were male, 49% married, 61% were college graduates, 72% work full-time, and 68% were white.
This sample completed a personal income question which was used as a proxy for job success
among those with full-time jobs, as well as measures of physical health, negative emotion,
depression, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. No subjects completed measures of
job satisfaction or attempted suicide.
Sample 4: Immigrants
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American immigrants from India (47 subjects), West Africa (45 subjects), and South
Korea (53 subjects) were recruited January, 2018 to April, 2019 to take the survey for $5 Amazon
gift cards. Subjects were recruited via (a) flyers around the University of Pennsylvania campus;
(b) social media networks of three undergraduate student researchers who were themselves 2nd
generation immigrants; and (c) student groups (e.g., Penn’s African Student Association) in the
greater Philadelphia area. Initial analysis showed primals subscales to be unusually unreliable
(compared to reliability coefficients reported by Clifton et al., 2019) presumably because of
reported English disfluency or the need for cultural adaptation of the measurement instrument.
Therefore, prior to any further analysis of results, I examined whether one or more of the three
subgroups were driving the unreliability, determined it was the Indian group which, when
removed, left 98 subjects, and subscale reliability rose to typical levels. Of remaining subjects, all
were non-white, 71% were 2nd generation (primarily college age) and 72% were female. This
sample completed measures of negative emotion, satisfaction with life, and psychological
flourishing. No subjects provided information on job success, job satisfaction, depression, or
attempted suicide.
Sample 5: Philly Pros
A sample of Philadelphia-area professionals including lawyers (private practice), car
salespersons, and police officers were recruited from January 2018 to March 2019. Because car
salespersons proved especially difficult to recruit, they were offered a 5$ Amazon gift card for
their participation. Of 120 completed surveys across occupational groups, 10 were excluded for
failing more than one attention check, leaving 110 (Mage=47 years, SDage=13) who were 67%
married, 73% male, and 88% white. Subjects provided detailed information on job success and
also completed measures of job satisfaction, physical health, negative emotion, attempted
suicide, satisfaction with life, and psychological flourishing, though not a depression inventory.
Sample 6: Undergrads
A sample of 497 undergraduate college students at the University of Pennsylvania
completed the survey for course credit in the Spring of 2018. Of these, 24 were removed for
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failing more than one attention check, leaving 473 (Mage=20 years, SDage=1). Of these students,
27% were freshmen, 33% were sophomores, 23% were juniors, 17% seniors, 74% were female,
and 48% were white. They provided information on all eight outcomes.
Seventeen Valenced Primals
The Primals Inventory (PI-99) consists of 99 items, 39 of which are reverse-scored. The
PI-99 resulted from Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) broad-based effort to empirically derive all
major primals humans hold. For example, one of ten projects aiming to capture candidate primals
involved the analysis of over 80,000 tweets beginning with the phrases “the world is,” “the
universe is,” and “life is.” Another project involved the analysis of over 1,700 instances of world
description gleaned primarily from sources that experts considered to be the 385 historically most
influential sacred texts, philosophical treatises, novels, political speeches, and films. These
projects led to the identification of 234 items subjected to three rounds of factor analysis (N =
930, N = 524, N = 529) which identified the 26 temporally-stable, normally-distributed,
meaningful, reliable dimensions in the form of one primary primal (i.e., the belief the world is
Good), three secondary primals (the beliefs that the world is Safe, Enticing, and Alive), and 22
tertiary primals. Pertinent to Study 2, however, were only those primals with clear valence.
Changing, for example, cannot be considered negative or positive for conceptual and empirical
reasons. Based primarily on empirical relationships with Good, I prioritized the 17 primals
highlighted in Figure 4. These include Good; Safe and its seven associated tertiary primals; and
Enticing and its seven associated tertiary primals. Thus, data on 9 primals were not analyzed.
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Figure 4
Seventeen Primals With the Clearest Valence

Note. Figure adapted from Clifton and Kim (2020)
Study 2a: Job Success
Measures
YourMorals.Org subjects (Sample 2; n=1,639) reported working in 27 professional
contexts (18 sub-samples and 9 sub-sub-samples where n≥30), as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Educators, including teachers and administrators at all levels (n=136); sub-subsample of pre-college teachers (n=62) and college professors (n=32)
Sales and communications (n=46)
Business, including entrepreneurs, owners, executives, managers, and consultants
(n=128); sub-sub-sample of mangers/executives (n=46) and small business
owners/entrepreneurs (n=34)
Clerical, including secretaries and administrative office workers (n=47)
Creative arts, such as design, fashion, filmmaker, musician, photographer (n=69);
sub-sub-sample not including designers or fashion (n=54).
Customer service (n=73); sub-sub-sample of hospitality workers (n=38) and non-food
service cashier (n=30)
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Engineer, not including information technology (n=57)
Food service (n=46)
Government (n=35)
Healthcare, including doctors, nurses, dentists, etc. (n=70)
Lawyers (n=33)
Manual labor, such as construction (n=83)
Military/public safety (n=35)
Researcher/analyst (n=74)
Student (n=227)
Technology (n=166); sub-sub-samples of programmers (n=116) and other (n=50)
Miscellaneous, including farmer, finance, insurance, and journalist (n=248)
Unemployed (n=66)

Across these occupational contexts, success was measured using a single item with 10 response
options asking subjects to rank themselves compared to others in their country in regard to
income, education, and respect. Job success among Sample 3: mTurk subjects who were fulltime workers making $10,000 or more annually (N=476) was measured by personal income,
another proxy for success. Sample 5: Philadelphia Professionals and Sample 6: Undergraduates
offered more precision due to several job-specific success indicators administered on the
recommendation of members of each occupation:
•
•
•
•

Car salesperson success was determined by cars sold per month, monthly closing
ratio, monthly commission, dealership rank, and salary
Private-sector lawyer success was determined solely by current salary
Police officer success was determined by annual community compliments,
community complaints, special assignments, and salary
Student success was determined by High School and College GPA, standardized
test scores (SAT), and quality and quantity of relationships with friends and teachers.

Undergraduate relationships with friends (α=.87) and teachers (α=.87) was measured by two
subscales from Pascarella and Terenzini’s (1980) Student Involvement Questionnaire. Example
items include It has been difficult for me to meet and make friends with other students (reversescored) and Since coming to this university I have developed a close, personal relationship with
at least one faculty member.
Analysis
Across samples and within each profession where n≥30, I examined pairwise Pearson
correlations (rs) to determine when decreases in primals scores (i.e., more negative beliefs) might
be associated with more job success. Because personal income was skewed in Sample 3, I
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computed Kendall’s τ b (a non-parametric test) and then converted it to Pearson’s r for crosssample comparison. For Sample 5: Philly Professionals, I partialed age and years spent
practicing the profession (this data was not available for other samples), which would presumably
control for generation-related or seniority effects. To determine whether seeing the world as
slightly positive vs. distinctly positive was associated with greater job success, I conducted t-tests
comparing those who on average selected the Slightly Agree response option indicating the belief
that the world is positive (PI-99 scores rounded to 3) to those who on average selected Agree or
Strongly Agree (PI-99 scores rounded to 4 or 5), doing so when n≥30 in both groups. Due to low
power relatively fewer extreme scores, subjects averaging 4 were not compared to those
averaging 5 and t-tests were not conducted within occupationally-defined subgroups.
Despite conducting several hundred analyses, correcting for multiple comparisons in the
course of this sort of research was deemed inappropriate for several reasons most of which are
summarized by Rubin (2017), O’Keefe (2003), and Rothmann (1990). First, multiple comparisons
never influences statistics; Rubin (2017) notes a gambler might buy 100 lottery tickets to increase
his or her chances of winning, but this does not alter the promise (i.e., p-values) of individual
tickets. Second, my pre-registered hypotheses were specific to the overall pattern of correlates
associated with a category—in this case 17 valenced primals—which entails examining many
statistics. As long as conclusions are confined to the pattern and not a particular result, the
multiple comparison problem is irrelevant because the analysis allows for a portion of false
positives. (To aid researchers interested in particular relationships, I report significance
thresholds of p<.0001.) Third, most multiple-comparison correction techniques are not designed
for this sort of analysis approach involving several thousand analyses, potentially resulting in a
large increase in false negatives (e.g., Rothman, 1990). Fourth, multiple comparison problems
concern p-values and not effect sizes and I rely primarily on effect-sizes to interpret relationships.
Fifth, with many large effect sizes, p values were often too small to play a meaningful role in
comparing relationships. Sixth and seventh, whereas multiple comparison is most problematic
when examining one sample and selectively reporting few results from many analyses conducted,
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I examine all outcomes in multiple samples and report results of all analyses conducted. This
approach precludes cherry picking. Still, multiple tests of the same hypothesis does inflate alpha
levels (Rubin, 2017) and, though I analyze 17 statistically distinguishable primals, much of the
variance is explained by one primal (Good). Therefore, I encourage some caution in the
interpretation of these results.
Results
Those with more positive primals enjoyed more job success, but not much more and not
always. Of the 68 relationships displayed in Table 4 (4 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,639), 36
were significant (p<.05). In all 36, negative primals were associated with less job success. Effect
sizes were small (with none among Sample 5: Philly Professionals). This pattern of results held
nearly without exception when looking across a variety of success indicators and 31 different
occupations and occupational groups, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who
see the world negatively, of 55 t-tests comparing job success levels among those who hold
slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30, 19 were significant
(p<.05). In all 19 cases, those with slightly positive primals reported less job success. Primals
notably associated with job success included Progressing, Pleasurable, Safe, and Good—Just
was predictive but not especially. Primals least related to job success include Worth Exploring,
Meaningful, and Funny.
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Table 4
Job Success’ Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r
Sample 2:
Sample 3:
Sample 5:
Sample 6:
YM.Org
mTurk k
Philly Pros
Undergrads
N
1639
476
98
426
Good
.22**
.10*
.09
.24**
Safe
.26**
.17*
.08
.23**
Pleasurable
.20**
.16*
.11
.21**
Regenerative
.15**
.09
.05
.16*
Progressing
.22**
.17*
.11
.20**
Harmless
.24**
.20**
.10
.12*
Cooperative
.16**
.09
-.02
.22**
Stable
.15**
.09
-.03
.12*
Just
.16**
.12*
.15
.14*
Enticing
.12**
.02
.11
.18*
Interesting
.13**
.01
.07
.18*
Beautiful
.09*
-.01
-.02
.16*
Abundant
.17**
.06
.18
.18*
Worth Exploring
.02
.01
.04
.13*
Meaningful
.09*
.05
.09
.07
Improvable
.07*
.02
.13
.12*
Funny
.03
.09
.05
.06
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Negative relationships are bolded. k Derived from Kendall’s τ b and then converted to
a Pearson’s r.

Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 2: YM.Org. Of 459 examined
relationships between 17 primals and success within 27 occupation categories where n≥30, 110
relationships were significant (p<.05). In 97% of these relationships, negative primals were
associated with less job success. Two of three exceptions were in the creative industry, driven by
a sub-sample of filmmakers, musicians, and photographers within which success was associated
with seeing the world as less Beautiful (r(52)=-.28, p=.043). The other exception was among
college professors within which success was tied to seeing the world as less Worth Exploring
(r(30)=-.36, p=.046). The only other significant relationship among professors was Funny
(r(30)=.37, p=.037), which was positively related to success. Across relationships, Enticing and its
tertiary primals were positively related to success 31 times, while Safe was related 65 times.
Primals least related to success include Worth Exploring, Meaningful, and Improvable, which
were only related one time each. Primals most related include Harmless (13 times), Safe (13
times), Abundant (9 times), Pleasurable (8 times), Progressing (8 times), Beautiful (8 times), Just
(7 times), and Interesting (7 times). Positive primals were especially predictive of success among
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a small sub-group of small business owners/entrepreneurs, including the belief that the world is
Progressing (r(32)=.55, p=.0008) and Regenerative (r(32)=.46, p=.006).
Figure 5
Relationship of r=.71 Between Funny and Salary in a Small Sub-Sample of Police Officers

Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Within three small
sub-samples of specific occupations in the Philadelphia metro area (car salespersons, lawyers,
and police), I examined 204 relationships between 17 primals and 12 outcomes ((6 car
salesperson outcomes x17)+(1 lawyer outcome x 17)+(5 police outcomes x17)), finding 24
significant positive relationships and no negative relationships. Twenty-one of the significant
positive relationships, however, were among police officers. In this very small subsample (n=26),
several positive primals were related to the composite success measure, including Good,
Regenerative, Enticing, Beautiful, Meaningful, Improvable, and Funny. These relationships were
driven more by the absence of annual community complaints than the presence of annual
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community compliments, had no relationship to being awarded special assignments, and were
especially related to salary, particularly among Enticing and it’s tertiary primals. Figure 5 displays
the strongest relationship found across all examinations of job success in all groups, which was
between the belief that the world is Funny and salary (r(24)=.71, p<.0001), dropping nominally
when controlling for age or years in law enforcement.
Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 6: Undergrads. High school and
college grade point averages, as well as SAT scores, were generally unrelated to primals (see
Table 5). Of seven significant relationships, two were negative, and all effects were small.
Looking at a subgroup of students for which SAT Verbal and Math scores were available,
Cooperative’s positive relationship to combined SAT scores was more driven by its relationship to
Verbal scores than Math scores; Safe’s and Progressing’s positive relationship to combined SAT
scores was more driven by Math than Verbal; and Meaningful’s negative relationship was driven
by both Math and Verbal. Meanwhile, no negative primal and all positive primals were related to
establishing good relationships with teachers and peers while in college.
Table 5
Academic Success’ Relationship to 17 Primals Among Sample 6: Undergrads Using Pearson’s r
High School
SAT
Undergrad
Peer
Professor
GPAk
Scoresk
GPAk
Relationships Relationships
N
468
446
470
463
469
Good
.06
.01
.01
.38**
.25**
Safe
.07
.12*
.05
.31**
.19**
Pleasurable
.09
.05
.03
.30**
.18*
Regenerative
.01
.05
.02
.24**
.13*
Progressing
.01
.18*
.01
.24**
.12*
Harmless
.07
.03
-.00
.13*
.12*
Cooperative
.04
.15*
.14*
.20**
.15*
Stable
.03
.06
-.06
.22**
.11*
Just
.03
-.01
-.01
.20**
.18**
Enticing
.04
-.08
-.01
.36**
.22**
Interesting
.01
-.01
.03
.34**
.17*
Beautiful
.08
-.05
.04
.25**
.16*
Abundant
.04
.01
-.02
.27**
.12*
Worth Exploring
.12*
-.05
.02
.18**
.13*
Meaningful
-.05
-.18*
-.03
.30**
.17*
Improvable
.05
-.04
-.07
.24**
.20**
Funny
-.02
-.04
-.11*
.21**
.13*
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Negative relationships are bolded. k Derived from Kendall’s τ b and then converted to
a Pearson’s r.
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Discussion
If success is associated with negative primals in any occupation, prime candidates may
be occupations involving low incidence of failure but high cost of failure, such as a police officer
and lawyers. This did not bear out. In general, primals are not strongly associated with success
outcomes, but, when they are associated, the connection is almost always to positive primals,
including among low-failure-incidence and high-failure-cost jobs where this result is theoretically
least likely. It may well be that in these contexts expecting the worst might have benefits, but
these benefits might be counteracted by the negative effects of negative beliefs, such as being
less agreeable, more introverted, less emotionally stable, less proactive, more suspicious of
colleagues, and less happy, all of which is thought to impact workplace success (e.g., Rode et al.,
2008; Boehm & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Also noteworthy was that in no occupation was less success
associated with seeing the world as distinctly positive compared to slightly positive. The more
positive, it seems, the more success, even for more objective measures of success less likely
impacted by positivity bias (e.g., salary).
Nevertheless, these success measures were of variable quality and, the more objective
and higher quality the measure, the smaller the relationship with primals appears to be. Analyses
of Sample 2 and 3 relied on proxies for success—perhaps poor proxies—and the relationship
between primals and success among Sample 4: Undergrads was driven by relationship scores—
not more objective measures like grades and test scores. In Sample 5: Philly Professionals,
which involved objective success metrics tailored to what success means in each profession
(e.g., monthly cars sold for car salespersons), primals were quite unrelated to success. Though
analysis of Sample 5’s three sub-samples did reveal some fascinating and remarkably strong
connections, these sub-samples were too small to justify conclusions of any strength. Further
research should examine, for example, the altogether unbelievably high relationship between
Funny and salary among police officers (r=.71), the moderate relationship between Enticing and
peer friendships among undergraduates (r=.36), and the moderate relationships between
Progressing and success among pre-college teachers (r=.41) and entrepreneurs (r=.36).
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Results for Just were noteworthy for not being noteworthy. As mentioned, Just has
received by far the most research attention, with several studies finding connections between
Just and job success, productivity, grades, and even GDP (e.g., Furnham, 1993). The idea is
that, similarly to why people work harder in contexts where they believe hard work will be
rewarded, people work harder in worlds where they believe hard work will be rewarded. Though,
unable to replicate Dalbert and Stoeber’s (2005) connection between Just and grades among
undergraduates, Just was nevertheless often related to success at low levels. But several other
primals, including Good, Safe, Pleasurable, and Progressing, were just as if not more related to
success. Researchers who study success factors might consider the role other primals play
besides the belief that the world is just.
Study 2b: Job Satisfaction
Measure
I used Thompson and Phua’s (2012) psychometrically-validated four-item Brief Index of
Job Satisfaction Measure (BIAJS) to measure job satisfaction. This scale was designed as an
affective measure of how one feels about their job, rather than a measure of objective job
conditions, such as renumeration and opportunities for advancement. This scale includes no
reverse-scored items. An example item is I find real enjoyment in my job and all items refer to “my
job”. Responses were collected on a five-point likert scale. I changed one word in the prompt for
each sample as appropriate (e.g., Thinking specifically about your current job as a [lawyer/care
salesperson/student/police officer], do you agree with the following?).
Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more job satisfaction. Of 32 relationships
displayed in Table 6 (17 primals x 2 samples; total N=583), 31 were significant (p<.05). In all 31,
negative primals were associated with less job satisfaction. Several involved moderate effect
sizes. When subsets of Philadelphia-area Professionals—car salespersons, lawyers, and
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police—were examined individually, across 51 relationships (17 primals x 3 sub-samples), there
were 24 significant relationships (p<.05). Again, in all 24 relationships, negative primals were
associated with less job satisfaction. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world
negatively, in 24 t-tests comparing job satisfaction among those who held slightly positive versus
distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30, 17 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 17
cases, those with slightly positive primals reported less job success than those with distinctly
positive primals. Primals notably associated with job satisfaction include Improvable, Enticing,
Progressing, Pleasurable, Safe, and Good.
Table 6
Job Satisfaction’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r

N
Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing
Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
*p<.05 **p<.0001

Sample 5:
Philly Pros

Sample 6:
Undergrads

110
.46**
.38**
.42**
.31*
.37*
.18
.21*
.20*
.38**
.47**
.37**
.39**
.37**
.20*
.32*
.46**
.22*

473
.33**
.30**
.27**
.21**
.31**
.19**
.21**
.11*
.17*
.29**
.22**
.22**
.22**
.17*
.17*
.25**
.21**

Discussion
Job satisfaction has been previously tied to the belief the world is Just (e.g., Otto, Glaser,
& Dalbart, 2009) but not other primals. In these two samples, negative primals (including Just)
were routinely associated with slightly to moderately less job satisfaction. This connection to job
satisfaction may partly explain why in Study 2a negative primals were hardly ever associated with
job success. Even if in some occupational contexts negative primals contribute to job success,
that contribution may be weak in comparison to the negative effects of negative primals on other
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outcomes, one of which may be low job satisfaction, which is known to erode workplace
performance (e.g., Rezvani et al., 2016). It should be noted, however, that these two samples
represent a few hundred subjects (N=583) rather than the few thousand examined in connection
to other outcomes. Still, because Sample 5: Philly Professionals involves three sub-samples in
which similar effect-sizes were observed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the observed
pattern is somewhat common.
Study 2c: Physical Health
Measure
Butler and Kern’s (2016) psychometrically-validated PERMA Profiler, which was used to
measure general psychological flourishing (described below), includes a three-item global
measure of physical health. Items are as follows:
1. In general, how would you say your health is? (0 = “terrible”, 10 = “excellent)
2. How satisfied are you with your current physical health? (0 = “not at all”, 10 =
“completely)
3. Compared to others of your same age and sex, how is your health? (0 = “terrible”, 10
= “excellent)
Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Subjects with more positive primals reported better physical health. Of 68 relationships
displayed in Table 7 (4 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,393), there were 65 significant
relationships (p<.05). In all 65, negative primals were associated with worse health, with most
effect sizes in the small to moderate range. This pattern of results held nearly without exception
when looking across 19 different occupations and occupational groups, as discussed below.
Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, in 58 t-tests comparing health
among those who held slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30,
43 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 43 cases, those with slightly positive primals reported
worse health than those with distinctly positive primals. Primals most associated with job success
included Pleasurable and Safe. For example, among 473 undergraduate students, Safe
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correlated with better health at r=.40, p<.0001. Among those primals least related to health
include Worth Exploring and Funny.
Table 7
Health’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r

N
Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing
Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
*p<.05 **p<.0001

Sample 1:
AH.Org

Sample 3:
mTurk

Sample 5:
Philly Pros

Sample 6:
Undergrads

1,118
.25**
.24**
.24**
.20**
.20**
.21**
.13**
.12**
.18**
.17**
.12**
.14**
.15**
.07*
.13**
.19**
.08*

692
.35**
.31**
.32**
.26**
.30**
.24**
.14*
.12*
.32**
.29**
.18**
.21**
.28**
.22**
.19**
.29**
.15**

110
.39**
.36**
.42**
.33*
.26*
.18
.23*
.27*
.24*
.33*
.22*
.20*
.37*
.14
.32*
.36**
.08

473
.36**
.40**
.36**
.35**
.25**
.26**
.29**
.26**
.24**
.23**
.19**
.17*
.22**
.14*
.19**
.18**
.10*

Occupation-Specific Health Results in Sample 1: AH.org. Within the 1,118 subjects
who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten professional groupings had n≥30:
executives (n=49), managers (n=117), administrators and other professionals (n=360), clerks
(n=61), skilled manual laborers (n=50), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=33), and no occupation
(n=411). Eight of the 65 specific professions had n≥30: administrative person (n=46),
licensed/certified professional (n=31), other manager (n=55), other professional (n=197), small
business owner (n=30), student (n=351), teacher (n=39), and unemployed (n=35). Of 255
examined relationships ((7 occupation groupings + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there
were 84 significant relationships (p<.05). In all cases, more negative primals were associated with
less health. Worth Exploring and Funny were most unrelated to psychological flourishing across
occupations. Primals especially predictive of health include Good, Safe, Pleasurable,
Regenerative, Progressing, Harmless, and Abundant. For example, health was related to
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Pleasurable among executives (r(47)=.43, p=.002) and clerks (r(58)=.43, p=.0002) but not skilled
manual laborers (r(48)=.14, p=.31).
Occupation-Specific Health Results in Sample 5: Philly Professionals. Of 51
relationships between 17 primals and health among 3 professions (car salespersons, lawyers,
and police), 20 were significant (p<.05). In all 20 cases, the negative primal was associated with
worse health. Only Good and Abundant were related to health in all three groups.
Discussion
Seeing the world as dangerous was associated with less physical health, with small to
moderate effect sizes. This replicates in 2,393 subjects in four samples and 19 occupation groups
what Clifton and colleagues (2019) had found earlier in one sample of 524 subjects using a
preliminary version of the Primals Inventory: there is a connection between primals and health.
Positivity bias (or negativity bias), however, is likely a systematic source of error influencing
measures of both health and primals. Yet it is not clear how this source of error could fully explain
sometimes sizeable levels of covariance (e.g., r=.40 between health and Safe among 473
undergraduates) or the consistent differentiation seen between particular primals and health (e.g.,
health was more highly correlated with Safe than Enticing in all 4 samples). This suggests that, in
addition to belief valence, belief content also matters.
The size and direction of the relationship between primals and health is not necessarily
obvious. The avoidance of many physical dangers requires preparation and alertness, which can
be motivated by the expectation that dangers are likely to be encountered, which may be driven
in part by the belief that the world is generally a dangerous place (i.e., low Safe scores). It may
also be the case that poor physical health can cause one to see the world as more dangerous,
since declining health increases real and perceived vulnerability to increasingly less severe
threats. Yet, recently argued (Clifton, 2020), the research thus far suggests that primals more
often function as lenses used to interpret experiences while being themselves relatively
uninfluenced by those experiences. If so, primals may not reflect experiences of being healthy or
unhealthy in this sort of straightforward manner.
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Another possibility is that negative primals contribute to poor health outcomes. Five
causal pathways were recently proposed (Clifton & Kim, 2020). First and second, threat-relevant
primals might influence perceptions of danger (e.g., percepts of a poisonous snake in the grass),
resulting in (a) more frequent and acute stimulation of the cardiotoxic stress axis as well as (b)
the gene expression pattern known as the conserved transcriptional response to adversity. These
processes are associated with chronic and inflammation-related conditions including cancer, type
2 diabetes, heart disease, and neurodegenerative disease. Third, primals such as Improvable
might influence adherence to healthy behaviors, such as diet and exercise. Fourth, primals such
as Regenerative and Just may influence treatment expectations, which are known to influence
treatment outcomes through placebo effects and other mechanisms. For example, Just has
already been tied to physician-adjudicated recovery from myocardial infarction (Agrawal & Dala.
1993). Fifth, Clifton and colleagues (2019) theorized that Good, Meaningful, and Needs Me
should contribute to the pattern of thought and action often understood to be trait optimism and
having purpose in life, both of which have been associated with positive outcomes when facing
several age-related chronic conditions (e.g., Alzheimer’s, stroke, respiratory disease). Indeed,
optimists appear to live 11-15% longer than pessimists (Lee et al., 2019). Building on above
results and these hypotheses, a good next step towards exploring the primals-health connection
would be to compare Primals Inventory scores to more objective measures of physical health
(e.g., blood pressure) as well as automatic physiological responses to potentially threatening but
ambiguous stimuli.
Study 2d: Negative Emotion
Measure
Butler and Kern’s (2016) PERMA Profiler also includes a three-item global measure of
negative emotion frequency, as follows:
1. In general, how often do you feel anxious? (0 = “never”, 10 = “always”)
2. In general, how often do you feel angry? (0 = “never”, 10 = “always”)
3. In general, how often do you feel sad? (0 = “never”, 10 = “always”)
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Negative emotion frequency typically correlates negatively with psychological flourishing and
positive emotion, but remains sufficiently unrelated to warrant separate treatment.
Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Subjects with more positive primals reported more infrequent negative emotions. Of 85
relationships displayed in Table 8 (5 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,491), there were 75
significant relationships (p<.05). In all 75, negative primals were associated with more frequent
negative emotions, with effect sizes ranging from small to r=-.50. This largest effect size was
found between negative emotions and Pleasurable among 473 undergraduates. Similar results
were observed when looking across 19 occupations and occupational groups, as discussed
below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, in 65 t-tests comparing
negative emotion frequency among those who held slightly positive versus distinctly positive
primals where both groups ≥30, 49 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 49 cases, those with
slightly positive primals reported more frequent negative emotions than those with distinctly
positive primals. For example, 309 mTurkers who saw the world as slightly Safe averaged 4.9 out
of 10 on negative emotion frequency while 78 subjects who saw the world as distinctly Safe
averaged 2.9 on negative emotion frequency (t=9.5, p<.0001). In general, primals most
associated with negative emotion infrequency include Pleasurable and Stable. Among those least
related include Worth Exploring and Funny.
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Table 8
Negative Emotions’ Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r
Sample 1:
AH.Org

Sample 3:
mTurk

Sample 4:
Immigrants

N
1,118
692
98
Good
-.44**
-.46**
-.35*
Safe
-.43**
-.41**
-.33*
Pleasurable
-.42**
-.41**
-.33*
Regenerative
-.39**
-.39**
-.15
Progressing
-.29**
-.28**
-.22*
Harmless
-.24**
-.24**
-.34*
Cooperative
-.33**
-.34**
-.20
Stable
-.32**
-.31**
-.25*
Just
-.19**
-.17**
-.23*
Enticing
-.35**
-.43**
-.23*
Interesting
-.37**
-.49**
-.30*
Beautiful
-.24**
-.33**
-.23*
Abundant
-.33**
-.35**
-.15
Worth Exploring
-.15**
-.27**
-.05
Meaningful
-.32**
-.49**
-.13
Improvable
-.31**
-.31**
-.12
Funny
-.17**
-.11*
-.13
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Bold highlights the one positive relationship.

Sample 5:
Philly Pros

Sample 6:
Undergrads

110
-.42**
-.48**
-.50**
-.34*
-.33*
-.32*
-.39**
-.40**
-.23*
-.26*
-.25*
-.22*
-.23*
.05
-.31*
-.27*
-.06

473
-.42**
-.44**
-.39**
-.31**
-.31**
-.25**
-.34**
-.35**
-.24**
-.29**
-.24**
-.21**
-.24**
-.09
-.25**
-.28**
-.18**

Occupation-Specific Negative Emotion Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. As described
above, within the 1,118 subjects who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten
professional groupings and eight of 65 specific occupations had n≥30. Of 255 examined
relationships ((7 occupation groupings + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there were 151
significant relationships (p<.05). In all cases, more negative primals were associated with more
frequent negative emotions. For example, negative emotions were strongly negatively correlated
to Interesting among executives (r(47)=-.52, p=.0001), teachers (r(37)=-.57, p=.0002) and the
unemployed (r(33)=-.60, p=.0002).
Occupation-Specific Negative Emotion Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of 51
relationships between 17 primals and flourishing among 3 professions (car salespersons,
lawyers, and police), 21 were significant (p<.05). In all 21, the negative primal was associated
with more frequent experiences of negative emotion. Only Worth Exploring and Funny were
unrelated to negative emotion in all three groups, while only Safe and Pleasurable were related in
all three groups, with effect sizes ranging from .36 to .64.
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Discussion
Subjects with more negative primals reported more frequent negative emotions, often
much more. While it is possible that negative primals sometimes protect the individual from
negative emotions such as disappointment, negative primals might in many other ways induce
negative emotions, dwarfing any possible benefit. For example, negative primals like the belief
that the world is a place where most things and situations tend to fall apart (Stable vs. fragile)
may contribute to fear and anxiety across a variety of circumstances. Anxiety is in turn connected
to many negative outcomes, such as poor academic performance (e.g., Liu, 2006), that may in
turn induce further negative emotions, increase negative beliefs, and so forth in the sort of selfperpetuating circle described by Fredrickson (e.g., 2001). Other research on negative beliefs,
such as negative beliefs about one’s partner (e.g., Niehuis, 2011) or one’s abilities (e.g., King,
2016) connect negative beliefs with negative emotion. Indeed, a half-century of depression
research suggests that negative beliefs about the self, one’s future, or one’s social environment
(Beck’s cognitive Triad, discussed below) do not protect the individual from negative emotion, but
instead propels the individual towards both increased negative affect and clinical depression
(Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005; Beck et al., 1979; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2012).
Study 2e: Depression
Measure
I used Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, and Swinson’s (1998) 21-item Depression Anxiety
Stress Scales (DASS-21) to measure depression. No items are reverse-scored and responses
were collected on a 4-point likert scale (never, sometimes, often, almost always). An example
item is I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything. However, in Sample 1:
AuthenticHappiness.Org, the DASS-21 was not available. For that sample, I analyze Radloff’s
(1977) 20-item CES-D, with four reverse-scored items. Example items include I felt lonely and I
had crying spells. Response were collected on 4-point likert scale: Rarely or none of the time
(less than 1 day), Some or a little of the time (1-2 days), Occasionally or a moderate amount of
the time (3-4 days), and Most or all of the time (5-7 days). Both scales asked how people had
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been feeling over the past week, with items probing various symptoms of depression. Both scales
have been validated as measures of depression symptoms in nonclinical contexts.
Analysis
Same as above.
Table 9
Depression’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pairwise Pearson’s r

N
Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing
Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
*p<.05 **p<.0001

Sample 1:
AH.Org
1,291
-.48**
-.45**
-.49**
-.40**
-.32**
-.30**
-.27**
-.31**
-.37**
-.36**
-.28**
-.23**
-.34**
-.11*
-.34**
-.36**
-.17**

Sample 3:
mTurk
692
-.52**
-.40**
-.45**
-.44**
-.26**
-.16**
-.34**
-.25**
-.22**
-.53**
-.54**
-.40**
-.42**
-.36**
-.60**
-.37**
-.15**

Sample 6:
Undergrads
473
-.49**
-.45**
-.43**
-.38**
-.29**
-.21**
-.29**
-.37**
-.30**
-.39**
-.33**
-.24**
-.27**
-.23**
-.41**
-.28**
-.21**

Results
Subjects with more positive primals reported fewer depression symptoms. Of 51
relationships displayed in Table 9 (3 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,456), all were significant
(p<.05)—all but one at p<.0001—and in all cases negative primals were associated with
increased levels of depression, typically involving moderate to large effect sizes. This pattern held
when looking across 19 represented occupations, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside
those who see the world negatively, of 49 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive
versus distinctly positive primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, 45 were significantly
different (p<.05). In all 45 cases, those with slightly positive primals were more depressed than
those with distinctly positive primals. Primals most associated with less depression include Good,
Safe, Enticing, Interesting, and Meaningful.
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Occupation-Specific Depression Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within the 1,291
subjects who took both the PI-99 and the CES-D, seven of ten professional groupings had n≥30:
executives (n=61), managers (n=151), administrators and other Professionals (n=405), clerks
(n=73), skilled manual laborers (n=55), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=42), and no occupation
(n=460). Ten of the 65 specific professions had n≥30: administrative person (n=52),
licensed/certified professional (n=46), other manager (n=71), other professional (n=203), retired
(n=33), small business owner (n=42), student (n=373), teacher (n=49), and unemployed (n=41).
Of 289 examined relationships ((7 occupation groups + 10 specific occupations) X 17 primals),
there were 221 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 221 cases, negative primals were
associated with increased depression, though with some variation by occupation. For example,
depression and Good were less correlated among administrators (r(50)=-.30, p=.03) and artists
(r(29)=-.41, p=.02) than among the unemployed (r(39)=-.65, p<.0001), retirees (r(31)=-.69,
p<.0001), and small business owners (r(40)=-.59, p<.0001).
Discussion
Negative primals are strongly associated with depression. Sample 1 effect sizes are also
slightly suppressed because a substantial minority did not take the primals and depression
measures concurrently but on average several months apart. While of course cross-sectional
research like this cannot indicate causation, such results are highly consistent with theoretical
paradigms that do suggest causation.
From ancient times until the 1970s, highly negative yet non-delusional beliefs like People
despise me or This situation is hopeless were listed among symptoms of melancholia/depression
(Radden, 2002; Lewinsohn et al., 1976; Berger, 1977; Lewinsohn & Youngren, 1976; Coyne &
Gotlib, 1983; Haas & Fitzgibbon, 1989). The consensus that negative beliefs were primarily
symptoms of depression persisted even after Beck (1963, 1964, 1967; Beck et al., 1979)
suggested that negative beliefs are more cause than symptom. Correlational research at the time
found strong relationships between depression and negative beliefs—similar to results above—
but was of course unconvincing. Many noted that large effect sizes between depression and
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negative beliefs are equally explained by either the depressive state causing the belief or the
belief causing the depressive state (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1981; Beidel & Turner, 1986; Haas &
Fitzgibbon, 1989; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). What finally clarified the role of negative beliefs was the
success of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which aims to increase the patient’s ability to
persuade themselves of more positive, functional, (and often seemingly more accurate) beliefs.
For example, two meta-meta-analyses examining 285 meta-analyses from 1994 to 2011
concluded that, compared to alternatives (including nondirective therapy, relaxation therapy,
supportive therapy, and a variety of pharmacological interventions and other treatments), CBT is
typically a more effective tool capable of moderate to large treatment effects (Butler et al., 2006;
Hofmann et al., 2012). Today, CBT is by far the most widespread form of talking therapy and has
been adapted to treat many mental health issues besides depression largely because the impact
of negative beliefs is not limited to depression. Most treatments approved by the Society of
Clinical Psychology (2013) are either CBT or CBT-related. Field, Farnsworth, and Nielsen (2014)
found that 94% of American counselors using any evidence-based treatment used CBT and
conclude that evidence-based treatment is likely to remain practically synonymous with CBT for
the foreseeable future.
Beck and CBT are relevant to the interpretation of above correlations because primals
are highly similar to—and to some degree already are—the beliefs Beck highlighted and CBT
was designed to target. Beck organized depression-relevant beliefs into three topics called the
Cognitive Triad: beliefs about the self (e.g., I am worthless), the self’s future (e.g., Nobody will
ever love me), and the self’s world (e.g., My boss hates me). Though primals likely fall within the
latter category, Beck used the term world primarily to refer to the individual’s immediate social
environment, as the preponderance of his published examples suggest and he himself has
confirmed (personal communication, March 1st 2019). Nevertheless, Beck’s suggestion about
topics of belief may be less pertinent than the sort of modifiers he considered to be depressionrelevant. For example, the beliefs I am of average height; I am extroverted; or I have a soul; are
not generally seen as depression relevant, despite being beliefs about the self, because
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depression-relevant beliefs involve particular modifiers. In the three prominent paragraphs
introducing the Cognitive Triad in Cognitive Therapy of Depression (Beck et al., 1979, p. 11), the
following modifiers are used: negative, defective, inadequate, diseased, deprived, undesirable,
worthless, hard, frustrating, failed, uncomfortable, and difficult. Primals are described and
measured using similar modifiers—sometimes precisely the same ones. Clifton (2018) observed
that Beck’s modifiers are typically simple, global, current, stable, goal-relevant, and reactionnormative—quite a specific type. Thus, if primals were found to not influence outcomes like
depression, then primals’ special irrelevance to depression and other outcomes would itself
require some explanation.
Thus, for strong empirical and theoretical reasons, primals cannot be dismissed as mere
symptoms of depression until more research is done. A key next step would be creating a CBT
module targeting primal world beliefs and then running a randomized controlled trial to test the
relative impact of a CBT-only condition, a primals module condition, a CBT + primals module
condition, and a control condition. In addition to providing crucial information about causality, this
research could shed light on how primals relate to other mental health problems where similar
beliefs are thought to play a role and CBT is now commonly used as a treatment, such as
generalized anxiety, stress, and suicidal thoughts.
Study 2f: Attempted Suicide
Measure
I used one item from Osman and colleagues’ (2001) four-item Suicidal Behaviors
Questionnaire-Revised scale to measure having attempted suicide. This scale has been validated
for clinical and nonclinical samples. The item used was Have you ever thought about or
attempted to kill yourself? Response options were collected on the following six-point scale:
Never / It was just a brief passing thought / I have had a plan at least once to kill myself but did
not try to do it / I have had a plan at least once to kill myself and really wanted to die / I have
attempted to kill myself, but did not want to die / I have attempted to kill myself, and really hoped
to die. This item was selected because it was the only item concerning attempted suicide.
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Analysis
Since suicide data was ordinal and subjects not normally distributed, correlations were
derived from Kendall’s τ b (a non-parametric test) and then converted to Pearson’s r. Otherwise,
same as above.
Table 10
Attempted Suicide’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Kendall’s τ b Converted to Pearson’s r
Sample 5:
Philly Pros

Sample 6:
Undergrads

N
110
473
Good
-.20
-.32**
Safe
-.25*
-.26**
Pleasurable
-.20
-.34**
Regenerative
-.17
-.17*
Progressing
-.30*
-.21*
Harmless
-.12
-.10
Cooperative
-.14
-.12*
Stable
-.35*
-.15*
Just
-.10
-.24**
Enticing
-.06
-.27**
Interesting
-.11
-.18*
Beautiful
.08
-.16*
Abundant
-.11
-.23**
Worth Exploring
.16
-.09
Meaningful
-.15
-.37**
Improvable
-.02
-.21*
Funny
.07
-.06
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Positive relationships are bolded.

Results
Subjects with more positive primals were less likely to have seriously contemplated or
attempted suicide. Of 32 relationships displayed in Table 10 (17 primals x 2 samples), there were
17 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 17, negative primals were associated with increased
suicide attempts, with five involving effect sizes r > .30. Furthermore, putting aside those who see
the world negatively, of 24 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly
positive primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, four were significantly different (p<.05). In
all four cases, those with slightly positive primal world beliefs were less likely to have ever
attempted suicide than those with distinctly positive primals. Primals notably associated
(negatively) with attempted suicide were Meaningful, Progressing, and Stable.
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Discussion
Suicide kills approximately 800,000 annually, making it the 17th leading cause of death
worldwide, with 79% of deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries (World Health
Organization, 2016). A predictor of suicide is being bullied and bullying others, either online or in
person (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010)). Above results suggest that another predictor are more
negative primal world beliefs. The strongest relationship was the belief among 473 college
students that the world is meaningless (i.e., a place where most things, situations, and events
likely do not matter, r=-.37, p<.0001). While most effect sizes are smaller than those in
connection to some other outcomes examined in this chapter, they are in some ways more
remarkable. Other outcomes concern concurrent states and feeling states (e.g., depression)
whereas this outcome is the lifetime prevalence of a discrete, highly memorable event possibly
having occurred many years prior. Error due to misremembering is likely low and the concern that
the negative primal is a symptom of the outcomes is muted. Further research might examine
whether suicide risk factors include low scores on Good, Meaningful, Safe, and Enticing.
One prominent theory of suicide is the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide (Van Orden et al.,
2010). It suggests that certain beliefs about the self, especially the belief that one does not belong
and is a burden on others, contributes to hopelessness, leading to suicidal desire. This desire,
when combined with the presence of suicide capabilities (e.g., a weapon), can result in lethal or
near-lethal action. Given this emphasis on belongingness, one exception to Study 2’s analysis
plan was made: the author examined the relationship between attempted suicide and the belief
that the world has an important role for the individual to play—the primal Needs Me—which is not
one of the 17 valenced primals examined in this chapter. Indeed, Needs Me is perhaps the primal
most correlated with attempting suicide (undergrads: r(474)=-.31, p<.0001; Philly professionals:
r(108)=-.24, p=.048). Future suicide research, as well as research into the other seven outcomes
examined in this study, might examine Needs Me or any of the nine other primals not examined in
Study 2’s search for the value of negative primals.
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Study 2g: Life Satisfaction
Measure
I used Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin’s psychometrically-validated five-item
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) to measure life satisfaction, which has been cited over
25,000 times (Google Scholar, Feb. 2020). It was designed to measure a global judgement of
one’s life according to one’s own criteria. It includes no reverse-scored items. Example items are
In most ways my life is close to my ideal and If I could live my life over, I would change almost
nothing. Responses were collected on a seven-point likert scale.
Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more life satisfaction. Of 102 relationships
displayed in Table 11 (6 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,773), there were 99 significant
relationships (p<.05). In all 99, negative primals were associated with less life satisfaction, with
many effect sizes moderate and some large. This pattern held without exception when looking
across 21 different professions, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the
world negatively, of 82 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly positive
primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, 62 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 62
cases, those with slightly positive primal world beliefs reported worse life satisfaction than those
with distinctly positive primals. Primals notably associated with life satisfaction include Good,
Safe, Pleasurable, and Just. Primals least related include Worth Exploring, Funny, Meaningful,
and Improvable.
Occupation-specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within the 1072
subjects who took both the PI-99 and SWLS, seven of the 10 professional groupings had n≥30:
executives (n=46), managers (n=113), administrators and other professionals (n=348), clerks
(n=60), skilled manual laborers (n=53), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=30), and no occupation
(n=384). Seven of the 65 specific professions had n≥30: administrative person (n=41), other
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manager (n=54), other professional (n=190), small business owner (n=36), student (n=320),
teacher (n=40), and unemployed (n=34). Across 238 examined relationships (14 professions X 17
primals), there were 145 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 145, negative primals were
associated with less life satisfaction. Worth Exploring was especially unrelated to life satisfaction
across groups and all primals were unrelated to life-satisfaction among skilled manual laborers.
Life satisfaction was strongly related to Enticing among the unemployed (r(34)=.67, p<.0001).
Among clerks, Meaningful was especially predictive (r(58)=.50, p<.0001). Among executives,
Interesting was strongly related (r(44)=.57, p<.0001).
Occupation-Specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 2: YM.Org. Within the 328
Sample 2 subjects who took both the PI-99 and the SWLS, there were three sub-samples where
n≥30: students (n=42), tech workers (n=32), and a category of miscellaneous professionals
including farmers, financiers, insurers, and journalists (n=84). Of 51 relationships between
primals and life satisfaction in these sub-samples (17x3), 31 were significant (p<.05). In all cases,
the negative primal was associated with less life satisfaction. For example, the belief that the
world is Meaningful and Progressing was highly correlated with life satisfaction among students
(r(40)=.56, p=.0001; r(40)=.51, p=.0006) but not tech workers (r(30)=.23, p=.19; r(30)=.24, p=.15).
In all three groups, the more subjects saw the world as Good the higher was their life satisfaction:
students (r(40)=.49, p=.001), tech workers(r(30)=.51, p=.002), and the miscellaneous category
(r(82)=.62, p<.0001).
Table 11
Life Satisfaction’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r

N
Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing

Sample 1:
AH.Org
1072
.43**
.37**
.43**
.32**
.27**
.24**
.22**
.20**
.34**
.37**

Sample 2:
YM.Org
328
.52**
.45**
.45**
.32**
.30**
.32**
.27**
.30**
.34**
.42**

Sample 3:
mTurk
692
.49**
.45**
.45**
.37**
.38**
.36**
.23**
.27**
.47**
.37**
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Sample 4:
Immigrants
98
.42**
.50**
.39**
.29*
.30*
.46**
.45**
.43**
.29*
.21*

Sample 5:
Philly Pros
110
.55**
.50**
.52**
.33*
.41**
.29*
.34*
.39**
.39**
.49**

Sample 6:
Undergrads
473
.54**
.49**
.50**
.38**
.33**
.25**
.35**
.34**
.32**
.47**

Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
*p<.05 **p<.0001

.25**
.29**
.31**
.15**
.28**
.32**
.26**

.38**
.35**
.37**
.16*
.36**
.27**
.16*

.18**
.35**
.35**
.20**
.24**
.38**
.26**

.20*
.21*
.21*
.00
.03
.18
.22*

.45**
.36*
.42**
.22*
.47**
.41**
.20*

.42**
.38**
.39**
.31**
.31**
.32**
.22**

Occupation-Specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of 51
relationships between 17 primals and life satisfaction among 3 professions (car salespersons,
lawyers, and police), 40 were significant (p<.05). In all cases the negative primal was associated
with less life satisfaction, with many moderate and large effects. For example, life satisfaction was
highly correlated with Cooperative among car salespersons at r=.63; with Interesting among
lawyers at r=.49; and with Safe and Pleasurable among police officers, both at r=.71.
Discussion
Life satisfaction was strongly related to holding positive primals. There were no
exceptions across samples, professions, or primals, and effect sizes were routinely moderate to
large. Samples 1 and 2 also involved subjects who did not take measures concurrently, which
likely dampened effect sizes. Given these results and the diversity of samples and occupations
considered, there appears to be a robust connection in the population between one’s opinion
about the sort of reality one finds oneself in and one’s opinion about the quality of one’s own life.
This connection is not necessarily obvious. Satisfaction with life is largely unrelated to
objective life circumstances (e.g., finances, physical health, Argyle, 1987), involving instead an
explicit comparison between one’s own life and some reference norm (e.g., Fox & Kahneman,
1992). Historically, there has been some debate regarding the nature of this norm. One line of
inquiry suggests that life satisfaction springs from comparisons made between one’s current
circumstances and one’s previous circumstances, as well as conjectures of other directions life
could have taken (e.g., Fox & Kahneman, 1992; Zhang et al., 2014). Another line of research
suggests the reference norm is primarily social—sometimes called Social Reference Theory—
involving what an individual believes to be happening in the lives of others, presumably in
domains one has limited information, such as romance (e.g., Cheung & Lucas, 2016; Zaborskis et
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al., 2019; Frison & Eggermont, 2016; Boyce et al., 2010; Fox & Kahneman, 1992). In both
understandings, negative primals theoretically should lead to not lower but higher life satisfaction.
If primals operate as maximally general schemas used to interpret reality as has been theorized
(Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Clifton et al., 2019; Clifton, 2018, 2020), then primals should presumably
be used to interpret what is happening in the lives of others, a topic involving more ambiguity
compared to knowledge of one’s own life. For example, if a white upper-middle class soccer mom
living in a high-income neighborhood sees the world as a dangerous place, she might consider
herself as having successfully carved out a modestly safe portion of the world and feel very
fortunate to have been spared the perils that most others face. Likewise, if primals inform one’s
sense of what could have been, then a negative primal like the belief that the world tends to fall
apart (i.e., low Regenerative scores) might lead one to think that life could have been much worse
(i.e., the counterfactual referent) or has become worse (i.e., the personal history referent).
Indeed, if primals influence ambiguity interpretation writ large, then negative primals theoretically
should negatively impact perceptions of all possible referents—though presumably to different
degrees—making one’s own life look better in comparison. Indeed, in a terrible world, a mediocre
life is a great success, but above results are inconsistent with this line of thinking.
Two other perspectives of life satisfaction are more consonant with above results, often
called the bottom-up and top-down approaches (e.g., Erdogan et al., 2012). The bottom-up
approach frames life satisfaction as a general judgement that aggregates domain-specific
judgements. For example, Cummins’ (1996) organized 173 studied domains into seven: material
wellbeing, health, productivity, intimacy, safety, community, and emotional wellbeing. Domains
are presumably weighted differently by each individual. Alternatively, the top-down approach
considers life satisfaction to be an expression of stable person characteristics or traits—some
people are simply more easily satisfied. If primals influence ambiguity interpretation and
judgements of domains require ambiguity interpretation, then primals’ should influence domainspecific judgements, which would be aggregated as systematic variance into the overall life
judgement. If primals and life satisfaction are globalized value judgements of extremely large and
104

heterogenous objects, and given Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) suggestion that the primary
primal Good is largely determined by aggregating judgements of secondary and tertiary primals,
Good may be formed by many of the same bottom-up judgement-related mechanisms and biases
used to aggregate judgements of more specific life domains into the overall judgement of life
satisfaction. Moreover, primary, secondary, and tertiary judgements—as well as how they are
weighted and aggregated by individuals—may be systematically influenced by various personality
traits, including meta-beliefs and BIG 5 personality traits. An example meta-belief capable of
influencing both is when it comes to global value judgements of things one has to live with, it’s
always good to err on the positive side. This meta-beliefs may motivate individuals to see value
in, for example, purchased items one cannot return, a spouse one cannot leave, a life that cannot
be re-lived (i.e., life satisfaction), or a world one cannot escape (primal world beliefs). Though the
best candidate BIG 5 trait for influencing both life satisfaction and primals is neuroticism—since of
BIG 5 traits neuroticism most strongly predicts life satisfaction—effect sizes between neuroticism
and life satisfaction are not large enough to explain the relationship between life satisfaction and
Safe, let alone other primals which are les related to neuroticism (Steel et al., 2008; Clifton et al.,
2019). Finally, one of the simplest explanations of covariance may be causal. In The Tale of Genji
(2014/1000, p. 134) Shikibu writes, “It was a difficult world, which refused to give satisfaction.”
Primals may influence a variety of behaviors and outcomes, including one’s emotional state,
which impacts overall life satisfaction. This explanation presumes increased difficulty when trying
to find satisfaction in any place perceived as terrible, barren, dangerous, and so forth, whether
the place in question is a home, a restaurant, a town, or a world.
Study 2h: Psychological Flourishing
Measure
Butler and Kern’s (2016) psychometrically-validated PERMA Profiler was used to
measure general psychological flourishing. Whereas the SWLS scale assesses a global
judgement of one’s life based on one’s own criteria that the researcher must guess at, the
PERMA Profiler measures five dimensions of psychological flourishing that most humans
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intrinsically value and weights them equally: positive emotion, engagement, relationships,
meaning, and accomplishment (Seligman, 2011). Scores on the five three-item subscales
strongly intercorrelate and were aggregated into a 15-item general measure, as is commonly
done. No items are reverse-scored. An example item from the relationships subscale is To what
extent do you feel loved? Responses were collected on an eleven-point scale.
Analysis
Same as above.
Results
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more psychological flourishing. Of 85
relationships displayed in Table 12 (5 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,491), 82 were significant
(p<.05). In all 82 cases, negative primals were associated with less psychological flourishing,
often with large effect sizes. This pattern held when looking across 19 different occupations, as
detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, of 65 t-tests
comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals in which both groups
had ≥30 subjects, 58 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 58 cases, those with slightly
positive primal world beliefs enjoyed less psychological flourishing than those with distinctly
positive primals. Primals notably associated with psychological flourishing include Good, Enticing,
and Abundant. Primals least related include Worth Exploring and Funny.
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Table 12
Psychological Flourishing’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r
Sample 1:
Sample 3:
Sample 4:
Sample 5:
Sample 6:
AH.Org
mTurk
ImmigrantsPR Philly Pros
Undergrads
N
1,118
692
98
110
473
Good
.48**
.61**
.43**
.57**
.60**
Safe
.39**
.50**
.41**
.45**
.51**
Pleasurable
.44**
.53**
.35*
.57**
.51**
Regenerative
.36**
.46**
.23*
.41**
.41**
Progressing
.27**
.41**
.25*
.33*
.32**
Harmless
.26**
.34**
.41**
.12
.23**
Cooperative
.20**
.25**
.27*
.37**
.35**
Stable
.21**
.25**
.35*
.31*
.36**
Just
.39**
.49**
.28*
.40**
.40**
Enticing
.41**
.55**
.32*
.57**
.53**
Interesting
.26**
.34**
.30*
.48**
.45**
Beautiful
.30**
.47**
.34*
.44**
.35**
Abundant
.35**
.49**
.28*
.56**
.41**
Worth Exploring .20**
.37**
.05
.25*
.33**
Meaningful
.31**
.39**
.17
.52**
.46**
Improvable
.38**
.51**
.25*
.43**
.39**
Funny
.23**
.30**
.24*
.22*
.26**
PR
Sample 4 did not complete the entire PERMA Profiler so combined scores on the positive emotion
and relationship subscales were used as a proxy. *p<.05 **p<.0001

Occupation-Specific Psychological Flourishing Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within
the 1,118 subjects who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten professional
groupings and eight of the 65 specific professions had n≥30 (detailed above). Of 255 examined
relationships ((7 occupation groups + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there were 160
significant relationships (p<.05). In 99% of them, the negative primal was associated with less
psychological flourishing, often strongly. The one exception was one of the five significant
relationships found in a subsample of 39 teachers in which seeing the world as more threatening
(i.e. low Harmless scores) was tied to increased psychological flourishing (r=-.36, p=.026).
Primals especially predictive of psychological flourishing include Good, Just, Enticing, and
Abundant. For example, flourishing was strongly related to Good among executives (r(47)=.59,
p<.0001) and students (r(349)=.51, p<.0001) but not administrative personnel (r(44)=.25, p=.097).
Occupation-Specific Psychological Flourishing Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of
51 relationships between 17 primals and flourishing among 3 professions (car salespersons,
lawyers, and police), 34 were significant (p<.05). In all cases the negative primal was associated
with less psychological flourishing, with many moderate and large effects. For example, Abundant
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was notably related to flourishing in all three groups (car salespeople, r=.71; lawyers, r=.57;
police officers, r=.41). Funny and Progressing were the only primals not correlated with
flourishing in any of these three occupations.
Discussion
Because life satisfaction judgements rely on the individual’s own criteria, individuals may
make these judgements in incommensurate ways, adding noise, suppressing effect sizes, and
frustrating meaningful comparisons across persons. This can be partially side-stepped, however,
by prescribing what the life domains will be and how they will be weighted. Seligman’s (2011)
definition of psychological flourishing specifies five domains and the PERMA Profiler weighs
these five domains equally in an aggregated psychological flourishing score. These domains are
frequency of positive emotion and engagement, quality of relationships, finding meaning in
activities and life direction, and frequency and feelings of accomplishment. While domain scores
tend to intercorrelate and may not be statistically distinct enough to be considered separately
(e.g., Ryan et al., 2019; Seligman, 2018), the overall prescriptive measure of wellbeing allows for
greater commensurability across persons and groups than life satisfaction measures.
Across persons, groups, and occupations, above results find psychological flourishing to
be strongly related to holding positive primals, especially Good and Enticing, which replicates
findings from Clifton and colleagues (2019). Effect sizes were often so large as to indicate that
achieving high psychological flourishing if one sees the world strongly negatively is nearly a
psychological rarity, as is the person who sees the world as exceedingly wondrous yet suffers low
psychological flourishing—such exceptions should be studied. Likely some of this relationship
between primals and psychological flourishing will be explained by measurement error, including
positivity/optimism bias and shared method-variance. However, given the scale of effect sizes, for
such an explanation to be sufficient either the Primals Inventory or the PERMA Profiler (or both)
would have to be predominantly capturing error variance. Some of the relationship between
primal world beliefs and psychological flourishing may also be explained by primal world beliefs
influencing perceptions, feelings, and behaviors the way that any beliefs about the characteristics
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of a place could influence a person while the person is in that place. Another explanation could
involve causality in the other direction. For example, having deeper and more supportive
relationships may increase emotional and material resilience in the face of hardship, thus actually
making the world more dangerous, thus influencing danger perceptions. However, as I have
recently argued (Clifton, 2020), primals may be largely unresponsive to past experiences in this
way.
General Discussion
Primal world beliefs are (a) important to study; (b) challenging to study; and (c) have
remained largely overlooked, all for precisely the same reason: because they are beliefs about
the character of a uniquely encompassing place. As previously argued (Clifton & Kim, 2020),
understanding the behavior of any given creature requires that the scientist observe the
creature’s behavior in multiple environments. Scientists who observe a creature in one
environment only, such as a dog in a dog park, are handicapped observers, being unable to
distinguish context-specific behaviors (i.e., a state-like reaction to particular environments, or at
least the creature’s beliefs/perceptions about that environment) from organism-specific behaviors
(i.e., a trait-like expression of that creature’s peculiar temperament). But what if a creature had
beliefs about the character of an environment that, for whatever reason, the organism never
leaves? If so, such beliefs would theoretically drive patterns of action that would manifest as
organism-specific traits while actually being driven by context-specific reactions to underlying
perceptions. Furthermore, if said environment became populated by other creatures who also
never left, but viewed the character of said environment differently, all such creatures would be
handicapped observers, unable to distinguish context-specific from organism-specific behaviors.
Moreover, if these creatures were ignorant of their disagreement—which is likely if these beliefs
are implicit—all such creatures should be expected to misattribute numerous individual
differences to differences in traits, thereby committing the fundamental attribution error on a
massive scale.
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Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) suggestion is that, for humans at least, this remarkable
situation may be precisely the case. Substantial variance in human behaviors and outcomes (i.e.,
neuroticism, agreeableness, optimism, curiosity, gratitude, depression, subjective wellbeing,
attachment style—perhaps most major variables psychologists study) could stem from 26
differences in opinion about the most psychologically salient characteristics of the one place
humans never leave (i.e., primal world beliefs). Given the import of this suggestion—and the
obvious need for experimental and quasi-experimental research to determine causation—the
reader may find cross-sectional research like that above quite unsatisfying. Nevertheless,
establishing the direction and typical size of correlational relationships has value for four reasons.
First, correlations can point to promising areas of research. Second, there is a gap in the
literature concerning primals’ wellbeing correlates and the two studies that have been done found
substantial effect sizes worth replicating (Clifton et al., 2019; Stahlmann et al., 2020).
Third, establishing primals’ correlational relationship to wellbeing-related variables is
valuable because, based on existing theory, the size and even direction of some of these
relationships is not actually that obvious. Life satisfaction, for example, is commonly understood
as a comparative judgement of one’s own life against a referent, such as a sense of what could
have been (Fox & Kahneman, 1992; Zhang et al., 2014; Cheung & Lucas, 2016; Zaborskis et al.,
2019; Frison & Eggermont, 2016; Boyce et al., 2010). If so, living a mediocre life in an incredible
world where much more was considered readily achievable should be less satisfying than living
the same mediocre life in a terrible world in which one was highly fortunate—but above result
indicate that seeing the world as a terrible place is associated with much lower life satisfaction.
Another example is health: the belief that the world is dangerous should theoretically increase
vigilance across circumstances, perhaps resulting in successful avoidance of physical dangers,
dangerous habits, and pathogens, which should increase health outcomes—but seeing the world
as dangerous is actually associated with moderately worse health.
Fourth, moving past what researchers might learn directly from correlational research,
correlational research can provide fodder for interventions designed to counter certain meta110

beliefs that bolster negative primals. For example, a lawyer who thinks that lawyers who see the
world as dangerous usually perform better than those that see the world as safe might be
interested to know if, on average, this is not the case.
Study 1 attempted to establish some prevalence for these meta-beliefs by asking 180
parents which primals they thought most likely to help their children. Results suggested there are
at least two prospective meta-beliefs that might encourage individuals to hold negative primals.
First, a minority of parents—usually a fairly large minority and in one case a majority—reported
their meta-belief that the best way to prepare their children to navigate life was to teach them the
world is in different ways a terrible place, specifically that it is dangerous, unfair, not funny,
unstable, cut-throat, and in decline. Secondly, looking at only those who saw more value in
positive primals, clear majorities of parents saw less positive positive primals as better for their
children than more positive positive primals. One parent volunteered the following rationale for
this moderating approaching: I don't want my children to have so much fear that they're afraid to
get out there and try stuff, but I do want them to be cautious and not trust people and situations
blindly. In this line of thinking, positive primals are helpful but distinctly positive primals can make
one naïve, overly trusting, and vulnerable. While this quote falls under prospective meta-belief #3
identified in Table 2, all six prospective meta-beliefs listed can support either holding negative
primals or holding less positive positive primals.
The popularity of meta-beliefs favoring slightly versus distinctly positive primals is
particularly interesting because, despite the surge of interest in positive psychology over the past
few decades, this distinction is relatively underexamined. For example, it is now well-established
that strongly negative beliefs—often so negative as to be called illusory such as I am a totally
worthless person—contribute to depression (e.g., Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005; Beck et al.,
1979; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2012). But what about negative beliefs that are not that
negative and slightly positive beliefs that could be more positive? Taylor and Armor’s (1996)
review of the literature on positive illusions concludes that positive illusions are common and
usually associated with better outcomes in the face of adversity. Setting aside the extent to which
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a very positive belief is illusory or not, understanding the comparative utility of positive and very
positive beliefs when neither can be considered illusory—perhaps the truth is irrelevant or, as in
the case of primals, unknowable—may help clinicians and coaches design interventions. While
extremely negative negative beliefs may offer the most room for improvement, sometimes those
darkest beliefs may not be sufficiently malleable—perhaps the client has already tried a variety of
strategies to shape the very negative belief. If so, perhaps there is value-add in targeting beliefs
that are already fairly positive to make them even more positive, presuming doing so is typically
not associated with negative consequences that might indicate a damaging illusory belief.
Study 2 consisted of a cross-sectional search for situations in which positive outcomes
were associated with (a) negative primals versus positive primals and (b) distinctly positive
primals versus somewhat positive primals. I examined correlations between 17 primals and eight
outcomes among six samples with a total 4,535 unique subjects representing 48 occupations
(n≥30). A total of 3,291 statistics were produced, 1,860 of which were significant. In only six of
these relationships were more negative primals related to more positive outcomes. All six
involved small effects and small occupationally-defined sub-samples. Thus, in 99.7% of
significant relationships, more positive primals were associated with better outcomes, roughly
categorized as slightly increased success and greatly increased wellbeing. Moreover, I could find
no empirical justification for the popular moderation approach among the parents in Study 1. In
422 t-tests conducted in Study 2, there were 297 significant differences in outcomes between
those who saw the world as somewhat positive and those who saw the world as distinctly
positive. In every case, seeing the world as distinctly positive was associated with more success,
more job satisfaction, better physical health, less negative emotion, less depression, not
attempting suicide, more life satisfaction, and more psychological flourishing. In sum, this crosssectional search yielded unambiguous results that replicates and extends two initial studies using
the Primals Inventory as well as findings from the belief in a just world literature (Clifton et al.,
2019; Stahlmann et al., 2020; e.g., Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019). A robust correlational
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relationship exists between more negative primals and more negative outcomes, even when
comparing positive beliefs to positive beliefs, and even when comparing within occupation.
If those with negative primals typically enjoy worse success and wellbeing outcomes as
Study 2 demonstrates, why might meta-beliefs purporting the opposite be commonplace? I see
two clues. The first lies in the diversity of primals themselves, which, like meta-beliefs, are
normally distributed. One possibility is that individuals implicitly define relatively narrow bands of
belief within which “reasonable” people can disagree. Then, recognizing some utility in being as
positive as possible, position themselves near the upper limit of those bands. The result of
positive self-positioning within normally-distributed bands of supposed reasonableness would be
threefold. First, both meta-belief and primal world belief would be normally distributed (observed
empirically). Second, virtually nobody would see their own primals as stubborn, totalizing, or
precluding interpretive flexibility, regardless of one’s position along the continuum (observed
anecdotally). Third, virtually all beliefs more positive than one’s own would seem inflexible and
totalizing—like a Bayesian prior that refuses updating despite clear evidence—indicating a
serious lack judgement on the part of others (observed anecdotally). If virtually all primal world
beliefs more positive than ones own appear inflexible and totalizing, parents would of course not
want to wish such beliefs on their children (now observed empirically in Study 2).
The second related clue comes from the optimism literature. Like primals, optimism
correlates with many positive outcomes, yet common sense and empirical research (e.g.,
Foregeard & Seligman, 2012) suggest that high optimism can lead to problems in certain
domains, such as when a pilot is doing a final equipment check before a flight or a gambler is
doubling down on a bad bet. The proposed solution is flexibility and domain selectivity to avoid a
totalizing pattern of interpretation or behavior (Seligman, 1991; Armor & Taylor, 1998). For similar
reasons, individuals might believe that highly positive primals preclude flexibility and should be
avoided for similar reasons. However, this may be mistaken. Primals are not behaviors, but
beliefs, and, as beliefs about general character only, interpretive and behavioral flexibility is
inherent. Consider, for example, common non-world beliefs such as Jill is a liar or Jack is an
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extrovert. As trait claims, those holding these beliefs are not expected to believe that Jill never
tells the truth or that Jack has never been quiet at a party. Instead, these beliefs inform a posture
towards Jack and Jill which is readily adjustable depending on contextual information—numerous
exceptions are not just allowed but expected. Likewise, primals are traits claims about the
universe. They likewise do not entail totalizing thinking. After all, it is unlikely that the hundreds of
Study 2 subjects who saw the world as very safe and achieved much higher wellbeing than peers
while stumbling through life in a positive haze, unable to perceive, anticipate, or respond to
threats. To examine this further, researchers might empirically examine whether increasingly
positive primals are associated with any losses in interpretive or behavioral flexibility; there may
well be substantial orthogonality between responsiveness to primal-inconsistent information and
Primals Inventory scores. If this turns out to be the case, parents might best serve their children
by teaching them to avoid extreme optimism while embracing extremely optimistic primals.
Interestingly, if it pays to have accurate world beliefs (i.e., meta-belief #4 in Table 2), the
pattern of results in Study 2 may shed some light—curiously enough—on the nature of the world
itself (and, if so, may be worth incorporating into interventions). Charnov (1976) proposed
Marginal Value Theorem to describe optimal foraging strategies when food is in clusters or
patches and a forager must spend time travelling between patches. He states that foragers,
“should leave the patch it is presently in when the marginal capture rate in the patch drops to the
average capture rate for the habitat” (p. 132). If the forager leaves too late or too early, the
forager will experience diminishing returns or spend too much energy wandering the environment
in search of new patches, both of which should be associated with a variety of negative
consequences. Now imagine a researcher did not know the average capture rate of a habitat, but
did have a way to measure both expected average capture rates and differences in forager
outcomes. If so, and if Marginal Value Theorem holds, comparing creature outcomes to creature
habitat beliefs would shed light on the objective conditions of the creatures’ habitat. Theoretically,
creatures with more accurate expectations would on average experience better outcomes.
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In humans, the average capture rate for the habitat is the same or at least very related to
the primal labeled Abundant (versus barren), defined as the belief that the world is a promising
place full of opportunities and resources. Above studies have shown that higher Abundant scores
are linearly tied to positive outcomes, suggesting that, seemingly no matter how high Abundant
scores get, even higher scores are associated with improved outcomes. That may mean the
world is objectively, for humans at least, an abundant place. If so, the same logic applies to other
primals. For example, in very dangerous places like a war zone, it is presumably beneficial to
accurately recognize the objective reality of the situation, and people who do so should on
average enjoy a variety of better outcomes while in that place. But, among humans, seeing the
world as dangerous is clearly associated with much worse outcomes. This may indicate that, to
some degree, the world is not a very dangerous place. However, another possibility is that the
world is in fact a very barren and dangerous place, but the benefits of being accurate when it
comes to this unusual topic of belief are minimal compared to the psychological costs involved. If
so, when it comes to beliefs about the world as a whole, it may not pay to be accurate.
Limitations
While Study 1 aimed to shed light on the prevalence of a phenomenon, the population
and primals that were examined were selected precisely because that is where the phenomenon
was thought to be more prevalent, greatly limiting generalizability. In Study 2, though t-tests can
help establish linearity between primals and positive outcomes at the upper levels, larger samples
are needed to allow comparisons between subjects with more unusually high scores. In two
samples, measures of socio-economic status or personal income were used as proxies for job
success and are arguably poor proxies. For Sample 1 and 2, scale administration was not
concurrent, which likely dampened effect sizes. Because the current interest was identifying
trends across primals, samples, and outcomes, no correction was made for multiple comparisons,
which limits the generalizability of any one relationship (see above discussion). Finally, previous
literature connecting Just to increased victim-blaming and less prosociality (e.g., Benson & Ritter,
1990; Sakallı-Uğurlu, Yalçın, & Glick, 2007) should serve as a reminder that, outside these eight
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outcome variables, future research may yet find undesirable correlates of positive primals. Finally,
cross-sectional results like this do not allow causal inferences. Finally, all results were self-report,
which is subject to several types of error.
Concluding Remarks
In their foundational primals paper, Clifton and colleagues (2019) laid down a gauntlet by
suggesting that much of the variance in most major variables psychologists study might be driven
by beliefs psychologists had largely overlooked. Exploring this possibility calls for a great deal of
research, especially bold experimentation to examine causation. This chapter provides an
incremental step in that direction. By replicating and extending previous correlational research, I
have established that the correlational relationship between positive primals and positive
outcomes is robust, contrary to various suppositions concerning the value of negative primals.
Indeed, despite much searching, it remains unclear if negative primals have much value. Those
with more negative primals were on average slightly less successful at their jobs, substantially
less satisfied with their jobs, less physically healthy, suffered more frequent negative emotions,
were much more likely to be depressed, slightly more likely to have attempted suicide, were much
less satisfied with their lives, and reported dramatically less psychological flourishing—even when
comparing those within the same occupation. If nothing else, this research suggests that further
effort examining primal world beliefs is worthwhile. In the meantime, parents might consider
pausing all efforts to teach negative primals to children. It might well be a terrible idea.
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RESEARCH STATEMENT AND NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Research Statement
Behavior is influenced—sometimes dramatically—by perceptions of the basic character
of one’s environment. In places seen as fun, for example, people are more friendly; in places
seen as dangerous, people are more alert; and so on for many pairs of perceptions and
behaviors. My research explores the possibility that individuals also have numerous, widely
varying, highly stable perceptions of the world as one giant place—the one place humans never
leave—and that these perceptions may likewise influence many behavior patterns and wellbeing
outcomes. I call these perceptions primal world beliefs (“primals”).
The first step in exploring this possibility was measurement. I needed to demonstrate that
individuals hold primal world beliefs, empirically map what primals individuals hold, create a tool
to measure primals, and demonstrate the plausibility of the ‘big idea’ that primals’ might shape a
variety of outcomes. This five-year project was completed a year ago (the Clifton et al, 2019,
article in Psychological Assessment), with short-form scales forthcoming and an interest in
measurement methodology emerging in the process (e.g., the Clifton, 2019, Psychological
Methods article on validity versus reliability trade-offs).
The second step has been breadth. This involves integrating primals research into the
most obviously relevant literatures, especially literatures already examining primals or similar
beliefs. So far, this has been done via a few short theory papers examining connections between
primals and health (Healthy in a Crummy World, Clifton & Kim, 2020, published in Medical
Hypotheses), wellbeing (Happy in a Crummy World; Clifton, 2020a, published in The Journal of
Positive Psychology), and experiences (Chapter 2, recently published as Clifton, 2020b, in
Frontiers in Psychology). This dissertation continues the integration process with the first
empirical efforts to build on the primals framework.
The third step will be depth—moving beyond exploratory research to examine primals’
causal influence on personality and wellbeing. If causality is established, Step 4 will turn towards
application and how to responsibly leverage primals to address important social issues (e.g.,
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depression, political cooperation). Barring some decisive breakthrough, however, I expect basic
research in Steps 2 and 3 to continue for several years.
Narrative Summary
This dissertation’s main contributions are threefold. First, it represents early empirical
demonstrations of primal world beliefs as a worthwhile research topic. Second, it advances
multiple ongoing discussions about some of the few world beliefs previously studied. Third, it
takes concrete steps towards intervention design by addressing two-types of meta-beliefs (i.e.,
beliefs about beliefs) thought to often bolster negative primals.
Chapter 1 is an application of the primals framework to politics. Of the 26 primals humans
hold, arguably only two have been studied, with one being belief in a dangerous world. This
primal has been primarily studied in connection to political ideology. Based on theory,
correlational research, and complementary experimental work, the consensus has been that
conservatives tend to see the world as a more dangerous place, which increases conservatism,
and liberals tend to see the world as safer, which increases liberalism. Chapter 1 examines 8
diverse samples (N=3,734) and finds that dangerous world belief actually explained only .9% of
the variance in political ideology, placing it nearly in the middle a large group of fifteen primal
world beliefs—just below the belief the world is Funny at 1.0%—sharing so little variance with
political conservatism that they were dubbed the primals of virtual agreement across the political
spectrum. Why was previous political research so misleading? A second study finds that the
primary scale formerly used to measure belief in a dangerous world happens to highlight threats
conservatives fear and neglect threats liberals fear.
Far from indicating primals’ irrelevance to politics, however, this research points to the
importance of new primals. Six explained considerable variance in political ideology: Hierarchical
(15%), Intentional (11.5%), Acceptable (9.2%), Worth Exploring (6.9%), Just (5%), and
Progressing (2.6%). Their prominence suggests an alternative pair of perceived worlds in which
opposite political behaviors make sense. Conservatives see an inherently hierarchical, fair,
cosmically sanctioned order to the universe that is being eroded, suggesting wisdom in
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constraining change and tolerating inequality; while liberals see an inherently nonhierarchical,
unfair world that is improving, suggesting wisdom in accelerating change and resisting inequality.
This account—shorthanded hierarchy theory—is largely unrelated to fear-based political
motivations and has numerous implications for topics such as contemporary political messaging,
historical analysis, and the future of human cooperation.
After Chapter 1 (hopefully) demonstrates the value of the primals framework, Chapter 2’s
developmental question becomes more interesting and justified: where do primals come from?
Specifically, what is the role of experiences in shaping primal world beliefs? On this point too
some research has been conducted. Janoff-Bulman (1989) prominently suggested that trauma
might powerfully shape a variety of fundamental beliefs about the self and the world, including
some primal world beliefs. Her theory is one of a family of possible theories that suggest how an
individual’s primals might reflect an individual’s background. For example, if one grows up
wealthy (or poor), one may see the world as more abundant (or barren). I call this family of
theories retrospective theories, contrasting them with interpretive theories. Interpretive theories
hold that primals are not mirrors reflecting our backgrounds, but lenses used to interpret
experiences while being largely uninfluenced by those experiences. I then identify 12 tests that
would shed light on whether interpretive or retrospective theories tend to be more accurate and
hypothesize in favor of interpretive theories. (My plan was to also present new data on these
hypotheses but that was short-circuited by the Covid-19 pandemic).
If future research supports my guess—if primals generally do not reflect our backgrounds
in a straight-forward manner—what other experiences might shape primals? This question
brought me to a juncture where thousands before have stood. After introducing a construct,
researchers eventually ask, what experiences might shape my construct? Four years ago I asked
this question and searched the literature for a tool that would enable systematic theorizing about
a broad range of experiences in relation to my construct. What I found instead were a handful of
largely overlapping clinically-oriented checklists dominated by a particular type of involuntary,
negative experiences of quick duration, such as injury or death of a family member. So, absent
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the tool I sought, I made one—called the Cube Framework—which I introduce in Chapter 2 to
facilitate the identification of promising areas for further primals research, but also in the hope that
researchers might find it useful in other contexts. The Cube Framework identifies three
dimensions by which all experiences vary—time (acute/chronic), control (internal/external), and
valence (positive/negative)—permutations of which define eight experience types in which human
experiences can be sorted: bad luck, bad times, bad choices, bad habits, good luck, good times,
good choices, good habits. Applying this framework to primals research indicates good times and
good habits might be promising areas for further research. However, I end Chapter 2 confessing
skepticism that naturally occurring life experiences that reliably influence primals might be found.
Instead, such experiences may have to be designed. In fact, some already have been (e.g.,
cognitive behavioral therapy).
Chapter 3 turns towards intervention design. What will interventions have to accomplish
in order to alter negative primals? Among other things, certain meta-beliefs (i.e., beliefs about
beliefs) that bolster negative primals may need to be addressed. Chapter 3 observes that metabeliefs come in at least two types. First, retrospective meta-beliefs hold that our backgrounds
dictate our primals, thus giving one little choice but to continue seeing the world as one does.
Second, prospective meta-beliefs hold that one’s primals are associated with success and
wellbeing, and are retained therefore in the hopes that they will likely prove useful in achieving
future goals. Both types of meta-beliefs deserve study for being underexamined, involving clear
implications for intervention design, and for being interesting in their own right as plausible
explanations of behavior. Chapter 2 has already discussed a way forward in the study of
retrospective meta-beliefs (which are nothing but personal lay retrospective theories of how one’s
own primals developed). Thus, Chapter 3 tackles the issue of prospective meta-beliefs.
Chapter 3 identifies several perhaps common prospective meta-beliefs. For example:
•
•

While positive primals might make me feel better, it’s a luxury I can’t afford
because people usually don’t succeed in my job without a darker view of things.
More often than not, seeing the world as this amazing place leads to
disappointment with what you get, both at work and home, which can make you
depressed, lose hope, and even get suicidal—best keep expectations low.
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•

Seeing the world as safe where everyone sings ‘Kumbaya’ leaves people
vulnerable to predation, physical threat, germs, illness, and even death—you
gotta stay vigilant.

Study 1 preliminarily finds that such prospective meta-beliefs purporting the value of negative
primals are not unusual. This was done by asking parents which primals they most desire to instill
in their children (N=180). Normally distributed response patterns indicated that substantial
minorities of parents (and in one case a majority) believe the best way to prepare children to
navigate life is to teach them that the world is in various ways a bad place: including that that the
world is full of physical threats; does not reward or punish fairly; is rarely that funny; is full of
fragile situations that could easily fall apart; is cut-throat; and is getting worse. Moreover, among
those who aim to teach positive primals to their children, clear majorities preferred slightly positive
primals to distinctly or very positive primals. Few, in other words, thought that teaching
moderately to very positive primals to children was the best way to prepare them to navigate life.
Might there be truth in these parental intuitions? Study 2 consisted of a cross-sectional
search across six diverse samples representing 48 occupations (N=4,535) for instances in which
any of eight key outcomes might be connected to either (a) more negative primals or (b) slightly
less positive positive primals. This search discovered 1,860 significant relationships between the
seventeen primals examined and the eight life outcomes. In 99.7% of these relationships,
negative primals were associated with worse outcomes, as follows: slightly decreased job
performance/success, much decreased job satisfaction, moderately decreased physical health,
moderately increased suicide attempts, much increased negative emotions, greatly increased
depression, greatly decreased life satisfaction, and dramatically decreased overall psychological
flourishing. Given multiple samples, some large and diverse, replication, and pre-registration,
there appears to be a robust correlational relationship between more negative primals and more
negative outcomes, even when comparing positive beliefs to positive beliefs, and even when
comparing within occupations. Such correlational findings do not indicate causation, but are
useful for theory-building; for identifying promising areas for future research; for creating

128

interventions designed to combat inaccurate prospective meta-beliefs, and, perhaps, for
motivating the reconsideration of certain parental goals.
What are researchers to make of all this? Some findings are conclusive, with perhaps the
most interesting being that political conservatives and liberals differ on the belief that the world is
dangerous to an unremarkable degree. However, the value of this dissertation is not in any
particular conclusion, but in the repeated discussion sections in which the primals framework is
repeatedly applied to different outcomes—from politics to attempted suicide to job satisfaction to
life satisfaction—and explanatory promise is seen as plain and obvious. Yet this is a small
sampling of outcomes that primals might influence. Of course, for some of these outcomes—
perhaps most—the explanatory promise may never bear out. Substantial covariation between
primals and outcomes may be explained in a variety of ways, depending on the outcome, person,
or primal. Nevertheless, I suspect that every discipline that examines human behavior or
outcomes will have to one way or another eventually take primal world beliefs into account to
some degree, if only to control for them. This is because of a simple reason mentioned repeatedly
throughout this dissertation: behavior can be highly influenced by the perceptions of the
environment in which the behavior takes place, and primals concern the environment in which all
behavior takes place.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1
Definitions and Structure of 26 Primal World Beliefs

Note. 26 primals (22 tertiary, 3 secondary, and 1 primals) as identified by Clifton and colleagues (2019).
Figure reproduced from Clifton and Kim (2020).
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Table 1
Comparing the BDW Scale to the Primals Inventory’s Safe Subscale
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The BDW scale
10 items; unidimensional; Perry et al, 2013
- My knowledge and experience tells me that the social
world we live in is basically a safe, stable and secure
place in which most people are fundamentally good.*
- It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly
respectable people, and more and more persons with no
morals at all who threaten everyone else.
- Although it may appear that things are constantly getting
more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn’t so. Every era
has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a
safe, untroubled life are better today than ever before.*
- Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us.
All the signs are pointing to it.
- There are many dangerous people in our society who
will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no
reason at all.
- The ‘‘end’’ is not near. People who think that
earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be
about to destroy the world are being foolish.*
- My knowledge and experience tells me that the social
world we live in is basically a dangerous and
unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral
people’s values and way of life are threatened and
disrupted by bad people.
- Despite what one hears about ‘‘crime in the street,’’
there probably isn’t any more now than there ever has
been.*
- If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing
bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a
dangerous world.*
- Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial,
a person’s chances of being robbed, assaulted, and
even murdered go up and up.
*reverse-scored item

The Primals Inventory’s Safe subscale
29 items; multidimensional; Clifton et al, 2019
Harmless
- On the whole, the world is a safe place.
- Real danger is everywhere; even if we don’t notice it.*
- Most things and situations are harmless and totally safe.
- I tend to see the world as pretty safe.
- On the whole, the world is a dangerous place.*
Cooperative - Instead of being cooperative, life is a brutal contest where you got to do
whatever it takes to survive.*
- For all life—from the smallest organisms, to plants, animals, and for people too—
everything is a cut-throat competition.*
- Instead of being cooperative, the world is a cut-throat and competitive place.*
- The world runs on trust and cooperation way more than suspicion and
Progressing
competition.
- On the whole, the world is getting worse.*
- It feels like the world is going downhill.*
- Though the world has problems, on the whole things are definitely improving.
Regenerative - It feels like the world is getting better and better.
- Though sometimes situations get worse, usually they get better.
- Most things have a habit of getting worse.*
- The usual tendency of most things and situations is to get better, not worse.
Stable
- Over time, most situations naturally tend to get worse, not better.*
- The world is a place where things are fragile and easily ruined.*
- It takes a lot for things to fall apart.
- Most things and situations are delicate and easily destroyed.*
- Most situations are delicate. Though they may be fine now, things could easily
Just
unravel.*
- The world is a place where working hard and being nice pays off.
- If someone is generous and kind, the world will be kind back.
Pleasurable - The world is a place where we rarely deserve what we get.*
- Life offers more pain than pleasure.*
- On the whole, the world is a good place.
- Life in this world is usually pain and suffering.*
- Life offers way more pleasure than pain.
- Most things in the world are good.

Table 2
Primals Inventory Descriptive Statistics for Eight Samples in Chapter 1
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Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing
Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
Alive
Intentional
Needs Me
Interactive
Other tertiary primals
Acceptable
Changing
Hierarchical
Interconnected
Understandable

Sample 1:
AH.Org
N = 773
M
SD
α
3.40 .64 .97
3.14 .77 .95
3.49 .90 .87
3.42 .82 .82
2.86 1.09 .90
2.86 1.03 .88
3.32 1.03 .82
2.80 .93 .77
2.89 .79 .71
3.77 .62 .94
3.94 .83 .84
3.72 .82 .80
3.85 .78 .81
3.79 .71 .73
3.94 .89 .81
3.54 .76 .78
3.32 .95 .86
2.82 .75 .85
2.84 1.11 .85
3.47 1.08 .90
2.14 .91 .82

Sample 2:
YM.Org (USA)
N = 1070
M
SD
α
2.94 .64 .95
2.64 .79 .94
2.74 1.03 .86
2.96 1.00 .86
2.80 1.22 .90
2.34 1.08 .88
2.88 1.11 .83
2.22 1.09 .84
2.25 .99 .78
3.44 .71 .92
3.47 1.04 .84
3.29 1.03 .82
3.57 .93 .80
3.76 .92 .78
3.11 1.34 .87
3.32 .91 .79
3.26 1.19 .90
1.87 1.01 .89
1.64 1.40 .90
2.22 1.45 .91
1.76 1.03 .86

Sample 3:
YM.Org (Intl.)
N = 354
M
SD
α
2.77 .68 .96
2.50 .82 .94
2.52 1.05 .86
2.87 1.05 .87
2.84 1.28 .91
2.24 1.09 .88
2.70 1.15 .84
2.02 1.04 .83
2.03 1.04 .82
3.25 .77 .92
3.33 1.10 .86
3.01 1.10 .82
3.39 .99 .82
3.66 1.00 .81
2.85 1.40 .88
3.22 .87 .73
3.00 1.22 .90
1.77 1.04 .91
1.50 1.38 .90
2.03 1.42 .89
1.84 1.07 .88

1.73
3.17
1.96
3.52
2.97

1.43
3.04
2.17
3.12
2.62

1.29 .96 .84 1.53
3.12 .96 .87 3.25
2.26 1.21 .83 2.32
3.09 1.23 .88 3.25
2.46 1.17 .84 2.22

.83
.74
.94
.88
.94

.75
.74
.76
.81
.80

1.00
.95
1.25
1.25
1.11

.85
.85
.86
.89
.82

Sample 4:
Immigrants
N = 98
M SD α
2.86 .52 .95
2.52 .65 .94
2.76 .87 .84
3.08 .78 .81
2.40 .89 .78
1.92 .78 .78
2.61 .83 .73
2.32 .74 .71
2.53 .83 .77
3.27 .52 .90
3.47 .78 .80
3.13 .75 .71
3.39 .67 .65
3.20 .75 .72
3.59 .85 .82
3.03 .68 .67
2.81 .88 .79
2.99 .59 .80
3.18 .84 .79
3.30 .96 .89
2.41 .86 .82
.76
.64
.82
.76
.88

.82
.76
.72
.82
.79

Sample 5:
Philly Pros
N = 80
M
SD
α
3.25 .55 .96
2.99 .67 .93
3.53 .82 .82
3.28 .75 .83
2.71 1.06 .88
2.57 1.00 .85
3.04 .93 .77
2.63 .80 .73
2.90 .79 .71
3.59 .56 .91
3.62 .80 .77
3.42 .73 .65
3.81 .72 .74
3.60 .79 .78
3.84 .86 .81
3.46 .63 .69
3.09 .92 .81
2.61 .85 .89
2.49 1.13 .84
3.47 1.15 .91
1.83 .85 .86

Sample 6:
Undergrads
N = 321
M
SD
α
2.91
.50 .95
2.63 .60 .93
2.95 .80 .85
3.05 .77 .80
2.60 .96 .87
2.16 .78 .81
2.66 .87 .79
2.24 .77 .79
2.71 .75 .74
3.32 .53 .91
3.47 .78 .78
3.18 .76 .73
3.49 .68 .76
3.48 .69 .69
3.47 .89 .83
3.07 .65 .73
2.83 .86 .82
2.68 .70 .85
2.67 1.00 .85
2.90 1.09 .90
2.45 .79 .83

Sample 7
2019 mTurk
N = 611
M
SD
α
2.83 .66 .97
2.62 .76 .95
2.86 .93 .86
2.85 .90 .81
2.54 1.07 .87
2.47 .92 .85
2.63 .98 .80
2.34 .86 .75
2.57 .88 .81
3.11 .72 .94
3.21 .95 .81
3.04 .91 .78
3.14 .90 .79
3.16 .83 .74
3.24 1.08 .84
3.01 .78 .77
2.77 .96 .81
2.48 .79 .88
2.51 1.00 .82
2.66 1.13 .87
2.19 .80 .76

Sample 8
2015 mTurk
N = 755
M
SD
α
2.57 .68 .97
2.17 .81 .96
2.66 1.01 .90
2.43 .91 .86
2.09 1.16 .92
2.06 1.06 .91
1.90 1.01 .83
1.54 .89 .82
2.49 .90 .82
3.08 .73 .95
2.67 .92 .84
3.13 .92 .83
3.18 .91 .84
3.20 .83 .80
2.78 1.01 .86
2.94 .82 .81
2.84 1.06 .90
2.18 .88 .91
2.08 1.14 .88
2.51 1.20 .91
1.83 .91 .85

1.44
2.94
2.25
2.66
2.88

1.44
3.18
2.36
3.05
2.13

1.85
2.97
2.42
2.88
2.59

.97 .86 .83
2.92 .72 .80
2.22 .88 .77
2.83 1.00 .87
2.16 .91 .79

.73
.76
.87
.92
.87

.76
.77
.73
.78
.77

.70
.71
.88
.74
.82

.79
.82
.81
.72
.74

.84
.74
.82
.89
.91

.76
.76
.73
.79
.75

Note. Bolded α values indicate five instances where α<.70. M = mean. SD = standard deviation. α = standardized Cronbach’s α.

Table 3
Primals Relationship to Political Ideology for Eight Samples in Chapter 1
Primal

Mean % Variance
Explainedm
N=3,333
%

Sample 2:
YM.Org US
N=1070
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τ

%

15.0(+)

[7.0, 23.0]

.17***

7.0

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

11.5(+)
9.2(+)
7.9(+)
6.9(-)
5.0(+)

[6.3, 16.7]
[2.3, 16.0]
[3.9, 11.8]
[3.3, 10.4]
[1.9, 8.2]

.14***
.02n.s.
.10***
-.10***
.07*

4.6
.1
2.6
2.5
1.1

.29***
.30***
.24***
-.23***
.18***

19.8
20.2
13.7
12.1
7.8

.31***
.31***
.27***
-.26***
.22***

22.2
22.2
16.9
15.7
11.8

7. Interconnected
8. Needs Me
9. Progressing
10. Cooperative
11. Harmless

3.5(-)
2.7(+)
2.6(-)
2.1(-)
2.0(-)

[1.9, 5.0]
[.9, 4.4]
[-.7, 6.0]
[.7, 3.5]
[1.0, 3.0]

-.11***
.03n.s.
-.07**
-.09***
-.10***

2.7
.2
1.2
2.0
2.4

-.14***
.13***
-.03n.s.
-.12***
-.12***

4.9
4.1
.2
3.4
3.4

-.08n.s.
.18***
.05n.s.
-.16***
-.12**

12. Beautiful
13. Interactive
14. Changing
15. Meaningful
16. Funny
17. Safe (secondary)
18. Enticing (secondary)
19. Regenerative
20. Interesting
21. Pleasurable
22. Improvable
23. Good (primary)
24. Stable
25. Abundant
26. Understandable

1.5(-)
1.4(+)
1.3(-)
1.1(+)
1.0(-)
.9(-)
.8(-)
.7(-)
.6(-)
.5(-)
.4(-)
.4(-)
.2(+)
.2(+)
.0(+)

[.7, 2.2]
[.3, 2.6]
[.6, 2.1]
[-.1, 2.4]
[.4, 1.5]
[.3, 1.5]
[.5, 1.1]
[.2, 1.1]
[.3, 1.0]
[.1, .9]
[-.1, .9]
[.1, .7]
[-.6, .1.1]
[.0, .4]
[-.1, .2]

-.10***
.02n.s.
-.05*
-.01n.s.
-.08**
-.07*
-.07**
-.04n.s.
-.05n.s.
-.03n.s.
-.02n.s.
-.05n.s.
-.03n.s.
.01n.s.
-.02n.s.

2.5
.1
.7
.0
1.6
1.1
1.2
.3
.6
.2
.1
.6
.2
.0
.1

-.09***
.08**
-.09***
.10***
-.04n.s.
-.07**
-.05n.s.
-.06*
-.04n.s.
-.05*
-.02n.s.
-.02n.s.
-.00n.s.
.05*
.03n.s.

2.0
1.7
2.2
2.5
.3
1.0
.6
.8
.5
.7
.1
.1
.0
.6
.3

-.04n.s.
.16***
-.07n.s.
.15**
-.10*
-.06n.s.
-.04n.s.
-.05n.s.
-.05n.s.
-.03n.s.
.01n.s.
-.01n.s.
-.08n.s.
.04n.s.
-.01n.s.

n.s.

τ

%

Sample 3:
YM.Org Intl.
N=354

1. Hierarchical
Intentional
Acceptable
Alive (secondary)
Worth Exploring
Just

95% CI

Sample 1:
AH.Org
N=773

.36*** 28.4

τ

%

Sample 4:
Immigrants
N=98
τ

%

Sample 5:
Philly Prosm
N=80
τ

%

Sample 7:
2019 mTurk
N=611

τ

%

τ

4.2

.17***

6.8
44.1
7.0
.0
18.2

.18***
.14**
.19***
.02n.s.
.16***

7.5
.21*** 10.6
4.6
.19*** 8.7
8.9
.16*** 6.5
.1. -.15*** 5.3
6.2
.19*** 8.6

-.01n.s.
.12n.s.
.20*
.07n.s.
.11n.s.

.0
3.6
9.6
1.1
3.1

.04n.s.
.16***
.10*
-.03n.s.
.07n.s.

.4
5.8
2.5
.2
1.2

-.0 n.s.
.11***
.03n.s.
.01n.s.
.02n.s.

.3
3.1
.2
.0
.1

-.15*** 5.4
.08** 1.7
-.21*** 10.3
-.07** 1.3
-.08** 1.5

.04n.s.
.14n.s.
-.20*
.15n.s.
.03n.s.
.20*
.07n.s.
.15n.s.
.00n.s.
.15n.s.
.07n.s.
.19*
.15n.s.
.07n.s.
.24*

.3
4.6
9.9
5.4
.2
9.1
1.3
5.8
.0
5.2
1.3
8.3
5.7
1.2
13.1

.08n.s.
.05n.s.
-.09n.s.
.12*
.12**
.09*
.10*
.03n.s.
.02n.s.
.12**
.07n.s.
.13**
.05n.s.
.09n.s.
.05n.s.

1.8
.6
1.8
3.3
3.4
2.0
2.6
.3
.1
3.7
1.2
3.8
.5
1.9
.6

-.01n.s.
.06*
-.09**
.03n.s.
-.03n.s.
.05n.s.
-.04n.s.
.01n.s.
-.02n.s.
.03n.s.
-.01n.s.
.02n.s.
.10***
.01n.s.
.03n.s.

.0
.8
2.2
.3
.3
.6
.4
.0
.1
.2
.0
.1
2.3
.1
.2

-.08**
.08**
-.02n.s.
.03n.s.
-.07**
-.08**
-.07**
-.08**
-.07**
-.07**
-.08**
-.06*
.01n.s.
-.00n.s.
-.03n.s.

6.1

.04n.s.

.5

.16*
.18*
.08n.s.
-.07n.s.
.02n.s.

6.4
8.1
1.4
1.1
.1

.17n.s.
.46***
.17n.s.
.00n.s.
.28**

1.7
8.1
.7
6.3
3.5

-.16* 6.0
-.05n.s. .7
-.07n.s. 1.2
-.03n.s. .2
-.07n.s. 1.4

.3
5.9
1.1
5.3
2.4
1.0
.4
.5
.5
.3
.0
.0
1.5
.4
.0

-.02n.s. .1
.01n.s. .0
-.12n.s. 3.4
.02n.s. .1
-.04n.s. .3
-.06n.s. .9
-.04n.s. .4
-.01n.s. .0
-.03n.s. .2
-.05n.s. .6
-.01n.s. .0
-.04n.s. .5
-.03n.s. .2
.01n.s. .0
-.03n.s. .2

%

Sample 8:
2015 mTurk
N=755

.13**

.16*

.38*** 31.5

Sample 6:
Undergradsm
N=321

7.2

τ

%

.21*** 10.1
.17***
.10***
.15***
-.14***
.07**

7.1
2.3
5.6
4.5
1.3

1.5
1.7
.1
.2
1.2
1.7
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.2
1.6
1.0
.0
.0
.2

Not significant *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 mSample-weighted mean % of variance explained, accounting for direction of relationships, and excluding samples 5 and 6 for using
party as a proxy measure for political ideology. r2 is derived from Kendall’s τ b. Confidence intervals calculated using sample-weighted standard deviations. + or – in parentheses
indicates mean direction of relationship.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Measures in Chapter 1
Measure

611 mTurkers

YourMorals.Org Subjects
Mean
SD
Range
3.25
.98
0-5.00

Mean
3.59

SD
.82

Range
0-5

α
.73

n
1278

Fairness

3.55

.78

.17-5

.70

1276

3.42

.79

.17-5.00

.66

Loyalty

2.60

.99

0-5

.79

1277

2.07

1.00

0-5.00

.78

Authority

2.83

.95

0-5

.78

1286

2.20

1.03

0-5.00

.79

Sanctity

2.58

1.23

0-5

.87

1283

1.60

1.21

0-5.00

.86

Right Wing Authoritarianism

1.94

.99

0-4.53

.91

845

1.36

.95

0-4.93

.90

Social Dominance Orientation

1.57

1.12

0-4.87

.94

494

1.89

1.42

0-6.33

.94

Belief in a Dangerous World

2.34

.92

0-5

.87

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Conservatism

2.53

1.83

0-6

NA

1460

2.06

1.17

0-6.00

NA

Care

Note. The Belief in a Dangerous World scale was not available to YourMorals.Org subjects and
conservatism was measured via a 1-item scale.
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α
.78

Table 5
Duplicating the Relationships Between Primals and the BDW scale
Primals

Good
Safe
Pleasurable
Regenerative
Progressing
Harmless
Cooperative
Stable
Just
Enticing
Interesting
Beautiful
Abundant
Worth Exploring
Meaningful
Improvable
Funny
Alive
Intentional
Needs Me
Interactive
Other tertiary primals
Acceptable
Changing
Hierarchical
Interconnected
Understandable
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Pairwise r with
BDW, Study 5
(Clifton et al., 2019)
122 mTurkers
-.58***
-.68***
-.49***
-.53***
-.72***
-.67***
-.59***
-.39***
-.34***
-.40***
-.22*
-.47***
-.40***
-.32***
-.15
-.46***
-.40***
-.16
-.13
-.19*
-.01
-.16
.19*
.26**
-.19*
-.34***

Pairwise r with
BDW,
Study 2
611 mTurkers
-.60***
-.67***
-.54***
-.54***
-.66***
-.67***
-.52***
-.41***
-.30***
-.46***
-.32***
-.40***
-.42***
-.43***
-.22***
-.44***
-.43***
-.03
.08*
-.13**
.02
.02
.17***
.21***
-.13**
-.41***
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Difference
sig. calculated via
2-tailed Fisher r-toz transformation
-.02
.01
-.05
-.01
.06
.00
.06
-.02
.04
-.06
-.10
.07
-.02
-.11
-.07
.02
-.03
.13
.21*
.06
.03
.18
-.02
-.05
.06
-.07

Table 6
Pairwise rs Between Key Primals and Major Correlates of Conservatism among 611 mTurkers
1
Hierarchical (1)

2

3

.20*** 1

Acceptable (3)

.15*** .24*** 1

Just (5)

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

-.23*** .07
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-.02

Care (7)

-.19*** .11** -.24*** .24*** .04

Fairness (8)

-.18*** -.16*** -.35*** .22*** -.20*** -.10*

.25*** .19*** .26*** .52*** 1
-.05

1
.60*** 1

Loyalty (9)

.28*** .37*** .36*** -.22*** .36*** .10*

.15*** -.02

1

Authority (10)

.37*** .46*** .33*** -.25*** .35*** -.02

.12** -.03

.76*** 1

Purity (11)

.34*** .48*** .29*** -.28*** .30*** -.07

.11** -.07

.65***

.75*** 1

RWA (12)

.39*** .46*** .38*** -.37*** .28*** -.09*

-.18*** -.37

.57***

.68*** .72*** 1

SDO (13)

.32*** .14*** .50*** -.41*** .17*** .02

-.43*** -.54*** .35*** .38*** .37*** .58*** 1

BDW (14)

.21*** .08*
-.05

Conservatism (16)

16

1

Progressing (6)

τ

15

-.28*** 1

.17*** .56*** .27*** .12**

Safe (15)

14

1

Intentional (2)

Worth Exploring (4)

4

.02

-.43*** -.30*** -.66*** -.02

.38*** .17*** .36*** .72*** .79*** .06

.27*** .33*** .30*** -.23*** .29*** .04

-.06

.18***

.31*** .37*** .44*** .22*** 1

-.10*

.13**

.05

-.25*** -.40*** .39***

.00

-.03

-.05

-.67*** 1

.48*** .46*** .62*** .51*** .20*** .08

1

Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Measures 1-6 constitute the main primals of Hierarchy Theory. Measures 7-11 are the five subscales of the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire. Measure 12 is Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Measure 13 is Social Dominance Orientation. Measure 14 is Perry and colleagues
(2013) Belief in a Dangerous World scale. Measure 15 is the PI-99’s Safe subscale. Measure 16 is the 1-item political ideology measure. τUnlike the other
results in this table, conservatism’s relationships were assessed using Kendall’s τ b and then computed into Pearson’s r.

Table 7
Pairwise rs Between Key Primals and Major Correlates of Conservatism among YM.Org Subjects
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1
Hierarchical (1)
n=1424
.15*** 1
Intentional (2)
n=1424 n=1424
.16*** .23*** 1
Acceptable (3)
n=1424 n=1424 n=1424
-.31*** -.09*** -.21*** 1
Worth Exploring (4)
n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424
.09*** .43*** .20*** .04
1
Just (5)
n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424
-.08** -.07** -.02
.21*** .28*** 1
Progressing (6)
n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424 n=1424
-.41*** -.04
-.23*** .29*** -.04
-.02
1
Care (7)
n=973 n=973 n=973 n=973 n=973 n=973 n=1278
-.25*** -.18*** -.28*** .23*** -.14*** -.02
.56*** 1
Fairness (8)
n=969 n=969 n=969 n=969 n=969 n=969 n=1258 n=1276
.36*** .37*** .27*** -.17*** .30*** -.01
-.10*** -.20*** 1
Loyalty (9)
n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=1256 n=1254 n=1277
.41*** .43*** .33*** -.27*** .33*** -.04
-.18*** -.26*** .71*** 1
Authority (10)
n=980 n=980 n=980 n=980 n=980 n=980 n=1264 n=1263 n=1263 n=1286
.37*** .64*** .25*** -.28*** .29*** -.17*** -.06*
-.20*** .57*** .66*** 1
Purity (11)
n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=978 n=1260 n=1259 n=1260 n=1268 n=1283
Right Wing
.53*** .55*** .38*** -.36*** .29*** -.19*** -.37*** -.40*** .62*** .70*** .74*** 1
Authoritarianism (12) n=656 n=656 n=656 n=656 n=656 n=656 n=705 n=704 n=703 n=707 n=706 n=845
Social Dominance
.58*** .33*** .38*** -.40*** .27*** -.04
-.61*** -.61*** .48*** .54*** .44*** .70*** 1
Orientation (13)
n=386 n=386 n=386 n=386 n=386 n=386 n=404 n=403 n=401 n=403 n=405 n=403 n=494
.54*** .45*** .45*** -.36*** .29*** -.02
-.51*** -.54*** .58*** .67*** .63*** .79*** .73*** 1
Conservatismτ (14)
n=1096 n=1096 n=1096 n=1096 n=1096 n=1096 n=958 n=958 n=962 n=967 n=967 n=616 n=355 n=1460
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Measures 1-6 constitute the main primals of Hierarchy Theory. Measures 7-11 are the five subscales of the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire. Measure 14 is the 1-item political ideology measure. τUnlike the other results in this table, Conservatism’s relationships were
assessed using Kendall’s τ b and then computed into Pearson’s r.

Table 8
Twelve Linear Models Exploring Where Hierarchy Theory Fits Within the Nomological Net
Predictors

1: Correlates of Political
Ideology (mTurk)
2: Significant Predictors
from Model 1 (mTurk)
3: Main Predictors from
Model 1 (mTurk)
4: Hierarchy Theory
(mTurk)

Care Fairness* Loyalty Authority
Sanctity RWA*** SDO**
Fairness* RWA*** SDO***

Conservatism

603 35.4%

Conservatism

607 35.4%

RWA*** SDO***

Conservatism

608 35.0%

Hierarchical*** Intentional***
Acceptable** Worth Exploring*** Just***
Progressing*
Hierarchical*** Intentional***
Acceptable** Worth Exploring*** Just*
Progressing
Just** Alive*** Intentional*** Needs
Me*** Interactive** Acceptable**
Hierarchical*** (no other significant
primals)
Alive* Intentional*** Acceptable***
Hierarchical*** Interconnected***
Changing* (no other significant primals)
Fairness RWA*** SDO*** Hierarchical
Intentional Acceptable Worth Exploring
Just* Progressing
Hierarchical*** Intentional***
Acceptable*** Worth Exploring*** Just**
Progressing***
Hierarchical*** Intentional***
Acceptable*** Worth Exploring*** Just*
Progressing**
Care* Fairness*** Loyalty Authority***
Sanctity***
Care*** Fairness*** Loyalty Authority***
Sanctity***
Safe*

Conservatism

604 19.3%

Conservatism

1089 43.2%

Conservatism

584 21.5%

Conservatism

1069 47.2%

Conservatism

601 36.1%

RWA

604 46.8%

RWA

649 51.6%

Conservatism

605 29.0%

RWA

605 67.7%

4: Hierarchy Theory
(YourMorals.Org)
5: All 26 Primals (mTurk)

5: All 26 Primals
(YourMorals.Org
6: Model 2 & Hierarchy
Theory (mTurk)
7: Hierarchy Theory
Predicting RWA (mTurk
7: Hierarchy Theory
Predicting RWA
(YourMorals.Org)
8:Moral Foundations
Predicting Conservatism
9: Moral Foundations
Predicting RWA
10: Safe (mTurk

DV

10: Safe (YourMorals.Org) Safe***
11: Safe’s Seven Tertiary
Primals (mTurk)
11: Safe’s Seven Tertiary
Primals (YourMorals.Org)
12: Just only (mTurk)

Conservatism
Conservatism

Pleasurable Regenerative Progressing Conservatism
Harmless Cooperative Stable* Just***
Pleasurable Regenerative** Progressing Conservatism
Harmless*** Cooperative*** Stable*
Just***
Just***
Conservatism

12: Just only
Just***
(YourMorals.Org)
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Conservatism
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df

r2

Model

.6%
1094

1.0%

603 10.6%
1088 15.5%

609

7.4%

1094

6.1%

Figure 2
The Great Chain of Being by Fray Diego de Valades (1579)
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for the Primals Inventory for Six Samples in Chapter 3
Sample 1: AH.org
N=3,925
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Sample 2:
YM.org
N=1,843
M
SD
2.86
.66
2.58
.80
2.63 1.05
2.90 1.02
2.79 1.24
2.28 1.08
2.83 1.13
2.18 1.09
2.13 1.05
3.35
.76
3.46 1.06
3.14 1.09
3.48
.99
3.68
.96
3.06 1.34
3.24
.94
3.18 1.22
1.82 1.05
1.59 1.41
2.13 1.47
1.75 1.10

Sample 3:
mTurk
N=692
M
SD
2.91
.65
2.61
.73
2.93
.93
2.86
.87
2.53 1.05
2.45
.95
2.52 1.01
2.18
.82
2.78
.95
3.28
.71
3.18 1.00
3.25
.91
3.36
.91
3.33
.84
3.28 1.09
3.20
.81
2.93 1.01
2.66
.86
2.61 1.05
2.93 1.14
2.37
.96

Sample 4:
Immigrants
N=98
M
SD
2.90
.52
2.52
.65
2.81
.88
3.08
.78
2.40
.89
1.97
.79
2.49
.86
2.21
.76
2.67
.89
3.35
.55
3.35
.80
3.24
.78
3.50
.71
3.31
.74
3.48
.84
3.17
.75
2.92
.92
3.08
.63
3.23
.84
3.42 1.00
2.54
.91

Sample 5:
Philly Pros
N=110
M
SD
3.18
.62
2.91
.72
3.45
.88
3.18
.83
2.69 1.08
2.52 1.01
2.91
.97
2.50
.93
2.86
.87
3.52
.62
3.55
.83
3.33
.86
3.77
.74
3.56
.79
3.69
.92
3.45
.75
2.98 1.05
2.58
.98
2.43 1.19
3.34 1.29
1.91 1.01

Sample 6:
Undergrads
N=473
M
SD
2.93
.52
2.63
.61
2.99
.84
3.05
.76
2.64
.97
2.18
.81
2.60
.86
2.15
.79
2.81
.80
3.37
.57
3.41
.78
3.23
.81
3.58
.71
3.55
.74
3.35
.92
3.16
.70
2.90
.92
2.74
.76
2.68 1.01
2.99 1.11
2.51
.83

Sample-weighted
mean
N=7,025
M
SD
α
3.13
.61
.96
2.81
.76
.94
3.12
.93
.84
3.17
.88
.79
2.75 1.12
.88
2.51 1.04
.86
2.91 1.06
.79
2.33
.99
.78
2.63
.95
.76
3.61
.64
.92
3.64
.91
.82
3.53
.88
.76
3.71
.83
.76
3.82
.78
.73
3.40 1.13
.83
3.47
.78
.75
3.28 1.04
.86
2.46
.95
.89
2.33 1.28
.87
2.95 1.25
.89
2.08 1.04
.86

M
SD
α
α
α
α
α
α
Good
3.31
.60
.96
.95
.96
.95
.96
.95
Safe
2.97
.77
.94
.93
.93
.93
.94
.93
Pleasurable
3.38
.90
.84
.85
.79
.83
.84
.85
Regenerative
3.36
.85
.79
.84
.68
.78
.77
.79
Progressing
2.79 1.11
.89
.90
.82
.76
.88
.88
Harmless
2.68 1.08
.87
.87
.81
.74
.84
.83
Cooperative
3.06 1.08
.80
.81
.76
.69
.77
.76
Stable
2.43 1.00
.79
.83
.65
.70
.77
.78
Just
2.80
.92
.75
.80
.78
.78
.69
.75
Enticing
3.82
.59
.92
.92
.93
.90
.92
.92
Interesting
3.85
.86
.82
.84
.78
.79
.77
.79
Beautiful
3.80
.79
.75
.82
.73
.67
.68
.73
Abundant
3.90
.76
.75
.81
.74
.67
.76
.77
Worth Exploring
4.02
.70
.73
.79
.68
.67
.68
.70
Meaningful
3.57 1.08
.83
.86
.80
.77
.79
.82
Improvable
3.66
.72
.73
.78
.76
.71
.72
.73
Funny
3.45
.98
.86
.89
.79
.77
.85
.83
Alive
2.65
.94
.90
.90
.88
.82
.91
.87
Intentional
2.53 1.32
.89
.90
.79
.77
.84
.84
Needs Me
3.28 1.19
.89
.90
.84
.89
.92
.90
Interactive
2.12 1.05
.87
.87
.77
.82
.86
.83
Other tertiary primals
Acceptable
1.32
.80
.78 1.44 1.02
.85 1.71
.84
.69 1.42
.78
.81 1.45
.78
.74 1.43
.73
.79 1.40
.85
.79
Changing
3.43
.78
.80 3.02 1.00
.85 3.15
.77
.71 3.39
.69
.76 3.00
.84
.78 3.30
.73
.82 3.29
.83
.80
Hierarchical
2.23 1.09
.81 2.21 1.28
.85 2.51
.96
.77 2.45
.88
.74 2.35
.97
.75 2.43
.91
.81 2.27 1.10
.82
Interconnected
3.62
.97
.82 3.06 1.28
.89 3.01
.96
.77 3.36
.80
.79 2.68
.98
.75 3.13
.81
.75 3.37 1.03
.83
Understandable
2.68
.95
.71 2.57 1.13
.81 2.61
.87
.61 2.22
.88
.77 2.81
.91
.73 2.11
.81
.72 2.61
.98
.73
Note. Bolded α values indicates instances where α<.70. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. α indicates standardized Cronbach’s α. Range for primals is 0-5.

Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Additional Measures for Six Samples in Chapter 3
Sample 1:
Sample 2:
Sample 3:
Sample 4:
Sample 5:
Sample 6:
AH.Org
YM.org
mTurk
Immigrants
Philly Pros
Undergrads
n
M SD
α
n
M SD
α
n
M
SD
α n
M SD
α
n
M SD
α
n
M SD
α
Job Success
na
na
na
na na 1639 6.08 1.87 na 476 51125 59087 na na
na
na na 98 .46 .27 na 426 233
70 na
Job Satisfaction
1-5
na
na
na na
na
na
na na na
na
na na na
na
na na 110 3.79 .90 .94 473 3.47 .82 .92
Depression
1-4 1291 1.77 .61 .93
na
na
na na 692 1.77
.80 .94 na
na
na na na
na
na na 473 1.65 .56 .88
Suicide
na
na
na
na na
na
na
na na na
na
na na na
na
na na 110 1.35 .70 na 473 1.60 .78 na
Life Satisfaction
1-7 1072 4.94 1.35 .88 328 3.94 1.54 .89 692 4.57 1.58 .93 98 4.49 1.30 .85 110 4.90 1.25 .87 473 4.69 1.27 .87
Positive Emotion
1-11 1118 8.33 1.86 .87
na
na
na na 692 7.65 2.21 .91 98 7.63 1.56 .82 110 8.05 1.78 .88 473 7.64 1.66 .88
Engagement
1-11 1118 8.64 1.60 .69
na
na
na na 692 7.77 1.70 .69 na
na
na na 110 8.47 1.54 .68 473 7.88 1.49 .68
Relationship
1-11 1118 8.26 2.09 .82
na
na
na na 692 7.94 2.27 .88 98 8.01 1.75 .77 110 8.36 2.08 .81 473 7.97 1.84 .81
Meaning
1-11 1118 8.57 2.04 .90
na
na
na na 692 7.79 2.32 .91 na
na
na na 110 8.67 1.76 .84 473 7.72 1.72 .84
Accomplishment
1-11 1118 8.73 1.70 .81
na
na
na na 692 7.91 1.99 .85 na
na
na na 110 8.77 1.23 .78 473 7.89 1.44 .78
Overall Flourishing
1-11 1118 8.51 1.59 .94
na
na
na na 692 7.81 1.89 .96 na
na
na na 110 8.46 1.46 .93 473 7.82 1.35 .93
Health
1-11 1118 8.11 2.26 .92
na
na
na na 692 7.65 2.26 .93 na
na
na na 110 8.09 2.13 .91 473 7.77 2.00 .91
Negative Emotion
1-11 1118 5.40 2.23 .77
na
na
na na 692 5.19 2.34 .84 98 5.53 1.82 .73 110 5.38 2.06 .67 473 5.90 1.67 .67
Note. Bolded α values indicate instances where α<.70. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. α indicates standardized Cronbach’s α. na indicates not applicable
Range
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